The US-Saudi nuclear deal was announced in the midst of what has, as of 2026, become America’s Third Gulf War. The news broke just as Saudi Arabia and the US launched air raids against Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, in retaliation for alleged drone attacks directed Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities.

The future details of a deal – which would allow for exports of US civilian nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia – remain uncertain. However, past events raise the question of whether Riyadh would ever use such a program to eventually develop nuclear weapons.

A range of historical factors have discouraged nuclear proliferation in Saudi Arabia, but this has changed over the last decade with the rise of two leaders: Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, who came to the throne in 2015, and US President Donald Trump – both in his first term from 2016 to 2020, and during his second term and ongoing war against Iran.

In 2010, I wrote a chapter entitled “Saudi Petro-Nukes? Riyadh’s Nuclear Intentions and Regime Survival Strategies”. In it, I argued that, historically, Saudi Arabia had signalled no interest in a civilian nuclear program, let alone the possibility of developing a nuclear weapons program. This was because of two major factors: US pressure, and Saudi Arabia’s position in the world economy.

In 2003, on the eve of America’s war to eliminate Iraq’s alleged nuclear program, news emerged of Iran’s clandestine nuclear facilities. Policymakers presumed that the Islamic Republic’s program would spark a regional nuclear arms race, and that Saudi Arabia, its regional rival, would develop its own nuclear arsenal to deter Iran.

Saudi Arabia has long had the financial means to invest in a nuclear program, whether civilian or military.........

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