When Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025, U.S.-Indian relations were stronger than almost anyone in the twentieth century could have predicted. In the first 50 years after India gained independence in 1947, New Delhi was deeply suspicious of Washington, which it saw as an imperial power not unlike those in Europe. It repeatedly criticized the United States’ behavior and adopted a policy of nonalignment during the Cold War. But after the Soviet Union collapsed and the millennium turned, U.S. leaders realized that India could be an important partner in countering a rising China and a valuable market for American companies, and they worked assiduously to win over Indian officials. The courtship wasn’t easy: it required repeated visits and commitments to deepening defense and technology cooperation from Democratic and Republican administrations alike, spread out over the course of 25 years, alongside outreach from increasingly like-minded Indian governments. Slowly but surely, however, India and the United States forged a tight bond, undergirded by formal military agreements and increased economic ties.

But now, all this progress is at great risk. The problems began with a fit of presidential pride and pique, when Trump craved and claimed credit for ending the brief May conflict between India and Pakistan. Islamabad leaped to support Trump’s account, praising the president’s “decisive diplomatic intervention” and nominating him for a Nobel Peace Prize. But New Delhi—which does not accept foreign mediation in its conflict with Pakistan as a matter of principle—denied that Washington had played such a role. Trump then angered India further by hosting Pakistan’s military chief, General Syed Asim Munir, in the Oval Office less than two months after Pakistani terrorists killed 26 people in Indian-administered Kashmir and triggered the May conflict. Trump also declined to sign a trade deal with India and imposed draconian tariffs on its United States–bound exports, and in August, he called the country a “dead economy.” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in turn, traveled to China—his first visit there in seven years—and appeared clasping hands with China’s and Russia’s leaders. This prompted Trump to conclude that the United States had “lost India.”

The relationship between India and the United States is not quite lost. Even as their leaders feud, the two governments have continued to cooperate in the background. But it is teetering badly, and if U.S. officials want to fix it, they will need to move quickly. The Trump administration will have to lower tariffs on Indian goods. It will need to back away from claims that the United States negotiated peace between India and Pakistan and stop offering to mediate their eight-decade conflict over Kashmir. These may be tough asks of Trump, who is fixated on cutting the U.S. trade deficit and becoming a Nobel laureate. But repairing the U.S.-Indian relationship is of paramount importance. India is a global swing state, one whose outlook and actions will disproportionately influence the international order. It shares U.S. concerns about Chinese power, and it wants to ensure that the Indo-Pacific democracies are strong and work together. New Delhi, in other words, remains an essential American partner. Washington will miss it if it’s gone.

Indian policymakers were initially excited about Trump’s second term in office. The president prioritized building relations with the world’s most populous democracy during his first four years, and he seemed to appreciate India’s rise. His administration elevated defense ties and stressed the positive role India could play in his Indo-Pacific strategy. Trump treated Modi to a White House dinner in 2017 at which the two spoke of their countries’ deepening friendship. The leaders even forged a personal bond, appearing before 50,000 spectators at........

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