War rarely begins with a single event. More often than not, it emerges from years of mounting tensions, failed diplomacy and strategic miscalculations. The current war against Iran is no exception. What appears today as an open military confrontation is the culmination of a long process: the erosion of diplomatic frameworks, intensifying regional rivalries, and a shifting balance of power across West Asia. Yet the significance of this conflict extends beyond the battlefield. The war with Iran is likely to reshape the region’s political and security architecture, potentially altering alliances and strategic alignments for years to come.

The path to the current war was not linear. Rather, it resembled a recurring spiral of confrontation, diplomacy, partial agreements and renewed escalation.

For decades, tensions between Iran and its adversaries followed a familiar pattern: periods of crisis would lead to attempts at diplomatic resolution, temporary arrangements would reduce immediate pressure, and eventually the cycle would begin again.

For decades, tensions between Iran and its adversaries followed a familiar pattern: periods of crisis would lead to attempts at diplomatic resolution, temporary arrangements would reduce immediate pressure, and eventually the cycle would begin again.

This dynamic was visible as early as the late 1980s and 1990s, when indirect confrontations between Iran and the United States periodically escalated but rarely developed into open war. In the 2000s, disputes over Iran’s nuclear programme produced another cycle of tension and diplomacy, culminating in negotiations that temporarily reduced the risk of conflict. The nuclear agreement reached in 2015 represented the most significant effort to stabilise relations through diplomacy.

Yet these arrangements always rested on fragile political foundations. The withdrawal of the first Trump administration from the nuclear agreement marked a turning point in this long cycle. With the collapse of the most important diplomatic framework governing the dispute, the spiral of confrontation accelerated once again. Economic pressure intensified, regional rivalries deepened and the mechanisms that had previously helped contain escalation gradually eroded.

For years, however, this confrontation remained largely indirect. The conflict unfolded through proxy wars, covert operations, cyber campaigns and targeted strikes rather than direct interstate warfare. Despite repeated crises, a form of uneasy deterrence still existed. None of the parties involved believed that a large-scale regional war would serve their interests.

Two developments helped change this calculation. The first was the regional shock produced by the events of 7 October and the subsequent war in Gaza, which dramatically destabilized the regional environment. The second was the shifting balance of power following the collapse of the Assad government in Syria. Together, these developments altered strategic perceptions across the region. What had once appeared too risky now began to look, for some actors, like a window of opportunity.

The war against Iran therefore did not emerge suddenly. It was the culmination of a long spiral of confrontation in which diplomacy repeatedly failed to produce a sustainable framework for regional stability.

The strategic logic of the conflict

To understand the dynamics of the war, it is necessary to examine the strategic objectives of the key actors involved.

Israel’s objectives are relatively clear. For decades, Israeli strategic thinking has been shaped by the goal of preserving military and technological superiority in the region. From this perspective, Iran represents the most significant long-term challenge to Israeli regional dominance.

Israeli policymakers increasingly view the current moment as a historic opportunity to permanently eliminate Iran’s potential to emerge as a power capable of challenging that dominance. The destruction—or at least the long-term degradation—of Iran’s strategic capabilities therefore appears to be the central objective driving Israeli military action.

Israeli policymakers increasingly view the current moment as a historic opportunity to permanently eliminate Iran’s potential to emerge as a power capable of challenging that dominance. The destruction—or at least the long-term degradation—of Iran’s strategic capabilities therefore appears to be the central objective driving Israeli military action.

READ: Report: Washington gives Israel one week to end Iran war

The United States, by contrast, appears to lack a coherent grand strategy for West Asia. During the Cold War and the decades that followed, Washington often pursued a balancing approach among regional powers. In recent years, however, that strategy has become increasingly unclear. American objectives in the current conflict remain ambiguous: is the goal regime change in Tehran, support for Iranian domestic opposition, containment of Iran’s nuclear programme, or the reduction of its regional alliances and missile capabilities?

Different statements from American officials have pointed to different objectives, making it difficult to identify a consistent strategic framework.

In practice, US policy increasingly appears shaped by Israeli security calculations rather than a clearly defined American regional strategy.

In practice, US policy increasingly appears shaped by Israeli security calculations rather than a clearly defined American regional strategy.

