Poland’s Three Decades of Strategic Rigidity: The Russia Policy That Never Was. Part 2

Poland has spent three decades without a coherent strategy towards Russia — oscillating between treating it as irrelevant and as an existential threat.

Alternative Models: Pragmatism Without Surrender

Turkey has demonstrated the ability to maintain pragmatic ties with Russia while being a NATO member and opposing it in several regions. Examples include the acquisition of the S-400 system despite Western opposition, the TurkStream pipeline, significant trade volumes, and its mediation efforts such as the Istanbul talks and the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

Hungary, under Viktor Orbán, was for years a model of how a NATO and EU member state could maintain pragmatic relations with Russia without creating excessive dependency. Budapest consistently kept channels open at the highest level, negotiated long-term gas contracts, and pursued the Paks II nuclear project with Rosatom—despite pressure from Western allies. This was not an ideological “pro-Russian” policy but a calculation of national interest: energy security, price stability, and regional influence.

After the 2026 change of government and the rise of Péter Magyar’s Tisza party, many expected a fundamental shift. Indeed, the language changed: the new administration is more pro-European in rhetoric, more pro-Ukrainian in public declarations, and more cautious in openly displaying contacts with Moscow. Yet the underlying structure of Hungary’s interest-based policy has not changed. Budapest continues to rely on existing energy infrastructure, has not terminated long-term contracts with Gazprom, and Paks II has not been halted. The difference is primarily narrative—not structural. The continuity of Hungarian policy only underscores the point: interest-based pragmatism towards Russia is not the monopoly of one political camp.........

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