In the days since U.S. President Donald Trump’s highly public falling out with Ukraine and growing rapprochement with Russia, Kyiv’s prospects going into the fifth winter of war look grim. The Trump administration has demanded that Ukraine suspend its attacks on Russian refineries, which have been one of Ukraine’s most effective means of putting pressure on Moscow. Meanwhile, Kyiv faces dangerous gaps in its air defenses against Russia’s jet-powered drones and stepped-up use of ballistic missiles. And Trump has entered into a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin that temporarily waives U.S. sanctions on Russian diesel exports, offering Moscow a diplomatic win. Trump’s envoys have also proposed that Europe increase purchases of Russian gas as part of an effort to gain the Kremlin’s support for peace—further complicating the efforts of Ukraine and its remaining allies to squeeze Russia.

Yet missing from this bleak picture are the ways that Ukraine has already adapted to escalating attacks. Kyiv has developed innovative strategies to mitigate the impact of Russian energy strikes and keep its grid running, even amid intense bombardment. And despite the new U.S. pressure, Ukraine has continued to launch powerful drone strikes against Russia’s energy infrastructure, including successful mid-October attacks on an oil terminal in St. Petersburg and industrial gas processing plants as far away as Surgut and the Novy Urengoy, 1,800 miles from the Ukrainian border. Overall, since mid-2025, Ukrainian drone strikes have reduced Russian refinery throughput by roughly 30 percent; they have also eroded a significant share of Moscow’s excess refining capacity, resulting in a gasoline shortfall of about ten percent.

Still, this is only one part of a rapidly evolving energy war. Moscow has developed its own ways to limit the effects of Ukrainian strikes. And it has intensified its assault on Ukrainian infrastructure, including an October 19 barrage that damaged more than ten energy facilities. DiXi Group, a Ukrainian think tank, has estimated that Russia launched 12,800 missiles and drones at Ukrainian energy facilities in 2025 and early 2026, compared with just 2,800 during the first three years of the war combined. Although these figures count launches rather than successful strikes, they show how massive and relentless the Russian campaign has become.

Moreover, both sides are now able to target the substitutes and reserves that in the past could be used to cushion losses. Following Russian strikes on local power plants in early October, Ukrainians experienced widespread blackouts, even though Ukraine’s national grid had electricity to spare, because Russia continued hitting the lines and substations carrying the reserve power. During the summer, Ukraine hit so many of the refineries and pipelines around Moscow that Russia was forced to bring fuel by rail from as far as Lake Baikal, thousands of miles away.

If U.S. pressure and negotiations cannot stop the energy war, the central question for Ukraine is whether its remarkable capacity to adapt can keep pace with Russian attacks. At the same time, its fortunes this winter will depend on whether it can continue to hit Russian infrastructure in ways that challenge Moscow’s ability to repair and rebuild. Both Russia and Ukraine must now protect and repair their entire national networks around the clock; attackers can concentrate on the most vulnerable sites and strike again as soon as repairs are done. In such a war, defensive ingenuity matters as much as offensive capability. In the end, energy attacks alone are unlikely to force either side to accept the other’s terms, neither side may be able to gain a decisive advantage, even as both incur mounting costs. Recognizing the limits, as well as the power, of these strikes may be crucial not only to ending the present conflict but also to understanding the role that energy infrastructure will likely play in future wars.

THE RACE AGAINST ROCKETS

For Ukraine, international support has been especially crucial in containing Russia’s energy barrage. As of November 2025, before the worst of last winter’s attacks, Ukraine had suffered $17.1 billion in direct damage to its electricity infrastructure, according to a report by the UN, the World Bank, and the European Commission. Yet Kyiv was able to keep the electricity flowing by drawing on the country’s remaining nuclear plants; repairing thermal generation facilities; increasing electricity, gas, and diesel imports; and compensating for lost power plants with distributed generation—smaller units running on solar, wind, gas, and diesel energy that are connected to the main grid.

Europe has also provided crucial replacement technology. In 2025, the European Commission delivered equipment from a retired Lithuanian thermal power plant to Ukraine in 149 shipments, enabling........

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