Tehran, for its part, approaches the conflict from a more straightforward perspective: survival. For Iranian policymakers, the primary objective is not regional dominance but the preservation of the state and the avoidance of strategic vulnerability. Iranian leaders have long argued that their missile programme and network of regional partners function as a deterrent designed to prevent external intervention. Whether one agrees with this assessment or not, it reflects a strategic logic that is internally consistent.

In this triangular dynamic, Iran may paradoxically be the most predictable actor. Its strategic behaviour is largely driven by the imperative of regime survival and the avoidance of strategic encirclement. Israel seeks to eliminate a perceived long-term threat, while the United States appears to oscillate between different objectives without a clearly articulated end state.

These differing strategic logics make the conflict difficult to resolve. Each actor is pursuing a different vision of regional order, and none of them currently appear willing to abandon their core strategic assumptions.

Possible pathways to the war’s end

After eleven days of war, several conclusions have already begun to emerge. Perhaps the most important is that Israel’s most ambitious objectives appear difficult to achieve. Israeli decision-makers appear to have significantly underestimated Iran’s military capabilities and resilience. The expectation that a rapid campaign could decisively cripple Iran’s strategic infrastructure has proven far more complicated in practice.

The United States faces a different dilemma. Because American objectives in the conflict remain fluid, Washington retains considerable flexibility in declaring success. Without a clearly defined strategic objective, it becomes possible to frame a wide range of outcomes as a form of victory.

Iran’s objective, meanwhile, remains consistent: survival and the reduction of the permanent threat of war. Tehran does not need a decisive military victory to achieve this goal; avoiding strategic defeat may be sufficient.

Against this backdrop, three possible scenarios for ending the war appear plausible.

The first is a negotiated ceasefire. In theory, this represents the most rational outcome. If all sides conclude that continued escalation will only increase costs without producing decisive results, diplomatic mediation could lead to a ceasefire agreement. However, such a scenario faces serious obstacles. Iran’s experience with diplomacy in recent years—particularly negotiations with the Trump administration, which twice coincided with military strikes during ongoing talks—has significantly eroded trust in diplomatic processes.

The second scenario is the continuation of the war. Yet this option appears increasingly costly for all sides. Even within the first days of the conflict, the economic consequences for global energy markets and international trade routes have become evident. Moreover, the battlefield itself increasingly resembles a strategic stalemate. Prolonging the war may therefore fail to produce a substantially different outcome.

The third scenario may ultimately prove the most likely: a unilateral declaration of victory by the United States. In this scenario, Washington could announce that its objectives have been achieved and suspend military operations, while encouraging Israel to do the same. Iran, after several days of continued retaliation, might also gradually reduce its attacks, allowing the conflict to transition into a de facto ceasefire without a formal agreement.

Such outcomes are not unusual in modern warfare. Many conflicts end not with negotiated peace treaties but with tacit understandings that further escalation serves no one’s interests.

The reshaping of regional alliances

Whatever form the war’s conclusion takes, its political consequences are likely to reshape the strategic landscape of West Asia. Over the past several decades, Western powers have attempted a wide range of strategies to contain or transform Iran’s role in the region. These have included economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, covert operations, proxy conflicts and, now, direct military confrontation. The cumulative result of these efforts may ultimately lead to a different conclusion: that Iran is not a temporary challenge but a permanent feature of the regional order.

If the current war ends without the collapse of the Iranian state or the elimination of its strategic capabilities, Western policymakers may increasingly be forced to accept a new reality. Iran will remain a significant regional actor whose influence cannot simply be removed through external pressure.

This realization could gradually reshape regional diplomacy. States that previously sought to align themselves firmly within opposing blocs may begin to pursue more pragmatic strategies of balancing and hedging. Rather than rigid alliances, the region may evolve toward more flexible arrangements in which states cooperate on certain issues while competing on others.

In this sense, the war’s most lasting consequence may not be military but political. The conflict could mark the moment when the long effort to eliminate Iran as a strategic factor in West Asia finally gives way to a different approach: learning to live with it.

OPINION: The limits of Iran’s emerging ‘pragmatist prescription’

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

© Middle East Monitor