The American and Israeli bombardment of Iran is now entering its second week. The intensity of the firepower directed at Iran during the first week has been unprecedented. The military achievements attained thus far are also immense—nearly without precedent—and will undoubtedly be studied in military academies around the world for years to come.

At the same time, it is perfectly clear to all parties involved in this campaign—both on the American side and on the Iranian side—that aerial bombardment alone will not bring about a change of regime in Iran.

The United States and its partners have neither a real desire nor, most likely, the capability to occupy Iran on the ground (whether fully or partially) and impose regime change by force of arms. The enormous economic and political cost of such a move—compared with which the American occupation of Iraq would appear like a child’s game—renders it an unrealistic fantasy. President Trump has spoken explicitly on this matter, and it is worth listening carefully to what he has said.

Accordingly, regime change in Iran can only occur as the result of a popular revolution, in which millions of Iranians from all sectors of society simultaneously take to the streets, seize centers of power (all or some of them), and compel the current regime to relinquish control.

Such a transition could also occur through a coup—military or political—in which elements of the Iranian elite that are currently outside the ruling establishment persuade, by force or by other means, the remnants of the regime to hand over control of the state. However, at present the prospects for either a popular revolution or a military or political coup do not appear particularly high. There is little reason to believe that several additional weeks of aerial bombardment—even if they continue at their current intensity (which itself is doubtful)—will significantly increase the likelihood of either a revolution or a coup.

The reason is simple: for more than forty years the Iranian regime has developed and refined sophisticated repression mechanisms designed to ensure its survival in extreme scenarios, including situations of severe external military pressure. One of these mechanisms is the notorious Basij forces.

The Basij—a semi-military militia composed of the segments of the population most loyal to the regime—numbers, according to foreign reports, more than 13.5 million members and is capable of deploying approximately 1.5 million security personnel at any given moment. Even if there is genuine desire among the Iranian public or among segments of the Iranian elite to replace the current regime—and even if there is willingness to pay the high personal and collective price involved—the repression mechanisms that the Iranian regime has perfected over decades leave little room for optimism among those who might attempt to lead a revolution or a coup.

The Americans and their partners understand this very well. For this reason, a significant portion of the current bombing campaign is aimed at destroying, as much as possible, the repression mechanisms available to the regime in Tehran. Strikes against the leadership of these repression structures, the military camps that serve them, and the weapons depots at their disposal can certainly weaken them significantly and thereby improve the chances of success for those who may choose to confront them.

However, air strikes alone will not completely neutralize these repression mechanisms. Given their size, their initial strength, their broad geographic deployment, and their deep roots in Iranian society, anyone who chooses to confront them will likely be signing their own fate.

Under these circumstances, the United States and its partners are hoping for what may be called a “turning of the guns”—a situation in which military and paramilitary bodies that are currently integral parts of the regime and are meant to prevent revolution or coup instead turn their weapons against the regime itself and either lead, assist, or at least refrain from obstructing a revolutionary or coup attempt.

The logic behind this expectation is straightforward. Among such a large number of armed men cultivated by the regime for its own preservation, it is reasonable to assume that there will be enough ambitious individuals who wish to secure positions in the “day after,” or who fear the fate that awaits them if the regime collapses, to place their weapons at the service of a revolution or coup.

Yet the optimistic scenario of a “turning of the guns” depends on convincing these potential defectors that the regime is on the verge of collapse—or perhaps has already begun to collapse—and that this process has passed the point of no return. As long as the regime retains a reasonable chance of survival, potential defectors will hesitate to jump onto the bandwagon of revolution or coup.

The working assumption of all sides is that the American bombing campaign will not continue indefinitely. The immense logistical complexity of sustaining such operations—certainly at the current intensity—the potential shortage of munitions, the enormous economic cost of each day of fighting, the political price (which will only rise as American casualties increase), and domestic pressures, including rising oil prices, damage to global trade, and cumulative harm to U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf, all make the bombardment phase inherently limited in time.

President Trump has already framed this window as lasting approximately four to five weeks. It is therefore very likely that the Iranian regime will be able to withstand the pressure of the bombing campaign. Potential defectors are surely aware of this reality as well.

