menu_open Columnists
We use cookies to provide some features and experiences in QOSHE

More information  .  Close

Kicking the Ladder: How the Modern Monetary Order Unlearned Its Own History. Part 2

465 0
22.10.2026

Kicking the Ladder: How the Modern Monetary Order Unlearned Its Own History. Part 2

Part I traced a system built on the advice of four economists; even know their theories are not theology. The next half-century is a case study in what happens when that advice – however flawed – is abandoned, and in what happens to the few countries that never got the memo.

Part II: Dismantling the Scaffolding, 1971–2026

1971: The Anchor Goes Overboard

The IMF, once the keeper of a par-value system, became chiefly a crisis lender with conditions attached, which is the role that gave much of the global South its most memorable relationship with it.

Polanyi’s fictitious commodity had been invited back into the market, this time with a very large trading floor.

The arithmetic behind the change is known as the policy trilemma: a country cannot simultaneously have a 1) fixed exchange rate, 2) free capital movement and 3) an independent monetary policy, give up on trying, it’s simply impossible.

You want to know why is it impossible? Well, Bretton Woods sacrificed the second of them. The new era sacrificed either the first or the third, depending on the country and the year, which is a polite way of saying that governments gave up the ability to steer their own economies and called it modernization, that’s why.

And it’s the prefect lead-up to the next two decades.

The 1980s: A Decade, Misplaced

When the debt crisis hit in the early 1980s, the IMF and the World Bank attached policy packages to their loans. In 1989, the economist John Williamson labeled a list of ten reforms the “Washington Consensus”, meaning what the capital’s institutions could all agree Latin America needed. In the popular telling, the list hardened into a doctrine of three verbs: “privatize, liberalize, open up”.

As usual, the results were not what the brochure promised. Latin America grew at a sluggish 1% a year per person in the 1980s and only picked up slightly to 1.4% a year in the 1990s, according to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). The UN’s 2017 World Economic and Social Survey showed that the region only returned to the 1980 level of GDP per capita in 1994.

The same survey shows what happened to those who skipped the medicine. Contrary to what the Washington Consensus dictated, East Asia, and to a lesser extent South Asia, pursued strategies in which the state played an important role, and a “great divergence” opened across the developing world. South and East Asia grew by an average of 7.2% a year in the 1980s. Latin America, Africa and Western Asia managed 1.5, 1.7 and 1.7%, respectively.

Africa’s story is written in its trade statistics. UNCTAD’s own data show primary goods, meaning everything other than manufactures, making up 76.7% of the continent’s merchandise exports in 2025, and its 2022 Economic Development in Africa Report found commodities above 60% of merchandise exports in 45 of Africa’s 54 countries. Hardly the signature of successful industrial upgrading.

In Zambia, which adopted IMF and World Bank-backed trade reform in 1991, textile and clothing employment fell from over 25,000 in the 1980s to below 10,000 by 2002, despite a roughly 35% population growth between 1991-2002, and a 2006 study for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Linked to the German SDP party), estimates the contraction at over 60% within a decade.

By 1998 the World Bank’s own chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz, was lecturing on moving “toward the post-Washington Consensus”. By........

© New Eastern Outlook