This is a continuation of my OpEd article “Why the 1961 Framework is Somalia’s Path to True Sovereignty” in Eurasia Review dated March 8th, 2026. The current political impasse between Somalia’s Federal Government and the opposition and the friction between the center and the Federal Member States, is not merely a disagreement over policy; it is a fundamental crisis of legitimacy. The 2012 Provisional Constitution, while a necessary stopgap at its inception, has become a source of permanent transition. Because it was never ratified by a national referendum and remained a “work in progress,” which lacks the moral and legal gravity required to command the absolute loyalty of all Somali stakeholders. The constitution approved on March 4th, 2026, also lacks broad political consensus. Rather than serving as a neutral framework for governance, it is viewed as a partisan document structured to consolidate power for the current administration and disproportionately favors the incumbent political class. It is why it is necessary to  look backward to the 1961 Constitution  to find a path forward in order to stop this continuing bickering in the current corrupt political class.

The current debate is entrenched in a zero-sum struggle over power-sharing. While the central government advocates for increased authority to address economic and security challenges, regional leaders view the federal model as a vital safeguard for local autonomy and clan-based interests.

This friction is exacerbated by the provisional nature of the now replaced framework, which fostered a perception that governance rules was fluid and subject to external influence. This instability is further solidified by the March 4, 2026, constitutional approval, which many view as a lopsided arrangement. Rather than resolving these tensions through compromise, the new constitution is seen as a partisan instrument designed to codify the interests of the ruling elite, effectively tilting the scales of power and deepening the rift between central and regional stakeholders.

By contrast, the 1961 Constitution offers a “fixed” point of reference. It represents the only time in Somali history when the social contract was validated by the people themselves. Reclaiming this framework would shift the conversation from “how do we divide the state?” to “how do we restore the state?” It moves the political class away from the arbitrary negotiations of the “4.5 system” and the current lopsided constitution toward a system rooted in established legal continuity. 

The most significant hurdle to Somalia’s sovereignty is the institutionalization of clan-based regionalism. The current federal structure has inadvertently created semi-autonomous zones that operate like sovereign entities, often engaging in independent foreign policy and security arrangements. This fragmentation invites external interference, as foreign actors find it easier to manipulate smaller clan fiefdoms than a unified national government.

Adopting the 1961 framework as a base allows for a transition toward decentralized unitarist state. This is a crucial distinction: it does not mean returning to the autocratic centralism of the past, but creating administrative regions based on geography and service delivery instead of clan identity. For the opposition, this should be an attractive proposition; it replaces the whims of whoever holds the presidency with a rigid, historically grounded rule of law that protects individual rights over collective clan quotas.

The 1961 Constitution serves as a neutral arbiter. In the current climate of deep mistrust, any new constitutional amendment proposed by the sitting government is viewed with suspicion by the opposition as a power grab. Conversely, any resistance by the regional states is seen by the center as sabotage.

Returning to the 1961 document bypasses this personal animosity. It is not the President’s constitution or the Opposition’s constitution; it is the Republic’s constitution. Using it as the foundation for modern amendments provides a face-saving mechanism for all parties. It allows regional leaders to transition their roles into a national framework without feeling that they have surrendered to a rival clan, as they are instead surrendering to the historical sovereignty of the nation.

True sovereignty is not just about a seat at the United Nations; it is about the internal ability of a state to enforce its own laws and protect its borders. Somalia cannot achieve this while its primary legal document is a provisional draft heavily influenced by international consultants or a contested and lopsided constitution favoring the incumbent administration.

The political class must realize that the 2012 framework has reached the limit of its utility and the recently approved contested constitution cannot heal the divide. The ongoing disputes over election models, resource sharing, and judicial independence are symptoms of a foundational flaw. By amending the 1961 Constitution to include modern protections for regional development and human rights, Somalia can finally close the era of transition.

It is a “Third Way” that we propose to the political class: a bridge between the nostalgia of the first republic and the realities of the 21st century. It is time for Somalia’s leaders to stop trying to invent a new nation and instead choose to heal the one that already has a legal heart. If they do not, the country remains at risk of becoming a permanent protectorate, managed by the world but owned by no one.

© Eurasia Review