Since early 2025, the United States has made significant diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine. Negotiators have met in Abu Dhabi, Berlin, Geneva, Istanbul, Paris, and Riyadh; envoys have shuttled to Moscow and Miami. Those efforts deserve credit. But activity is not strategy—and, as demonstrated by the massive strikes across Ukraine and Russia in recent weeks, it has yet to produce results.

To make real progress toward peace, Washington should apply lessons from decades of international mediation experience. Although all conflicts are unique, past negotiations show that getting the process right is essential, and they offer insights about which approaches tend to work and which do not. If talks are well organized and parties have a sense of ownership, agree on the process, and build personal relationships, negotiations are more likely to succeed. Without those conditions, efforts to end the fighting are apt to falter, and the strategic, economic, and human costs will continue to mount.

For any process even to begin, the parties must, of course, be willing to engage. Although Kyiv has said it wants a cease-fire and negotiations, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent rhetoric—he called Ukraine’s government a “junta” in May—and the intensifying attacks on Ukrainian cities suggest that he is not in a talking mood.

Yet Putin is under the most significant economic, military, and political pressure since he launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022. His forces advanced by less than half a square mile per day in June 2026—a reduction of more than 90 percent from their rate of gain in June 2025. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s increasingly effective long-range drone strikes are disrupting Russia’s energy sector and reducing state revenues. Kyiv’s attacks on refineries and logistics infrastructure are affecting everyday life in major cities. With public sentiment showing signs of strain, the Kremlin faces a more difficult task in delivering a strong result for the ruling party in September’s Duma elections. None of this means that Putin will choose negotiations over fighting. But given the pressure he is now under, that possibility should at least be tested.

A well-designed process is the best way to gauge Putin’s intentions—and to shape them. That is because leaders pursue negotiations not only when they are struggling to achieve their military objectives but also when they see a credible alternative to war. A serious process can help the parties envision how a negotiated outcome could address their core interests and concerns. Without one, peace is a distant abstraction.

Mediating a full-scale war is among the hardest undertakings in international affairs. When hostilities intensify and become protracted, hatred, resentment, and the desire for revenge make war self-sustaining. Leaders typically come to see themselves as locked in an existential struggle against a malign and implacable enemy. They tend to treat negotiations as a futile distraction or a step that could undermine their political standing at home.

To even have a chance at overcoming such obstacles, mediation requires sustained and continuous efforts by a highly capable team. That means assembling a group of individuals whose primary job is ending the conflict and who have professional expertise and deep knowledge of its history and dynamics. Mediation also often involves more than one third party. Successful processes have featured a lead mediator working alongside supporting states or organizations. France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United Kingdom formed the contact group that backed the U.S.-led negotiations that ended the Bosnian war in 1995. Chile, Cuba, Norway, and Venezuela all played a role in the 2016 talks that concluded the Colombian government’s half-century war with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym, FARC). In Ukraine, by contrast, Washington has largely gone it alone. European allies, Gulf partners, and Turkey have been involved, but only at the margins.

At minimum, European governments, as major stakeholders in both Ukraine’s future and the security of the continent, should be involved as parties to the talks. Given their deep mediation expertise, they should cosponsor the process alongside Washington. Europe is not short of officials with........

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