The debate over this trend has intensified because of the staggering impact of energy insecurity and the growing demand for a transition to green energy. For this transition, critical minerals such as nickel, lithium and cobalt are imperative in a world increasingly shaped by great power rivalry between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China. Much like oil, natural gas and petroleum, critical mineral supply chains can often be weaponised as pressure points or strategic leverage against vested stakeholders.

The resurgence of resource nationalism signals a break from the post-Cold War world order, marking a retreat from conceptualising critical resources as tradeable goods between state actors in a free-market economy, without structural or institutional impediments. Moreover, this trend has been accompanied by a growing recognition among resource-rich countries that, in pursuing national interests, they can no longer remain confined to being mere exporters. Rather, amid a world order in flux, they must leverage their resource and geopolitical potential to renegotiate the terms of trade and supply chains that previously dictated geopolitical undercurrents. In doing so, they seek to establish a new normal in which at least a portion of the final product’s value is produced, processed, or created within their territorial borders, rather than remaining reliant on imported end-products.

However, resource nationalism extends far beyond the conventional understanding of the concept, which is often limited strictly to state expropriation or the nationalisation of resources. Instead, in the contemporary era, it has expanded to encompass states leveraging their indispensable role in the green energy transition and driving the vertical and localised integration of critical supply chains. Countries are utilising the critical minerals at their disposal to institutionalise new bargaining strategies with third parties through targeted policy frameworks.

By 2026, Indonesia has solidified its position as a global nickel hub, building on more than six years of industrialisation efforts following its January 2020 ban on exporting raw nickel ore.[1] Accounting for approximately 60 per cent of globally mined nickel, the country implemented this policy as part of a broader re-orientation of its regulatory frameworks. Crucially, nickel is an integral component in manufacturing lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles (EVs).

This decision aims to transform Indonesia from an exporter of raw nickel and an importer of finished goods from countries such as China and Japan into an integrated domestic industrial powerhouse. Under........

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