It was February 28, 2026, when the US and Israel attacked Iran despite reports that negotiations between Iran and the US were on track and an agreement was close. This war, lacking *Jus ad Bellum*, began with a strike on a girls’ school in Minab, in southern Iran, where around 168 young girls were killed. US authorities have failed to ascertain who carried out the attack. A hospital in Tehran was subsequently targeted. During the last fifteen days, more than one hundred civilian infrastructures have been targeted across Iran, resulting in more than fourteen hundred casualties. The war thus also lacks *Jus in Bello*. In retaliation, Iran has targeted US interests in the region alongside Israel.

One important aspect of this ongoing war is Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s geography affords it dominance over the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, through which twenty percent of the world’s energy resources and around twelve percent of global trade pass. While China receives around eighty percent of the oil and gas crossing the Strait of Hormuz, thirty percent of its oil and gas needs are fulfilled from the Middle East, with thirteen percent coming from Iran. Apparently, the US has entered this region without adequate preparation but certainly not without an objective, especially at the strategic level. The US National Security Strategy promulgated in November 2025 outlines one of its core foreign policy interests as preventing an adversarial power from controlling the Middle East, its oil and gas supplies, and the chokepoints through which they pass, while avoiding forever wars. Analysing this statement, US strategic and operational objectives can be clearly discerned. Preventing an adversarial power is the strategic objective, while a short conflict appears to be the operational one. As understood, the US wishes to retain influence over oil and gas reserves as well as the chokepoints in the region. Although the adversarial power has not been named, at the regional level it can clearly be Iran and, at the global level, China. The US has therefore entered the conflict with a purpose and does not seem likely to withdraw even if the war subsides.

The Strait of Hormuz is a passage linking the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman, which further opens into the Arabian Sea. It is 33km wide at its narrowest point, with a sharp bend in the middle. It operates under a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) approved by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), consisting of two lanes, each two nautical miles wide, separated by a two-nautical-mile buffer zone. In total, this makes six nautical miles, or 10.8km (as one nautical mile equals 1.8 kilometres). At some points the separation scheme enters the territorial waters of Iran in the north and Oman in the south. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) prohibits controlling, suspending, or impeding the passage of ships through a strait. Although a signatory, Iran has not ratified UNCLOS and is therefore not formally bound by all its provisions, though it generally acknowledges certain customary aspects while selectively implementing them. Controlling the Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s strategic capability, which it exercised on the first day of the war, and since then shipping across the strait has been subject to Iran’s approval. This has raised oil and gas prices worldwide, something Iran appears to have anticipated and intended. It has placed the burden of the war not only on GCC countries but also on others beyond the region.

Despite President Trump and his Secretary of War claiming that the Iranian navy has been destroyed, control of the Strait of Hormuz still rests with the IRGC. This is because the IRGC navy operates through asymmetric warfare, using small high-speed boats fitted with rocket launchers as well as remote-controlled kamikaze systems, and remains largely intact. Iran has announced that ships belonging to enemy countries, including the US and Israel, and those whose connivance in their actions is proven will not be allowed to use the Strait of Hormuz. In response, the US has called for joint action to seize control of the strait. Mr Trump has even threatened NATO with consequences if it does not support the US against Iran. The announcement of a coalition to patrol the Strait of Hormuz and protect international shipping is under consideration. Mr Trump is urging European partners and even China to join such a coalition. It is expected that many countries may refrain, as this initiative appears partly aimed at masking the legal controversy surrounding the war while also sharing the burden of the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, possibly in an attempt to reopen it.

It is important to understand that Iran has not yet blocked the strait but is effectively controlling it. It retains the option of physically blocking it, though such a move would also harm its own interests. While Iran’s Chahbahar port lies outside the complexities of the Strait of Hormuz, conducting the country’s entire trade through it is not a practical proposition. Moreover, if the strait were blocked, Chahbahar would likely lose immunity from US, Israeli, or allied action. If the US attempts to seize control by force, it could provoke a severe Iranian response in the form of naval mines or the scuttling of a vessel within the TSS, which would completely halt traffic through the strait for a significant period. The US appears aware of this risk and is exerting pressure on Iran to reopen the strait voluntarily. If Mr Trump fails to achieve this, escalation may intensify and unusual actions by any of the three belligerents could follow. The endgame remains uncertain, and the turbulent waters ahead demand prudent measures to mitigate the consequences of any adverse outcome.

Rear Admiral (retd) Faisal ShahThe writer is a freelance and can be reached via faisel68.fs@gmail.com

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