When will the war in Iran end? American officials claim that the answer is soon. “I think the war is going to end immediately after the [November] election,” declared U.S. President Donald Trump in September. “They can’t hold out any longer.” Iranian leaders agree that the war’s conclusion is near. Tehran has “brought the most heavily armed army in the history of the world to its knees,” proclaimed Ahmad Vahidi, the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in August. Many outside analysts think that the conflict will drag on for longer and end with negotiations rather than with a clear winner. But generally, there is a sense that the fighting will soon be resolved, one way or another.

Such thinking is understandable. All wars eventually end, and after months of rising energy prices, the world is especially eager for this one to stop. Yet the unsettling reality is that the conflict is nowhere near over. The war’s two principal belligerents cannot achieve their desired goals, yet they both feel they are accomplishing enough to make continued fighting through a mix of military and economic tools worth it. The United States cannot topple the Iranian regime, get it to give up its missile program, force it to abandon its nuclear program, or make it stop supporting its regional partners. But Washington can keep degrading Iran’s military and constricting its economy. Iran cannot evict the world’s only superpower from the Middle East. Yet it can keep damaging U.S. regional bases, bombing the United States’ regional allies, and disrupting international commerce.

Critically, both states have the resources needed to fight indefinitely—and both believe they have no choice but to use them. They think that if their side lets up, the other will press on until it has either humiliated them or achieved its main objectives. They carry out periodic talks, but there is no mutual trust. In fact, they suspect that their enemy will simply use a cease-fire to regroup and resupply before attacking again. The Iranian government fears that relinquishing leverage, whether over Hormuz, its missile arsenal, or the nuclear program, would leave it exposed to pressure later. Washington, for its part, worries that sweeping sanctions relief would provide Tehran with the resources and time it needs to reconstitute its capabilities. Israel, meanwhile, fears that restraint today would only create a stronger Iran tomorrow. The steps required to escape the war look dangerous precisely because they require each side to temporarily make itself more vulnerable.

The war, then, will carry on as it has. There will not be a comprehensive resolution. There will be no lasting peace deal. But because the status quo is sustainable for each side, and because the parties lack the power to seize the upper hand, there will be no dramatic escalation, either. Tehran and Washington won’t be defeated. Yet no one will win.

For the United States, the war was not supposed to go like this. When it joined Israel in striking the Islamic Republic on February 28, Washington thought that it would quickly prevail. The two countries, after all, had buried or destroyed most of Iran’s nuclear facilities and blown up many of its missile sites in June 2025. Israel had killed scores of senior Iranian scientists and more than two dozen military leaders, and it had decimated Hezbollah in Lebanon. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad—a longtime Iranian ally—had lost power, and massive protests had just rocked the Iranian government itself. The U.S. military and the Israel Defense Forces enjoyed what seemed like uncontested access to Iranian airspace. The regime, in other words, appeared to be on the precipice.

In the conflict’s opening days, Israel and the United States killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and many of the country’s top military commanders. But predictions that the Islamic Republic would collapse proved incorrect. The regime quickly replaced lost officials and set about striking back at its enemies, blowing up American jets, missile launchers, and radar systems on bases scattered throughout the Persian Gulf. It took control of the Strait of Hormuz and squeezed commercial flows through the waterway. And Iranian forces attacked civilian infrastructure across the Gulf region, making Washington’s regional partners pay for enabling the U.S.-Israeli assault.

American officials have downplayed these setbacks, promising that the Iranian regime is just one more strike or sanction away from being forced to make concessions. But it is extremely unlikely that Israel and Washington will force Tehran to compromise on anything significant. They have repeatedly tried to bomb the regime’s officials and military programs out of existence, only for Tehran to........

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