The strategic map around the Red Sea is changing faster than New Delhi can afford to ignore.

On 4 August 2026, Islamabad signed a defense cooperation agreement with Mogadishu covering counterterrorism, military training, exchanges of expertise and the development of Somalia‘s defense capabilities. Three days later, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, establishing that an armed attack against one signatory would be regarded as an attack against all three. The pact also envisages deeper defense cooperation across land, sea, air and cyber domains, including unmanned systems, electronic warfare and artificial intelligence.

Neither development, taken separately, amounts to a new military bloc controlling the Red Sea. Nor is there evidence that Pakistan has established a military base in Somalia or that the Makkah agreement is formally directed against India. Indeed, Pakistan and Türkiye have described the agreement as defensive.

But New Delhi should look beyond the labels.

The more consequential question is whether Pakistan is beginning to acquire a strategic position in the Horn of Africa at precisely the moment when the Red Sea, Gulf and western Indian Ocean are becoming interconnected theaters of competition. If that trend continues, India should reconsider one of its longest-standing diplomatic assumptions: that Somaliland can be left outside the architecture of Indian strategic planning.

The answer should be a Berbera counter-gambit — a calibrated Indian strategy centered on Somaliland’s port, maritime position and political institutions. Recognition of Somaliland should now be seriously considered not simply because of Somaliland’s own statehood claims, but because Berbera may become an increasingly important piece of India’s maritime-security architecture.

The Pakistan Proposition: From South Asia to the Horn

Pakistan is not returning to Somalia out of African ambition. It is doing what it has always done: converting military capability into diplomatic leverage. Islamabad possesses a large armed force, decades of counterterrorism experience, and a growing defense industry capable of supplying affordable platforms like the JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft — reportedly of interest to Mogadishu, potentially backed by Saudi financing. What Pakistan lacks — money, technology, and political weight — its new Mecca partners provide.

The equation is elegant in its asymmetry: Somalia provides geography, Pakistan provides military manpower and training, Türkiye provides defense technology and strategic reach, and Saudi Arabia provides financial resources and logistics for long-term deployments. Together, they form what can be termed an adaptable NATO shadow — exploiting Somalia’s governance vacuum to project power across one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors.

Pakistan’s traditional strategic environment has been South Asia. Its competition with India has centred on Kashmir, the western border, nuclear deterrence and the Indian Ocean. But Pakistan has increasingly sought relationships that extend its diplomatic and military influence beyond its immediate neighborhood. Somalia provides an attractive opportunity precisely because it sits beside one of the world’s most important maritime corridors connecting the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and Suez.

The danger is not that Pakistan suddenly establishes a giant military base opposite India. The danger is more gradual. Training agreements become defense cooperation. Defense cooperation becomes intelligence cooperation. Intelligence cooperation becomes logistics. Logistics becomes port access. Port access becomes a durable strategic presence. By the time a strategic network becomes obvious, its foundations may already be difficult to reverse.

The Turkish Archipelago: Camp TURKSOM and the Drone Littoral

No analysis of Pakistan’s Somalia gambit is complete without understanding the platform upon which it rests. Türkiye operates Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu — its largest overseas military base — hosting Bayraktar TB2 drones, intelligence personnel, and a permanent contingent that has already trained over 15,000 Somali troops. Ankara controls critical nodes including Aden Adde International Airport and the Port of Mogadishu.

Pakistan’s trainers and cyber specialists are being inserted into an architecture that Turkey built. Islamabad is not creating a new sphere of influence; it is renting space inside Ankara’s. The implications are profound: a Turkey-Pakistan-Saudi consortium at the mouth of the Red Sea, with Turkish drones providing the eyes, Pakistani officers providing the hands, and Saudi riyals providing the fuel.

Ankara has reportedly proposed establishing a humanitarian drone hub in Berbera — a move designed to extend Turkish influence even into Somaliland’s strategic space. If realized, this would compromise the only credible alternative to Turkish-dominated Mogadishu.

III. The Saudi Financier: Riyadh’s Indirect Empire

Saudi Arabia’s role is often understated because it is indirect. Riyadh does not need troops in Mogadishu; it needs outcomes. The Kingdom looks across the Red Sea with growing concern, aware that instability in the Horn threatens its energy transit routes. By financing Pakistan’s African footprint while anchoring it within the Mecca Pact, Saudi Arabia gains a security partner without deploying its own forces.

But the Saudi position is not without friction. Riyadh’s opposition to Somaliland’s recognition stems........

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)