The utility of regimes, the inconvenience of democracy

Every time a glimmer of hope seemed to open up for a less extremist Iran, the United States and its allies did everything possible to prevent it from happening.

Al-Qaeda did not exist in Iraq prior to 2003. There was no ISIS in Syria before 2011. There was no Hezbollah before the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. There was no Hamas in 1967. There were no Taliban before the Deobandi movement, born from colonial India and its scars. The list goes on, but now, two days after the appointment of a “radical hawk” like Mojtaba Khamenei to the position of Supreme Leader of Iran, the question many are asking is: what will the present lead to?

Predicting the future is impossible, but when uncovering the meaning of some decisive moments of the past and present, it is worth starting with an old Yiddish proverb: “A half-truth is a whole lie.” The war launched against Iran by Donald Trump and his allies – without any endorsement from the UN or the US Congress – has nothing to do with peace in the Middle East, nor with rights and democracy. Anyone who thinks otherwise is saying that kind of half-truth, as is clear to anyone who knows history.

Every popular movement in the Middle East that has called for parliamentary democracy since 1876 has been opposed by some of the major Western countries: from Egypt in the time of Ahmad Urabi to Iran under Mohammad Mossadegh, passing through Algeria in 1991 and dozens of other contexts and historical phases.

When millions of people in the region rebelled against the regimes keeping them subdued at the beginning of the last decade, several countries on both sides of the Atlantic and their allies (starting with the Saudi regime, which ranks third globally in terms of number of executions) managed to prevent an alternative to them from emerging. Regimes are “useful” because they guarantee “stability,” meaning control.

This was also the case in the 1970s, when Iran was the world's largest buyer of US weapons. At the head of that version of Iran was a dictator, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who considered women “incapable” and useful “only if they're beautiful.” His father, Reza Khan, who came to power in 1921 following a British-led coup, was a Nazi sympathizer. As late as June 1977, the Red Cross reported that 900 of the 3,000 political prisoners in Iranian jails had been tortured. In the words of British historian Michael Axworthy: “Quiet dissent was no longer an option: the regime was intent on erasing all dissent.”

How did this situation come about? We need to rewind the tape to the turbulent months of 1953 and the historical processes that led to the overthrow of the democratically elected government led by Mossadegh in favor of Reza Pahlavi's return to power. In the words of historians Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne: “The Anglo-American operation interrupted Iran's drive to assert sovereignty over its resources and helped bring to an end a heated chapter in the history of the country's nationalist and democratic movement. These consequences resonated with dramatic effects in the years that followed.”

Those effects referred to reached their peak in 1979, when the “Iranian revolution” changed its character, becoming an “Islamic revolution” within a few weeks. Despite the enormous popular participation in the events of 1979, the regime led by Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini immediately represented a paradox: the very concept of popular sovereignty was stigmatized by the Iranian leader as a colonial imposition aimed at undermining the concept of the umma (the community of Muslim believers).

The presence of citizens with sovereignty was not considered necessary: there was only room for “subjects” in need of guidance. The “guidance” Khomeini appealed to was a peculiar interpretation of the main tenets of Islam. Until the rise of Velayat-e faqih (the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), the totalitarian doctrine he devised to control every aspect of the country's government, the local Shiite clergy had largely agreed on the need to limit their influence to the spiritual sphere. It was Khomeini himself who gave the clergy the right and legitimacy to rule the state. “It was precisely on this point,” to quote French scholar Laurence Louër, “that Khomeini proved himself to be a 'revolutionary'.”

The regime in power in Iran over the next four decades made itself guilty of serious crimes against humanity and fierce internal repression, the latest of which took place just a few weeks ago. Alongside this irrefutable evidence, two further points must be added: all the wars launched by Washington in the Middle East this century (Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003 and Yemen in 2015 above all) have ended up marginalizing reformist elements within Iran.

Every time a glimmer of hope seemed to open up for a less extremist Iran, the United States and its allies did everything possible to prevent it from happening. Iran has the second-largest reserves of natural gas in the world, the fourth-largest reserves of oil, 92 million inhabitants and a massive domestic market: it could become the dominant country in the region within a few years. They want an Iran that is controllable and “useful,” not “free.”

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear program, supported by a less radical leadership than the current one, represented a solution – albeit imperfect – to resolve many of current problems and favor more compromise-oriented political figures. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) certified Tehran's compliance with the agreement 14 times, including in a UN Security Council resolution.

The agreement was broken by Washington in 2018. The United States and its allies needed this particular version of Iran to justify their policies of domination in the region. The goal is to make a public example: “submit to our rule, perhaps in exchange for benefits, or this is what awaits you.” Some will bow their heads, others will not – as always happens in history.

© Il Manifesto Global