The Wakhan Corridor mountain landscape view from the Pamir Highway near Afghanistan’s border with Tajikistan, circa July 2025. Afghanistan’s infrastructure buildup is stalled because of the Taliban’s unpredictable governance, writes Amel Metjahic. (Shutterstock/saiko3p)

Afghanistan’s Road to Nowhere, and the Central Asian Way Around It

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Central Asia’s investment in Afghanistan could reduce the region’s dependence on Russia without US recognition of the Afghan Taliban.

In early October 2026, the Afghan Taliban completed a 121-kilometer (75-mile) gravel road through the Wakhan Corridor, the narrow valley in Afghanistan’s far northeast that links the country to China. Afghan reports show that Kabul paid for it from the national budget, 365 million afghanis (about $5.5 million), with no reported Chinese investment.

Over three years, Kabul pressed Beijing to open a border crossing at the corridor’s end and bring Afghanistan into the Belt and Road Initiative. No Chinese representatives were reported at the opening, and Beijing has not announced that it will open its side. Trade through Wakhan would support Afghanistan’s economy and the Taliban administration’s standing, while China would gain a direct land route to the Afghan market and its mineral deposits.

While Taliban officials claim China aims to invest in joint infrastructure projects, Beijing has been more cautious. In January 2026, China’s state news agency Xinhua wrote that the corridor’s security situation is complex, that its elevation and climate make it impassable most of the year, and that opening a border crossing is unrealistic in the short term. Yet, China has already solved the terrain problem at the nearby Khunjerab Pass.

The obstacles lie on the Afghan side of the border. Beijing fears that militants could use an open corridor to reach Xinjiang. Chinese companies cannot reliably transfer profits from Afghanistan, and Afghan contracts have proven unreliable. Kabul’s conflict with Pakistan adds a political cost for Beijing. Until these problems are addressed, the new road will carry little trade. Meanwhile, Central Asia already offers China and other traders a working route into Afghanistan, and Washington has a stake in keeping it open.

Afghanistan’s Resources Have Nowhere to Go 

Although much of the country remains unsurveyed, Afghanistan holds significant deposits of copper, iron ore, lithium, and rare earths. Its non-fuel mineral wealth has been estimated at more than $1 trillion, and its copper resources could rank among the world’s five largest if proven accessible. Little of this wealth has been exploited. The flagship Chinese project, the Mes Aynak copper mine, was awarded in 2007 but only entered development in late 2025, and in May 2026 Afghan authorities were still pressing the contractor to begin production. 

Trade flows reflect the same problems. According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, China exported $1.544 billion of goods to Afghanistan in 2024 but imported just $42 million, down 34 percent from the year before, despite granting Afghan products duty-free access. 

Xinhua’s terrain argument doesn’t hold up. China’s........

© The National Interest