In recent days, major US and international media outlets, including The Washington Post, Sky News and The Wall Street Journal, have focused on Washington’s reassessment of its military footprint in the Middle East after the Iran war, while Turkey’s Anadolu Agency has closely followed these reports. Reports by these outlets have discussed reviews being conducted by the US Department of War concerning the redeployment of forces in the Middle East, reductions in the US military presence there, and the absence of plans to rebuild bases that were damaged.

These reports attribute this undertaking  to the extensive damage sustained by US bases during the war and argue that their presence exposed the vulnerability of the model of large fixed bases located close to Iran.

These reports attribute this undertaking  to the extensive damage sustained by US bases during the war and argue that their presence exposed the vulnerability of the model of large fixed bases located close to Iran.

The reports have also highlighted the cost of the war, which, according to Pentagon estimates, will have exceeded $37 billion by the end of next month, excluding the cost of rebuilding these damaged bases. This comes despite the fact that the war against Iran has not yet ended and its consequences for the region have yet to be determined. This raises a central question about how new these policy directions really are: are they indeed a consequence of the war with Iran, or do they represent a step in the implementation of a longer-term strategy pursued by successive US administrations over the past decade?

A review of the strategies pursued by successive US administrations, from President Barack Obama’s administration to the present day, points to the implementation of a gradual US withdrawal from the region following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. From this perspective, today’s proposals to redeploy US forces in the region, refrain from rebuilding American bases destroyed in the war, and reduce the US military presence there represent an advanced stage in the implementation of these earlier strategies. Since Obama’s first term, US strategy in the Middle East focused on withdrawing from Iraq and transferring security responsibility to the Iraqis, while maintaining a long-term relationship with them. It also emphasised key security relationships with allied states in the region, Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and sought to make their militaries and security systems more capable of working together. The strategy also focused on permanently integrating Israel into the region, while renewing the US commitment to Israel’s security. It described Iranian behaviour as posing an increasingly serious threat, despite continued engagement with Tehran and efforts to alter the course of its nuclear programme. During Obama’s second term, the strategy explicitly stressed the need for partners capable of defending themselves, and for US investment in building their capabilities, while maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge. The emphasis was on strengthening these partners rather than relying solely on US forces, in order to counter Iranian aggression and influence in the region.

The strategy of Donald Trump’s first administration stated explicitly that disengagement from the region would not insulate the United States from its problems there, while stressing the need to maintain only the necessary US military presence. At the same time, it emphasised supporting allies in building their capabilities and developing integrared defence systems in order to confront shared threats in the Middle East, including Iran. The administration put this approach into practice through decisions to move Israel from the US European Command to the US Central Command (CENTCOM), and through the signing of the Abraham Accords to normalise relations between Israel and........

© Middle East Monitor