30.03.2026: Press conference – Berlin

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz received the President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Ahmed al-Sharaa, at the Federal Chancellery in Berlin.

During the joint press conference, a journalist directed a two-part question to both. Addressing Ahmed al-Sharaa, he asked whether Syria would encourage refugees in Germany to return. He then pressed Friedrich Merz on how many of the roughly 900,000 Syrians under protection Germany plans to repatriate – and on what timeline.

Al-Sharaa’s response was notably brief, avoiding any clear answer. He expressed gratitude toward the German public for hosting large numbers of Syrians during the years of war, framing Germany’s role as a humanitarian anchor in a period of state collapse.

Merz’s statement was striking in its clarity. He announced that, over the course of the next three years, Germany intends to facilitate the return of up to 80 percent of Syrian nationals currently residing in the country under protection status. Crucially, he added that this objective had been discussed with the Syrian president, thereby framing the policy as a coordinated bilateral effort.

He concluded with a broader political assertion: that the Syrian civil war had come to an end, and that both governments would now take joint action to initiate a structured return process.

31.03.2026: Chatham House – London

One day later Ahmed al-Sharaa appeared in London as a guest of Chatham House, where he took part in a public discussion hosted by Bronwen Maddox.

She confronted him with the statement made alongside Friedrich Merz just 24 hours earlier regarding the repatriation of Syrian nationals from Germany. How exactly is the Syrian government going to facilitate this?

As the translation in his earpiece concluded, he smiled briefly before describing the figure cited in Berlin as “somewhat exaggerated.” He stressed that he had made no such commitment and framed the statement as solely attributable to the German side.

On April 1, 2026, Syria’s Foreign Minister, Asaad al-Shaibani issued a public statement on X (formerly Twitter). In unusually direct terms, he declared the categoric rejection of “any attempts at forced deportation” against Syrians from Europe, furthermore, calling the significant Syrian diaspora which has emerged as a result of a mass exodus since 2011 a “strategic resource”.

The Diaspora Asset – A Turkish Blueprint

These 48 hours succinctly illustrate a crucial aspect of the dilemma which European governments have maneuvered themselves into over the past decade and a half.

A well-documented example of this approach is the Republic of Türkiye.

Approximately three million people of Turkish origin live in Germany, with a slight majority of them holding German citizenship. While most identify fully with life in Germany, a significant segment has maintained a strong cultural, and informational orientation toward their country of origin, segregating themselves from the German society. This includes the consumption of Turkish state media, participation in religious and cultural networks linked to the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB) and continued political engagement with Ankara.

Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, these transnational ties have been systematically cultivated.

In a 2010 speech in Cologne, Erdoğan described the assimilation of Turks into German society as “a crime against humanity.”

A year later, in Düsseldorf, he emphasized that children of Turkish families should prioritize learning Turkish over German.

Following the failed coup attempt in 2016, tens of thousands gathered in Cologne in support of Erdogan’s Islamic AK-Party, chanting “Allahu Akbar” and demanding the death penalty for those who the Turkish President labeled terrorists.

When the German government barred pro-Erdoğan rallies ahead of a key referendum in 2017, he denounced the move as “no different from Nazi practices of the past.”

In 2018, Erdoğan personally inaugurated the new central mosque in Cologne, serving as DITIB headquarters in Germany.

The political relevance of this diaspora became particularly evident during the 2023 Turkish presidential election, in which Erdoğan secured approximately 65 percent of the votes cast by Turkish citizens in Germany – significantly above his overall margin against Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (52% vs. 48%), effectively securing his victory by these votes.

These dynamics constitute one of the central constraints facing Friedrich Merz and other European leaders when addressing refugee returns once protection status, in accordance with international law, is lifted. For most countries of origin, large-scale repatriation is not aligned with their strategic interests. On the contrary, there are strong incentives to keep substantial parts of their diaspora in Europe.

As Türkiye’s policy demonstrates, diaspora populations can be deliberately cultivated into political assets by driving a wedge between them and the majority society – a dynamic likely to extend to refugees who refuse to return, just as it did among significant segments of the second- and third-generation descendants of migrant workers.

The Dutch-born, Berlin-based migration expert Ruud Koopmans estimated in December 2025 that, over the course of the next 50 years, up to seven million people of Syrian origin could be living in Germany alone.

The long-term consequences for Israel

From an Israeli perspective, the long-term implications of such a strategic approach by external actors – combined with ongoing demographic shifts within European societies – are likely to be profound.

A look at Türkiye illustrates how diaspora policies can evolve beyond mere cultural engagement. They often reflect political frameworks that diverge significantly from European interpretations of democracy and the rule of law. These frameworks often intersect with currents of political Islam in its more confrontational forms, alongside antisemitic narratives and entrenched hostility toward the State of Israel.

In democratic systems, both domestic and foreign policies are ultimately shaped by societal trends and electoral dynamics. As demographic realities evolve, so too may the political center of gravity.

The strategic implication is clear: Israel cannot assume that its relationship with Europe will remain anchored in shared values and historical responsibility.

As antisemitism resurfaces under the cover of political Islam gaining visibility within parts of European societies, support for Israel risks becoming increasingly fragile.

If these trends continue, European policy may shift not primarily due to external pressures, but as a direct reflection of internal societal change – making Israel’s standing more contingent, more contested, and ultimately less reliable.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)