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China is expanding influence in Myanmar, Bangladesh. India has a geography advantage

India must not overreact to Bangladesh’s China outreach or Myanmar’s China dependence.

The recent visits of Myanmar President U Min Aung Hlaing to India and China, and Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman to China must be read together. They are not isolated diplomatic events. The visits point to a larger Chinese attempt to expand influence across India’s eastern neighbourhood, from Myanmar’s Bay of Bengal coast to Bangladesh’s ports, rivers, power networks, defence procurement, and political establishment—and an Indian effort to address that outreach.

Myanmar’s president visited India from 30 May to 3 June as his first foreign destination after assuming office. He then travelled to China from 15 to 19 June. Three days later, Bangladesh’s prime minister, despite an earlier invitation from Prime Minister Narendra Modi to visit India, chose China for his first major strategic outreach after assuming office. This diplomatic choreography carries meaning. Myanmar signalled balance; Bangladesh signalled recalibration; China signalled ambition.

For India, the concern is not merely that China is engaging its neighbours. Every sovereign country has the right to diversify partnerships. The concern is that Beijing’s role in both Myanmar and Bangladesh may gradually affect India’s border security, Northeast stability, Bay of Bengal posture, connectivity projects, migration pressures, defence planning, and regional influence.

Yet, the picture is not one-sided. China may offer finance, weapons, and infrastructure, but India remains indispensable to both Myanmar and Bangladesh because of geography, history, culture, markets, rivers, energy, medicine, connectivity, and people-to-people linkages.

Myanmar goes India first, but China still looms large

Hlaing’s decision to visit India before China was symbolically important. India’s official statement placed Myanmar at the confluence of India’s Neighbourhood First, Act East, and MAHASAGAR policies. The visit began at Bodh Gaya, underlining Buddhist and civilisational links. The agenda covered border security, Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, Rupee-Kyat settlement, healthcare, rare earths, cyber security, maritime cooperation, and capacity building.

Myanmar is the only ASEAN country sharing a land border with India. It is also India’s land bridge to Southeast Asia. The 1,643 km India-Myanmar border passes through Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram. Instability in Myanmar directly affects insurgency, narcotics trafficking, refugee flows, weapons movement, cross-border ethnic tensions, and internal security in the Northeast. Therefore, Myanmar’s assurance that its territory would not be used against Indian security interests was important. Although large parts of Myanmar’s borderlands are outside effective central control, India’s engagement with Naypyidaw is necessary, even if uncomfortable. India cannot secure its four border states if it ignores whoever controls official power in Myanmar.

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Myanmar’s mistrust of China

Myanmar’s relationship with China is deep but uneasy. The Myanmar military has depended on China for diplomatic cover, arms, trade, and engagement with ethnic armed organisations. Yet, the country’s political and military elite have long mistrusted Beijing. This mistrust is rooted in five issues: rare earth extraction in Kachin, the stalled Myitsone Dam, the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines, Chinese influence over ethnic armed organisations, and reported border encroachment concerns in northern Shan State.

In Kachin, rare earth extraction, mainly that of dysprosium and terbium, has become a major source of resentment. Myanmar has emerged as a key supplier of heavy rare earths. Reuters reported in May 2026 that Kachin is particularly significant because it produces about half of the world’s heavy rare earths. The problem is that much of this extraction feeds Chinese supply chains while leaving Myanmar with ecological damage. Investigations by Global Witness and others have described toxic mining practices, water contamination, destroyed hillsides, and serious local environmental degradation in Kachin.

The Myitsone Dam is another symbol of mistrust. Suspended in 2011 after public........

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