For most countries, electricity is an economic input. For Syria, it is something more fundamental: a test of whether the state can again provide basic services, reconnect its regions and translate political transition into material improvement. Factories cannot reopen, hospitals cannot function reliably and displaced families cannot be expected to return where power remains intermittent. Syria’s first peace dividend, therefore, must be electricity.

Yet the central question is not simply how many megawatts Syria can add. It is whether Damascus can transform foreign fuel, finance and technology into durable national capacity. If it succeeds, energy diplomacy could become an instrument of reconstruction and sovereignty. If it fails, Syria may merely exchange one form of external dependence for another.

A new map of energy dependence

Syria’s emerging energy system is already regional. Qatar began financing gas deliveries through Jordan to the Deir Ali power station, with two million cubic metres per day intended to generate around 400 megawatts. Gas from Azerbaijan has also flowed through Türkiye’s Kilis connection, with financial support from Qatar. The initial plan envisaged supplies of up to six million cubic metres per day, potentially supporting about 1,200 megawatts of generation.

These arrangements demonstrate energy diplomacy in practice. Qatar provides financial support, Jordan and Türkiye offer transit routes, Azerbaijan supplies gas, and Syria receives the energy needed to restart economic life. What appears to be a fuel transaction is, in reality, a new network of political relationships.

These arrangements demonstrate energy diplomacy in practice. Qatar provides financial support, Jordan and Türkiye offer transit routes, Azerbaijan supplies gas, and Syria receives the energy needed to restart economic life. What appears to be a fuel transaction is, in reality, a new network of political relationships.

Doha and Ankara are not acting solely out of humanitarian or commercial considerations. Energy assistance gives both governments an opportunity to consolidate their influence in post-war Syria and help shape the emerging political and economic order in the Levant. Damascus must benefit from this competition without allowing reconstruction to become a division of strategic assets among external patrons.

The scale of........

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