By 2026, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia has evolved from a predominantly transport-infrastructure programme into a multidimensional instrument of economic statecraft. It now operates in a more rigorous digital, green, and geopolitically contested environment.

ASEAN remains central to China’s connectivity and supply-chain strategies, but the terms of engagement are shifting under the weight of trade and tariff wars, selective decoupling, de-risking, the contested “overcapacity” narrative, and recurrent “China collapse” discourses. The intensifying US-China strategic competition, manifest in expanded US-Asia Pacific basing and security, has become an emerging hurdle.

ASEAN is not choosing sides. China treats ASEAN as a vital economic and strategic buffer, while the United States and its partners are expanding alternative connectivity architectures: the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the EU Global Gateway, and Japan/India-led initiatives, often alongside the Blue Dot Network and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

This competitive connectivity gives ASEAN governments more leverage, but also imposes higher transaction costs, regulatory complexity, and difficult choices between competing infrastructure statecraft models.

Since the pandemic and the tariff wars, global value chains have been reorganizing, and ASEAN has become a primary beneficiary of “China 1,” near-shoring, and regionalization. Chinese manufacturers are moving final assembly, packaging, and some intermediate production to Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Cambodia.

The BRI has adapted accordingly. Rather than only mega-dams or railways, it now supports industrial parks, logistics hubs, special economic zones, and cross-border e-commerce infrastructure. Chinese loans and private capital are flowing into ASEAN-based production, deepening regional economic........

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