After a month of condemnations by Gulf countries of Iranian attacks against them, the United Arab Emirates’s ambassador to Washington published an op-ed last week laying out what the Gulf hoped to see with the war’s end.

“A simple ceasefire isn’t enough,” Yousef Otaiba wrote in the Wall Street Journal two days after US President Donald Trump announced that talks with Iran aimed at ending the war were advancing. “We need a conclusive outcome that addresses Iran’s full range of threats: nuclear capabilities, missiles, drones, terror proxies and blockades of international sea lanes.”

The remarks were uncharacteristically clear and detailed for a senior official from the Gulf countries, which had largely tiptoed around the war in its first few weeks, presenting themselves as victims of powers beyond their control rather than full-throated supporters of the US-Israeli campaign against an Iran they have long viewed warily.

Though transparency on Gulf positions remains in short supply, the last several days have seen a marked shift in signals emanating from many of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, seemingly hardening demands that the war only end with Iran fundamentally denuded of the ability to threaten the region again, even if it means the continuation of fighting.

Their conditions, which are not uniform, are being framed as non-negotiable. “We cannot allow Iran to hold the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and the global economy hostage,” Otaiba wrote.

The turn appears to be driven by the harm the war has generated to the Gulf countries’ economies, with energy facilities unable to operate freely, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz choking off trade and the image of the GCC — Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait — as a hub of stability for global business and tourism shattered.

There are no comprehensive official figures yet quantifying the economic damage to Gulf states since the Iranian attacks, but reports and statements point to disruptions in trade, rising costs, and potential impacts on production.

The shift has coincided with Trump’s pursuit of negotiations aimed at ending the war, which are not guaranteed to meet Gulf demands, though it’s unclear to what degree, if any, the newly bellicose stances are being animated by concerns over the talks.

And though the UAE has offered sharper conditions than most others, messaging in much of the Gulf remains muddled between calls for a ceasefire and hints at the need to keep fighting, limiting the effect those stances may have on how the war eventually ends.

Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, the main export route for Gulf states to the rest of the world, primarily for oil and gas.

Since the US and Israel began bombing Iran on February 28, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has largely shut the channel, laying mines and threatening any ship attempting to pass through without its okay.

The disruption severely hampered not only oil exports but also the import of industrial materials and even food, much of which Gulf states rely on due to limited agricultural capacity caused by harsh climatic conditions.

The primary impact,........

© The Times of Israel