The security situation in Afghanistan under the Taliban has been marked by strict internal control, occasional insurgent actions across multiple fronts, and border disputes primarily with Pakistan. On the foreign policy front, while only Russia has granted full recognition, China, India and Pakistan are yet to formalise their diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime fully.

In August 2021, when the Taliban took over Kabul, even before the US–NATO forces fully withdrew, predictions about their stay were uncertain. Some experts forecasted either a rapid security collapse, an economic breakdown, or a return to civil war. The first version of the Taliban was ousted during the War on Terror, and their comeback after 20 years of US–NATO presence in Afghanistan seemed to validate their cause. As the US, which had fought the group’s resurgence for over a decade, withdrew, the Taliban further entrenched themselves and dismantled the democratic institutions established after the Bonn Peace Process. This process treated the Taliban as a defeated non-entity. Two decades on, the US moved away from the democratic framework and sidelined the elected government to strike a deal with the Taliban.

What Ruptured the Doha Peace Understanding?

Afghanistan’s political downfall originated/stemmed from fundamental issues in the deal itself, along with the fragile state of Afghanistan’s institutions and security forces. The US and Taliban signed a Peace Accord in Doha on 29 February 2020. The agreement included provisions for intra-Afghan dialogue between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Still, the government was excluded from peace talks because the Taliban refused to recognise its legitimacy. Pakistan facilitated the process, aligning with the Taliban at the time. The negotiations under the Doha Accord significantly weakened Afghanistan’s democratically elected government. Engaging directly with insurgent groups gave them legitimacy and eroded the democratic authority structures that the US had worked hard to build since its post-9/11 intervention.

Following the Doha agreement, the US hesitated to provide concrete support to Afghan security forces, leaving them stranded and causing increased desertion amid uncertainty and instability. Sensing vulnerabilities, the Taliban expedited their military campaign despite commitments to lessen violence. With the US disengaged and eager to withdraw, they seized the opportunity to strengthen their hold and took Kabul just before 15 August 2021. Overall, US indifference and the halt in air support made the security forces feel abandoned and isolated, hindering their ability to resist the Taliban effectively.[1]

What happened at the Kabul International Airport on 26 August was the final breach—a suicide bombing amidst a crowded airport killed 160–180 people, including 13 US service members who were killed at Abbey Gate while conducting a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO).[2] The attack put the Biden Administration, already on the backfoot, under sharp scrutiny for this scale of mismanagement, having ignored advice and input from the military and intelligence.

The brief assesses the Taliban government’s five years across broad verticals of the domestic environment, economic performance, and the scale of diplomatic pursuits and international outreach before prognosticating on the Emirate’s road ahead.

The Domestic Environment

The security situation in Afghanistan under the Taliban has become somewhat more stable, marked by strict internal control, occasional insurgent actions across multiple fronts, and border disputes primarily with Pakistan. Their quick comeback after the US withdrew had lifted their morale. Now in their sixth year, the Taliban claim to have resolved internal civil conflicts that were prominent during the US withdrawal.

The reduction in violence is partly because the Taliban is now enforcing laws they once bypassed. As a result, overall violence and security worries are viewed as diminished. Unlike the Taliban 1.0, this government controls all of Afghanistan and has pushed opposition groups to the edges, holding full authority. According to the World Bank, the Taliban government reportedly spends nearly half of its budget (47.8 per cent) on security, including on intelligence and law enforcement agencies such as the police.[3]

According to reports from the UN Sanctions Monitoring Team, the Taliban continues to support the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) even though Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada reportedly advised against increasing attacks on Pakistan.[4] As a result, many TTP fighters had reportedly been moved inland, away from the Pakistani border.[5] There is also evidence suggesting that al-Qaeda is integrated into the Taliban’s broader control structure, influenced by the Emirates’ preference to “absorb” rather than “confront” them.[6] Concerning the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Taliban and ISKP have remained fundamentally different, being “doctrinally distinct” due to their conflicting objectives.[7] The Taliban’s nationalist focus on Afghanistan is seen as opposing ISKP’s goal of establishing a global caliphate.

Another internal dispute revolves around the supposed rivalry between the Kandahar and Kabul factions: Kandahar is seen as more traditional and conservative, whereas Kabul’s group appears more pragmatic, flexible and media-aware. Despite these perceived divisions, both groups have generally acted cohesively, casting doubt on the accuracy of these perceptions/interpretations. Whether these perceptions are part of a deliberate strategy to balance the demands of daily governance and diplomacy with the fundamental principles of Taliban ideology remains unclear.

The social landscape under the Taliban is deeply worrying, characterised by sustained and institutionalised discrimination against girls and women. The Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, established after the Taliban disbanded the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, has overseen the worst forms of discrimination against women, including banning them from secondary and higher education and severely restricting their participation in the country’s workforce, which has declined to 18.3 per cent in 2019 and 16.5 per cent in 2020 to barely 5.1 per cent by 2026.[8] Amongst the minorities, the Shia Hazara community is the worst hit. There have been frequent incidents of targeted attacks against the community and their land being usurped and distributed amongst those belonging to the Taliban ideology or outfit.[9]

Between Taliban 1.0 and Taliban 2.0, Afghanistan’s GDP rose from US$ 4 billion to about US$ 19.8 billion. Foreign aid fuelled this growth, supporting a highly centralised yet corrupt system, while limited transparency reduced accountability. When that system collapsed, the country’s economic vulnerabilities became clear. The economy was also still reeling from the after-effects of natural calamities (the series of flash floods, the most destructive occurring in August 2020) and the pandemic.[10] As the Taliban took control, aid was severely cut: the US halted aid, froze Afghan assets worth US$ 9.5 billion, the IMF suspended US$ 440 million in Special Drawing Rights, and Germany halted US$ 300 million, among other economic measures.[11] The withdrawal of foreign direct budget support, combined with severe banking restrictions, plunged millions into poverty.

As the Taliban returned, the Afghan economy plummeted by about 20 per cent. However, by 2022, signs of recovery emerged after reaching “an inflexion........

© IDSA