India unilaterally suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty) with Pakistan on April 23, 2025, following the tragedy in Pahalgam in India’s illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir, where 26 tourists were mercilessly killed. The incident was widely followed by accusations against Kashmiris and Pakistan, and within no time the Treaty was suspended. Pakistan maintains that the episode bore the hallmarks of yet another false flag operation, used as a pretext for a decision that had long been contemplated.

Since then, Pakistan has raised the issue at international forums, emphatically pointing out that India cannot suspend the Treaty unilaterally to pursue ulterior aims and that water cannot be used as a weapon of war. Just as the UN Security Council has, for more than 77 years, failed to secure implementation of its resolutions granting the right of self-determination to the Kashmiris struggling against Indian rule, the World Bank — which brokered the Treaty — has refrained from taking punitive action against New Delhi. India may be a large country, but size does not absolve it of international responsibility. Its record of failing to honour commitments, including those relating to Kashmir and the assurances once given by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, remains deeply troubling.

Pakistan’s stance is right, just and fully in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. International forums, including the International Court of Justice at The Hague and the World Bank, as well as all countries that profess fairness and justice, should press India to rescind its unilateral and unjustified decision forthwith, without causing harm to Pakistan in any manner.

To understand why the Treaty matters so profoundly to Pakistan, it is necessary to revisit its historical background. The Treaty was brokered by the World Bank, headquartered in Washington, which Pakistan joined in July 1950. The prolonged negotiations between India and Pakistan, facilitated by the Bank, make compelling reading, particularly in light of India’s present withdrawal from yet another international commitment. Pakistan’s delegation was headed by G. Mueenuddin, who later served as Secretary of the Ministry of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources.

The negotiations were long and arduous, involving the largest irrigation system in the world. The Indus Basin system had been planned for a single country. The Partition of the subcontinent in 1947, which created Pakistan and India as two independent states, proceeded on the assumption that the irrigation system would remain undisturbed. That assumption quickly proved false.

On April 1, 1948, India stopped irrigation supplies to Pakistan without prior notice or warning. Supplies were resumed only after a joint statement in which India declared it had no intention of stopping water again, while Pakistan agreed to explore alternative sources. Subsequent negotiations at various levels produced no meaningful result, although the intentions of the Indian leadership towards Pakistan had by then become evident.

As the lower riparian, Pakistan felt the adverse impact of any suspension or reduction in water supplies. It proposed referring the matter to the International Court of Justice or another impartial judicial body, but India did not agree.

In 1951, David E. Lilienthal, former Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, toured both countries at their invitation. After consultations with Indian and Pakistani authorities, he suggested that an engineering solution was possible and that institutions such as the World Bank could help finance the necessary works. Eugene R. Black subsequently offered the good offices of the World Bank. Both governments agreed to establish a Working Party, but it failed to reach agreement.

In 1954, the World Bank put forward a new proposal recognising that joint development was impossible under the strained relations then prevailing. It suggested that Pakistan relinquish its claims to the Eastern Rivers after completion of replacement works funded by India, and that India relinquish its claims to the Western Rivers, except for existing uses in Jammu and Kashmir.

The proposal further concluded that, without constructing storage and relying solely on the flow of the Western Rivers, Pakistan could, after replacement works were completed, meet its historic withdrawals, restore the Sutlej Valley Canals to allocation levels and satisfy the requirements of projects in progress. However, Pakistan sought an independent appraisal by an American engineer, who confirmed that the flow of the Western Rivers would not meet even the uses assured by the Bank. The World Bank was duly informed.

Initially, the expression “projects in progress” was interpreted to include completed projects not yet at full designed maturity, projects under construction and projects that had received final sanction. Subsequently, the World Bank restricted the term to projects actually under construction, excluding the other categories.

When the Bank’s proposal was made in February 1954, no detailed studies had been undertaken to determine whether surplus flows of the Western Rivers were adequate, nor had reliable cost estimates been prepared for the required works. These technical issues were debated for two years by Indian and Pakistani delegations and the Bank’s engineers, including Tippett-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton.

Their studies concluded that while summer flows might be adequate, there would be consistent shortages during the Rabi season, occasionally beginning in late September or extending into early April, of a degree, duration and frequency that the Bank group considered “tolerabe”.

Muhammad Zahid RifatThe writer is Lahore-based Freelance Journalist, Columnist and retired Deputy Controller (News), Radio Pakistan, Islamabad and can be reached at zahidriffat@gmail.com

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