*Originally published in 2025 and preserved as part of our archive project.Get E-International Relations delivered to your inbox, free of charge. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber to support our work.

Neorealism, a cornerstone of international relations theory, is a comprehensive lens through which to analyse state behavior in a disordered world. States, whether driven by survival or ambition, are expected to balance power (Waltz 1979) or maximise it (Mearsheimer 2001), yielding predictable patterns of interaction across the global stage. Yet the empirical record disagrees, as geography and context muddy these theoretical waters. In the Arctic, a great power rivalry between the United States and China manifests as a quiet jostle for economic advantage. Oil exploration, rare earth mineral stakes, and tentative shipping lane claims play out without spiralling into direct confrontation. Contrast this with the South China Sea, where China constructs artificial islands and the United States conducts freedom-of-navigation operations (USCC 2016). Both regions pulse with systemic pressures and bipolar competition between superpowers, but one remains a cold standoff with little risk of serious escalation, the other a simmering flashpoint. Why does the same structural tension produce such starkly divergent outcomes?

This article proposes "regional neorealism," a theoretical innovation that reframes neorealist spirals through the prism of geographic location and dynamic external pressures. Within this framework, a spiral refers to a self-reinforcing cycle of actions between states, where each action provokes an escalating response. Whilst this is based loosely on Jervis' (1978) analysis of the security dilemma, where states' defensive measures are misinterpreted as threats, regional neorealism expands the concept by emphasising how geography and resources shape the spiral's trajectory, applicable to both offensive and defensive neorealism. This framework offers an innovative analysis of key cases: the Arctic, South China Sea, the Baltics, and Ukraine. It is grounded in neorealist roots whilst extending its reach to a world where an anarchical system derives from geographical locations and how they change. Regional neorealism offers not a rejection of neorealism, but a refinement, bringing both offensive and defensive schools together in harmony to produce a lens for a planet in flux.

Neorealist Foundations and Limitations

Neorealism stands as a dominant school in international relations theory, with its explanatory power rooted in the consequences of global anarchy. Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979) lays the foundation for defensive neorealism, arguing that the international order compels states to prioritise survival above all. Within this context, states are rational actors who calibrate their power to balance against external threats rather than squander their natural resources on ambition. Security dilemmas may emerge, wherein one state’s defensive buildup alarms another, sparking a spiral of mistrust, but Waltz suggests that mutual restraint often keeps extreme escalation in check (1979). The system’s structure, defined by polarity and power distribution, determines interaction outcomes: states seek only stability. John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001) counters this with offensive neorealism, painting a much bleaker picture. Whilst it recognises anarchy, it suggests that it results in not just fear but opportunity; states will maximise power, pursuing domination whenever feasible. Offensive neorealism also suggests that survival demands this dominance, and restraint is a luxury. Where Waltz sees stalemates and instinctual survival, Mearsheimer sees struggles and opportunity – tension is not just an unfortunate exception but inevitable.

These two branches of neorealism have formed decades of scholarly debate, offering a robust toolkit for understanding global dynamics. However, their strength fails when confronted with evidence of regional anomalies that defy their predictions. Take the Arctic, a theatre of great power rivalry that should, by offensive neorealist logic, hum with conflict. The United States and China vie for influence. Washington bolsters naval exercises near Alaska with Trump making a bid for Greenland, whilst Beijing pours investments into Greenland’s rare earth mines and eyes the Northern Sea Route- yet militarisation and direct conflict remain absent (Volpe 2020). No American forces shadow Chinese freighters, and no Arctic Council meeting devolves into sabre-rattling. Instead, competition unfolds in economic terms: drilling contracts, mining bids, and diplomatic jostling over shipping rights (Østhagen 2017). Mearsheimer’s offensive neorealism does not offer a plausible explanation here: if states maximise power relentlessly, why are there no Chinese bases on Svalbard, or no U.S. blockade of thawing passages? The Arctic’s calm defies any expectation of unchecked rivalry (Heron 2025).

The Baltic region also showcases a primarily defensive dynamic, driven by economic interdependence and the realities of geography. The Baltic Sea features vital shipping lanes which have linked major ports like Gdansk, Stockholm, and St. Petersburg. These Baltic hubs are central to Northern European trade, creating a shared prosperity that hinges on stability. Disruption, say from direct conflict between its actors, would cut these routes, inflicting economic pain on all regional actors (Rostoks and Sprūds 2015). This interdependence results in states prioritising protection over active aggression. Geography reinforces this as the Baltic’s shallow, island-strewn waters hinder large-scale offensive moves, favouring defensive tactics. Narrow naval passages, like the Danish Straits, amplify this as any attempt to dominate risks quick counteraction (Kasekamp & Rasmussen 2018). Territorial gains, such as seizing ports, promise little reward against the potential fallout: trade losses and reprisals. Even Russia’s Kaliningrad has served more as a defensive anchor than a springboard, it is hemmed in by NATO neighbours. The result is a region where economic risk-taking is deterred by geographic spatial constraints. States focus on safeguarding their lanes........

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