How America Can Counter Chinese Coercion
Over the past year and a half, China has shown the world the power of its economic arsenal—starting with the United States. In April 2025, Beijing retaliated forcefully against U.S. tariffs, imposing matching across-the-board levies and export controls on rare-earth elements. This counterpunch rattled bond markets and disrupted auto supply chains, forcing Washington to seek a truce that persists to this day.
Next, China targeted Japan. After Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi described a potential Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan as a “survival-threatening situation” that could justify deploying Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, in November 2025, Beijing imposed suffocating bans on rare-earth exports to the country. Reluctant to reinflame tensions with Beijing, Washington offered nothing more than token support. Tokyo has held firm, refusing to walk back Takaichi’s statement; the restrictions remain in force, and Japan’s mineral stockpiles are dwindling.
Then Europe came under fire. Fed up with a trade deficit with China that had reached $1.1 billion per day, the European Union began exploring new tariffs to counter Chinese overcapacity in May. As China threatened “resolute countermeasures,” French President Emmanuel Macron urged U.S. President Donald Trump at the G-7 summit in June to join forces in addressing global imbalances. But the United States elected to sit on the sidelines again, and Europe blinked, opting for talks with Beijing, with an October deadline set by Europe to take concrete steps toward reducing China’s trade surplus. The EU has since been in tense negotiations with Beijing over reducing exports of hybrid vehicles, chemicals, and machinery, taking on the threat of Chinese retaliation alone.
China, in other words, is exploiting the disunity between the United States and its partners. In a divide-and-conquer strategy that mirrors the Trump administration’s own globe-spanning tariff campaign, Beijing has broken the Western alliance into more manageable pieces, allowing it to fight actors one on one. Its market heft and control over critical minerals have been decisive, and as its fear of retaliation has diminished, it has rolled out more aggressive export restrictions and sanctions. In 2023 and 2024, Beijing added only five Western companies to its Unreliable Entity List, exposing them to financial and legal penalties; in 2025 alone, it added 76.
There is still hope for the United States and its allies—if they can relearn to act in concert. These countries should build a formal economic security alliance that establishes collective defense against economic coercion. The foundation of this alliance would be a pledge modeled on NATO’s Article 5, which considers an attack on one as an attack on all, in this case promising a joint response to economic coercion against any member of the alliance. Over time, this alliance could grow to address other economic challenges shared by members, just as NATO began as a security guarantee before evolving into a more integrated and expansive military alliance. It could adopt joint tariffs against Chinese overcapacity and currency manipulation, coordinate investment restrictions and export controls on advanced technology, and cooperate on critical minerals and AI development.
Amid transatlantic squabbles and European calls for “strategic autonomy,” a Western economic security alliance may seem more out of reach today than ever before. But enduring interests can outweigh temporary political friction. With the right policy shifts and trust-building measures—starting with the removal of Trump’s tariffs on allies and legislation that limits the U.S. president’s ability to reimpose them in the future—Washington can forge such a partnership and use it to check Chinese coercion.
The United States, Europe, and Japan are all confronting a major shared challenge: Beijing is intent on making the rest of the world more dependent on China and China less dependent on the rest of the world. Beijing subsidizes domestic production far beyond local demand, undervalues its currency by 20 to 30 percent, and enacts coercive economic measures—such as export controls and sanctions—to gain leverage over Western governments and companies and undermine policies it deems against its interest. The country’s resulting industrial overcapacity and surging exports, epitomized by a record $1.2 trillion trade surplus last year, threatens U.S., European, and Japanese industrial competitiveness and jobs. Beijing’s record of weaponizing its strengths also means that Chinese advancements in frontier technologies, such as artificial intelligence and connected vehicles, which continuously share data with external devices, pose security threats to Washington and all its partners.
Individually, the United States and its allies may struggle to match Beijing’s economic leverage, particularly its chokehold on rare-earth elements. But collectively, they are far stronger. The United States, Europe, and Japan alone produce around three times the amount of economic output that China does. They are home to the vast majority of the world’s most sophisticated companies. They also control critical inputs that China depends on, including lithography machines, specialized machinery for industrial production, chemicals, and aircraft engines. Despite efforts to reduce its dependence on the dollar, Beijing remains exposed to U.S. financial sanctions; only about 30 percent of China’s trade is settled in renminbi, and most of the rest is settled in dollars. The scholars Stephen Brooks and Ben Vagle have estimated that if the United States and its allies........
