A Palestinian Administrative Council: A Potential Pathway, If Structured With Care

In the aftermath of Gaza’s devastation and the fragmentation of Palestinian political life, policymakers and analysts are searching for transitional mechanisms that might stabilize the territory and create space for reconstruction. The collapse of Hamas’ administrative apparatus, the erosion of the Palestinian Authority’s legitimacy, and the absence of any coherent governing structure have created a dangerous vacuum. One possibility would be the creation of a Palestinian Administrative Council (PAC)—a transitional body with limited but real authority, operating under international supervision and designed to unify Palestinian representation during a period of extraordinary volatility.

The PAC is not a silver bullet. It is not a shortcut to statehood, nor a guarantee of stability. But under certain conditions—and with careful structuring—it could offer a pragmatic way to manage Gaza’s immediate governance vacuum while laying groundwork for longer‑term political reform. Under UN Security Council Resolution 2803, a committee of technocrats was envisioned to oversee Gaza’s administrative functions during the transition. A PAC could fulfill those same responsibilities while adding a more overtly Palestinian dimension, particularly were it to have an advisory role to the Board of Peace (BoP). This hybrid structure would preserve the technocratic competence envisioned in the resolution while providing a degree of political legitimacy that purely external or purely technical bodies often lack.

The idea gains further traction if the PAC is led by Marwan Barghouti, whose release would be conditioned on Hamas turning over its remaining weapons to the International Security Force (ISF) and on his acceptance and advocacy of Resolution 2803. Barghouti’s leadership would not resolve the conflict’s core issues, but it could give the PAC something no Palestinian institution currently possesses: broad, cross‑factional legitimacy. His credibility among West Bank Palestinians, his respect among many in Gaza, and his standing among prisoners and former militants make him one of the few figures capable of anchoring a transitional body in a fractured political landscape.

Only Israel can authorize Barghouti’s release. That fact alone makes the proposal politically sensitive. Yet under the right conditions, such a move could align with Israel’s strategic interests. If Barghouti’s release were explicitly tied to Hamas’ disarmament—verified through the ISF and supervised by the BoP—it could neutralize a long‑standing adversary at a moment when Israel faces what many consider more imminent and existential threats elsewhere in the region. In this framing, Barghouti’s release is not a concession but a calculated trade: the dismantling of Hamas’ remaining military capacity in exchange for elevating a Palestinian leader who accepts the framework of Resolution 2803 and operates within an internationally supervised transitional structure.

The question, then, is not whether the PAC is the answer to Gaza’s crisis. It is whether it could be a workable mechanism in a moment when alternatives appear to have stalled. Gaza’s governance vacuum is not merely an administrative problem; it is a security and humanitarian risk. Without a functioning authority, criminal networks can expand, unaligned militant cells can proliferate, humanitarian coordination can collapse, and reconstruction can stall before it begins. A transitional body with limited but real authority could help prevent these dynamics from hardening into long‑term instability.

A PAC would not be a government in the traditional sense. Its mandate would be temporary and its authority circumscribed. But it could coordinate humanitarian aid, give Palestinians a voice on reconstruction priorities, and serve as a unified Palestinian interlocutor for the ISF. These are the same functions envisioned for the technocratic committee in Resolution 2803, but the PAC’s composition and advisory role to the Board of Peace would give it a degree of Palestinian ownership that a purely technical body would struggle to achieve. In a context where legitimacy is as important as capacity, this distinction matters.

Hamas’ current condition also shapes the feasibility of this arrangement. The movement is no longer a governing authority or a coherent military organization. What remains is a degraded insurgency composed largely of young, poorly armed fighters operating in fragmented cells. In such circumstances, political integration becomes more likely, not less. A PAC led by Barghouti could offer Hamas’ political wing a face‑saving exit for giving up their control of half of Gaza, protection for its remaining cadres, and the security of living in a stable society. None of this guarantees Hamas’ cooperation, but it does suggest that the movement’s incentives are shifting in ways that make a transitional political structure more attractive than continued fragmentation and even further degradation of Palestinian society.

International supervision would be essential to the PAC’s success. The Board of Peace and the International Support Force envisioned in Resolution 2803 would provide oversight, ensure security during the transition, guarantee transparency in reconstruction, and deter spoilers. Barghouti’s seat on the Board of Peace would ensure that Palestinian leadership is embedded in the oversight structure rather than sidelined by it. This hybrid model—Palestinian‑led but internationally supervised—reflects the reality that Gaza’s reconstruction and stabilization require both local legitimacy and external guarantees.

None of this is without risk. Factional competition could undermine the PAC before it begins. Barghouti’s legitimacy could unify Palestinians or threaten existing elites. International supervision could be perceived as overreach. Israel’s position will shape the PAC’s operational space. Reconstruction expectations could outpace capacity. And, as with many transitional bodies, there is a danger that the PAC could become a permanent “temporary” structure if timelines and benchmarks are not clearly defined.

Yet the absence of any transitional mechanism carries risks of its own. Gaza’s governance vacuum will not remain empty. It will be filled by fragmentation, radicalization, and instability unless a credible alternative emerges. The PAC is not a solution to the conflict. But if structured with care, monitored rigorously, and anchored in both Palestinian legitimacy and international oversight, it may offer a starting point in a moment when the region desperately needs one.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)