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Since what the International Energy Agency called “the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market” arrived in February, China—the world’s largest crude oil importer, with more than 90 percent of these imports arriving by sea—has not scrambled to bid for every replacement barrel. By June, four months into the supply disruption, China had cut crude imports to the lowest level in nearly a decade. China began cautiously restoring crude imports in July, but its purchase rebound remained weak through August and September and far below precrisis levels.

China’s ability to endure the Strait of Hormuz stress test for so long shows that its decade-long efforts to build buffers and reduce dependence on oil for fuel have changed the socioeconomic pressure points of a supply disruption. The scale of China’s reduction in crude imports is striking, but the government did not directly order the cut.

Since what the International Energy Agency called “the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market” arrived in February, China—the world’s largest crude oil importer, with more than 90 percent of these imports arriving by sea—has not scrambled to bid for every replacement barrel. By June, four months into the supply disruption, China had cut crude imports to the lowest level in nearly a decade. China began cautiously restoring crude imports in July, but its purchase rebound remained weak through August and September and far below precrisis levels.

China’s ability to endure the Strait of Hormuz stress test for so long shows that its decade-long efforts to build buffers and reduce dependence on oil for fuel have changed the socioeconomic pressure points of a supply disruption. The scale of China’s reduction in crude imports is striking, but the government did not directly order the cut.

Chinese leaders view the Hormuz supply shock not just as an energy security problem but also as a macroeconomic stability challenge. Their priority is to prevent rising oil prices from cascading into imported stagflation: China’s industrial system could withstand lower crude imports, but its demand-constrained economy cannot withstand the wrong kind of imported inflation, where prices rise due to higher oil costs rather than rising wages.

The Chinese political system and its policymakers can manage an industrial adjustment problem diffused among a concentrated number of state-owned and independent refiners. A broad and visible increase in higher costs of living would be much more difficult to handle, especially at a time when social stability is under mounting pressure because of weak employment opportunities and stagnating wages.

As the crisis hit, Beijing instead used its well-honed supply-side approach to prioritize domestic supply and compress rising costs largely within its refining system. As crude prices started to increase rapidly in early March, the Chinese government first restricted refined products exports to ensure domestic needs. Within a week, it raised regulated retail fuel price ceilings in the sharpest increase since 2022.

Existing electrification helped ensure reduced needs. In the first six months of 2026, China’s existing electric vehicle fleet is estimated to have displaced about 1.35 million barrels of oil per day, or 6 percent of China’s total annual crude imports. But electrification does not eliminate crude oil demand. Rather, it has shifted demand growth away from fuel to petrochemical........

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