PAKISTAN is trapped. On its western border, the guns may have fallen silent for now, but the region remains far from stable. Each pause in fighting gives the hope that the worst is over, yet history suggests otherwise. Pakistan continues to face a tough choice: use force without gaining lasting results or pursue diplomacy, which has repeatedly failed. For decades, Pakistan’s western border policy depended on the idea that a friendly government in Kabul would secure the frontier and reduce threats. However, the reality has been much more complex. Past Kabul administrations failed to stop cross-border militancy and the Taliban’s return has made the situation worse. It is therefore fair to say that Pakistan’s policy was based on unrealistic hopes and a change is necessary.

In the past, the Pakistani response to this threat relied heavily on dialogue and engagement, with the hope that cooperation from Kabul would lead to a lasting solution. Those efforts have produced negligible results. Commitments were made, but promises were not kept. Therefore, Pakistan was forced to shift its policy and resort to the use of force. While military operations have successfully disrupted militant networks and their activities, as is evident by the reduction in cross-border activity, using force alone has limits. It can push the problem under the carpet, but it will not resolve it. History shows that militant groups adapt, change locations and wait for the next opportunity.

Islamabad needs to carefully consider its options. Relying exclusively on military action could provoke retaliation, while relying solely on diplomacy might be seen as a sign of weakness. Neither approach, by itself, will provide a lasting solution. Pakistan’s strategy should be to engage immediate threats militarily, while keeping lines of communication open with Kabul. Pakistan also needs to keep the border crossing points closed as a bargaining chip. But it must be kept in mind that the border closures and disrupted trade routes will affect Central Asia and the broader region. This can be used to Pakistan’s advantage, as linking its western border to the region’s wider stability can turn a bilateral issue into a mutual regional responsibility.

The instability emanating from its western border is slowing down some of Pakistan’s most important long-term economic projects. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), specifically its transition into the crucial Phase-II industrialization, has lost momentum in recent years, largely due to security concerns. Similarly, progress on the multi-billion-dollar Reko Diq project—one of the country’s most significant mining investments—depends heavily on a stable security environment in Baluchistan. As long as militant groups operating from across the border continue to pose a threat, these projects will struggle to move forward at full pace.

This highlights a key point: in the modern era, security and economics are two sides of the same coin. Without economic dividends for the local population, peace is unlikely and without a stable security environment, economic initiatives will fail. Pakistan’s policymakers need to recognize this fact. The current pause in fighting offers a brief opportunity for Islamabad and Kabul to reexamine their strategies and develop a broader regional framework. Bilaterally, Pakistan should establish a dedicated border coordination mechanism involving tribal elders from both sides, along with military representatives, to share intelligence, verify militant movements and prevent them before they carry out their actions. The reopening of the Torkham and Chaman borders and the resumption of transit trade should depend on verified reductions in cross-border violence.

Regionally, Pakistan should view China not simply as a mediator but as a key stakeholder having leverage over Kabul, which Pakistan itself lacks. China’s diplomatic ties and financial influence in Afghanistan make its involvement important. Islamabad should insist that Chinese investments in Afghanistan—such as reconstruction, infrastructure and energy—must be linked to Kabul’s verifiable actions against cross-border militancy. Projects like CPEC, Gwadar and regional connectivity depend on stability. Beijing cannot claim interest in stability and stay passive during turmoil. To safeguard its investments, China must use its influence to ensure Kabul’s territory is not used against Pakistan. Pakistan has tried escalation. It has tried patience. Neither has moved it from the place it has been stuck for decades. The trap will only open if Pakistan can use both force and diplomacy intermittently.

—The writer is a freelance columnist based in Manchester, UK

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