For these reasons, the Americans and their partners understand that what is now required is a ground initiative.

According to reports from recent days, they are hoping that the Kurds—who, according to foreign sources, have been armed and trained by Western forces in recent months in preparation for such a scenario—will be the first to enter the fray and perhaps inspire other minorities to follow.

However, the Kurds are not the appropriate force to lead a ground campaign aimed at toppling the Iranian regime. Although they are brave and experienced fighters with a long and bloody history with the current regime in Iran, the Kurds—whose population is spread across four countries (Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey)—face numerous constraints that make them ill-suited to lead such an operation.

One such constraint is the multiplicity—and sometimes contradiction—of Kurdish interests, which may undermine their commitment to a ground campaign to overthrow the Iranian regime. Because they operate across the territories of four different states, some of which (Turkey) openly support the Iranian regime and others of which (Iraq) host pro-Iranian militias, Kurdish military activity inside Iran could endanger vital Kurdish interests in other countries and even provoke overt sanctions against them in those states.

Moreover, within the internal Iranian arena, the Kurds—whose aspiration for an independent Kurdish state is no secret—are often perceived as pursuing interests that do not fully align with those of the broader Iranian nation. It is therefore not surprising that the Baloch—another significant Iranian minority with an insurgent tradition against the regime—have declared that they would join the Iranian regime in opposing a military campaign led by the Kurds.

What is required now is a game changer—a move that can be sustained for as long as necessary, that is not overly complex logistically, whose economic and political cost to the United States and its partners is relatively low, that is unlikely to cause the Iranian population to “rally around the flag” in support of the current regime, that has genuine potential to end in regime change, and most importantly, that can instill hope among the Iranian people and among potential defectors that change is near and that the moment has come to join the revolution or the coup.

That game changer would be the entry into Iran of an “Army of Exiles,” led by Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed Shah, accompanied by an international brigade of volunteers from around the world.

According to various estimates, between four and 4.5 million Iranians currently live outside Iran. Many reside in Western countries, including a population of between 600,000 and 1.2 million Iranian exiles and their descendants in the United States alone.

Many among them are deeply hostile to the current regime in Iran. Many still have family members in Iran suffering under that regime. It is reasonable to assume—and to hope—that among these Iranian exiles there are at least several tens of thousands of men and women of military age who are brave and determined enough to participate in a military effort aimed at replacing Iran’s murderous regime.

Historical experience from the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), and the International Brigades that fought alongside the Spanish Republic in an attempt to stop General Franco and the fascist forces, teaches us that if the opportunity is provided and the appropriate framework established, those brave Iranian exiles who join an Army of Exiles will likely be joined by thousands—perhaps tens of thousands—of volunteers from around the world who wish, for their own reasons, to take part in the worthy effort to remove Iran’s murderous regime.

The author of this column and his team believe that the entry of such an Army of Exiles and an International Brigade into Iran—through one or more of the many countries bordering Iran, some of which would gladly assist in the fall of the Iranian regime—and even the mere announcement of such an impending entry, would trigger a chain of events that would significantly increase the likelihood of a “turning of the guns” and the emergence of a revolution or coup in Iran in the foreseeable future.

Naturally, establishing, training, equipping, and financing a fighting force composed of an Army of Exiles under the leadership of Reza Pahlavi and an International Brigade that would invade Iran and rally local forces toward regime change is not without legal, political, and other challenges.

However, these challenges—each of which is solvable—pale in comparison to the immense potential such a framework holds for bringing about regime change in Iran, and to the enormous risks facing the Middle East and the world if the current campaign against Iran ends without the fall of the existing regime.

[In future columns, building upon work conducted in recent days, we will present a detailed operational roadmap explaining how Western and Arab states could establish the Army of Exiles and the International Brigade, finance them, recruit volunteers, equip and train the forces, and outline a possible scenario for the invasion of Iran—from the moment of entry to the arrival of the Army of Exiles in Tehran and the replacement of the Iranian regime.]

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)