Having grown up in Iran, I have been anxiously following the news ever since the United States eliminated Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28, 2026. The Islamic regime has held the Iranian people hostage for 47 years, but the recent US and Israeli strikes have made freedom for Iran a possibility. I’ve noticed a lot of confusion surrounding Iran and the regime. People are wondering: if Khamenei was taken out – over a month ago now, along with many other top officials – how is the regime still standing? Why haven’t they surrendered yet? Who is in charge, if the dictator is gone?

It is important to understand that the Islamic Republic of Iran is not a state like other conventional governments. The real structure of the Islamic Republic, at its core, is not what it appears to be from the outside. It may seem that there is a clear hierarchy: a Supreme Leader, a government, an elected president with ministers, military and security forces, and various formal offices. However, the functioning, decision-making, and execution of authority within the Islamic Republic do not operate as this outward structure may suggest. I have seen instances of people, including President Trump, referring to the regime as a paper tiger. But a paper tiger is ultimately flimsy and easy to defeat; it crumbles and burns to ashes. I liken the regime to a hologram, as it projects itself onto any person and still retains its form. A hologram is also hard to pin down because you only see its immaterial shape. Understanding this, the regime’s true nature, is key to eradicating it. 

First, affairs within the Islamic Republic are carried out through a committee-like system. This system does not resemble others that have a “head” or “heart” that can be targeted to disable it. Perhaps it may be better likened to a cellular or fungal colony: a collection that mimics the appearance of a single living organism, but in reality consists of many units operating alongside one another in a loosely coordinated, often random manner.

To better understand this, we must return to the origins of the Islamic Republic – specifically, the events of 1979. Following Ayatollah Khomeini’s success in toppling the Shah of Iran, clerical factions consolidated power and eliminated rival groups. These clerics – emerged primarily from mosques and religious gatherings. These gatherings were forms of voluntary collective activity organized around Shia religious ceremonies. Tasks were performed collectively, with roles shifting fluidly. Individuals would take on multiple responsibilities simultaneously to ensure that events were carried out. In this sense, these gatherings functioned with diffuse responsibility: everyone participated in everything, everyone was in charge, yet no one was solely accountable.

When these groups assumed power, their method of governance took on a new label: “Jihadi Management.” Individuals within the system were often assigned roles at random. A person could move from a military role in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to a position in an industrial sector, later the same person could serve in parliament, then transition to managing a cultural institution or holding a position within a financial foundation.

This is currently evident in contradictory statements now being issued by various “responsible” individuals within the system. These statements may also contradict actions committed by the various people with “authority.” For example, after an IRGC missile hits a civilian target in a neighboring Arab country, president Pezeshkian will issue a statement apologizing for the attack, yet the IRGC issues its own statement calling all civilian targets in the region legitimate, then the Foreign Minister Araghchi talks about peace and nonaggression while more missiles are fired at other Arab countries in the Persian Gulf. All at the same time. All seemingly random. And the cycle continues.

This committee-style management results in diffuse accountability, where responsibility is unclear. Overlapping authority allows multiple sectors to make parallel decisions simultaneously and independently. In such a system, removing a small number of individuals is unlikely to cause systemic collapse – unless participation is reduced to the point where basic functions can no longer be sustained. As Mehdi Parpanchi, an editor at Iran International, noted, the regime would just continue to “fragment into semi-independent pieces and keep operating,”  thus “missile launches… do not show strategic coherence.”

But why might such a system struggle to recognize defeat? To explore this question, we must look even further back in history—to elements within the historical and theological development of Shia Islam, to its roots and foundation.

One of the most significant and influential events in Shia tradition is the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE. During this battle, Hussein ibn Ali, the third Imam of the Shia, was killed by the forces of Yazid. In Shia interpretations, this event is often understood not as a military loss and battlefield defeat, but as a moral stance – where steadfastness and sacrifice are emphasized as forms of not just spiritual, but literal victory. Even though Hussein sacrificed 72 of his companions, including a three-year-old child and his teenage son, he was still victorious.

In Shia Islam, sacrificing one’s life to prove righteousness is a value taught from a young age. In first grade, we learned about the story of Hossein Fahideh, a thirteen-year-old who strapped grenades around his waist to destroy an enemy tank during the Iran-Iraq war. Was he victorious? No. Did he stop the Iraqi army from advancing? No. But he sacrificed his own life, and that is enough to make him the victor in Shia Islam!

In this view, being oppressed and killed is the ultimate proof of being righteous. In such a mindset, military defeat does not exist. Surrendering or admitting defeat only brings shame.

This is precisely why it appears the regime still stands. The regime does not—cannot—see these eliminations as defeat. Rather, they are being killed in a just cause by the oppressor. In order to defeat this hologram tiger, we must strike at the source of its light source. We must shift from the projections (regime officials) and destroy the source of its projection: The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), an entity under US sanctions and once targeted during the 12-day war.

But the question of timing then arises: when is the optimal, most strategic time to strike the projector, the IRIB? It must be done before the call for Iranians to take to the streets. Messages from the US and Israel remain steadfast in urging Iranians to stay indoors. Brad Cooper has said there will be a clear sign. When this sign arrives, the IRIB cannot exist. They cannot have the ability to project the Islamic hologram to the 92 millions in the country and others abroad. Instead, with the IRIB taken out, the US should use their infrastructure to display messages of freedom. Of encouragement. And a call to the streets, to reclaim their homeland.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)