Pakistan appears, at present, unusually consequential in global diplomacy. While Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir continues his engagement in Tehran, apparently calibrated to influence the parameters of next week’s second round of US–Iran talks, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is in Riyadh to pursue what may become a more durable regional understanding.

Sharif’s four-day visit also includes Qatar and Türkiye, and, taken together with FM Munir’s parallel track, suggests a deliberate civil–military division of labour. The underlying objective seems to be aligning Gulf and Turkish positions ahead of the next session, which is expected to convene on Pakistani soil.

This juncture is better understood as the product of sustained Pakistani diplomatic effort than as a fortuitous development. The first round of direct US–Iran negotiations in Islamabad on 10–11 April can be read as a modest but meaningful outcome of patient statecraft.

Over twenty-one hours, Vice President JD Vance’s delegation and the Iranian team, led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, remained in separate wings of the Serena Hotel, as Pakistani mediators Munir and Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar moved between them through the night. No overarching agreement was reached; nonetheless, both sides reportedly acknowledged incremental movement and kept the channel open.

That extended session, described as the first face-to-face engagement of its kind in decades, appears to have followed weeks of back-channel preparation, military-to-military confidence-building, and political facilitation that Islamabad was particularly well positioned to provide.

The wider setting remains unsettled. The escalation that preceded the talks followed US–Israeli strikes on Iranian targets in late February.

This episode was consistent with patterns observed in earlier Western interventions, generating immediate tactical effects and contributing to disrupted supply lines, energy market volatility, and elevated proxy risks across the Levant and the Gulf. As traditional mediators reduced their involvement, Pakistan increased its role.

Its long border with Iran, established intelligence interests, strategic ties with Saudi Arabia, operational channels with Washington, and working relationships with Türkiye and Qatar together constitute a distinctive set of assets. Factors often framed as liabilities—exposure to sectarian spillover and energy price shocks—were, in this instance, leveraged to convene.

The two-week ceasefire that began on 9 April was reportedly brokered with Pakistani involvement, and the Islamabad talks followed directly from that pause.

India and Israel occupy positions from which they may have both incentives and capacity to complicate Pakistan’s mediation

India and Israel occupy positions from which they may have both incentives and capacity to complicate Pakistan’s mediation

A notable feature of Pakistan’s approach is its emphasis on functional, low-profile execution rather than public positioning. The effort has been marked by limited rhetoric and an apparent preference for procedural essentials: a secure venue, discreet facilitation, and credibility, in part derived from Pakistan’s own experience navigating sanctions-related pressures and security challenges.

The coordination between Munir’s military channel in Tehran and Sharif’s political outreach in Riyadh has, by this account, been effective. In practical terms, the approach prioritises the relationships that demonstrably exist, keeps expectations bounded, and concentrates on de-escalation steps that serve core interests rather than highly visible “breakthroughs”.

At the same time, it is necessary to consider potential spoilers that could weaken or reverse the process. India and Israel occupy positions from which they may have both incentives and capacity to complicate Pakistan’s mediation.

New Delhi, shaped by enduring rivalry with Islamabad, is likely to view Pakistan’s increased diplomatic centrality with caution, particularly as India has strengthened strategic coordination with Israel. Israeli officials, for their part, have raised concerns about the neutrality of a mediator with whom Israel has no diplomatic relations, while continuing to press for stringent outcomes on enrichment, missiles, and proxy networks.

Neither capital necessarily benefits from an arrangement that reduces pressure on Tehran or enhances Pakistan’s standing in the Gulf or in Western policy circles. This is less a matter of covert design than of predictable strategic calculation.

Pakistan appears to have responded by broadening participation, engaging Riyadh, Doha, and Ankara in parallel, to create a broader set of stakeholders and reduce the vulnerability of interim understandings to bilateral contestation.

In that context, the second round should arguably be framed around feasible objectives rather than maximalist ambitions. Significant gaps remain on enrichment constraints, sanctions relief, security in the Strait of Hormuz, and limits on proxy activity.

A comprehensive settlement is likely premature, particularly given domestic political constraints in both Washington and Tehran. The more plausible near-term outcome, and the one Pakistan seems to be preparing to facilitate, would be a structured forty-five-day extension of the ceasefire, complemented by technical working groups.

Such mechanisms could focus on verifiable restraint in Hormuz, benchmarks for mutual de-escalation on proxy theatres, and a staged linkage between sanctions relief and enrichment caps. A contact-group arrangement incorporating Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Egypt is presented as one possible way to provide external assurances, reduce bilateral friction, and sustain momentum.

For foreign ministries, energy-market participants, multilateral lenders, and regional governments observing the process, Pakistan’s role offers a broader illustration of how mediation can emerge amid great-power distraction or fatigue.

Under such circumstances, middle states with geographic centrality, cross-cutting relationships, and pragmatic governance sometimes acquire space to act with effect. On this reading, Pakistan contributed to an initial ceasefire, hosted the first direct round, and is now working to align key regional actors towards restraint.

If the process holds, potential gains could extend beyond symbolism to more concrete outcomes, including opportunities in Gulf reconstruction, a somewhat improved climate for engagement with Western financial institutions, and a gradual reframing of Pakistan’s international role from a security-driven actor towards a credible convenor.

The risks, however, are non-trivial. Domestic audiences may contest the exposure and opportunity costs, and a breakdown in talks could leave Islamabad associated with negative spillovers.

Even so, the occurrence of these talks in Islamabad under Pakistani facilitation, alongside continued participation by both sides, constitutes a material departure from recent patterns. In this instance, Pakistan is portrayed not as a recipient of regional aftershocks but as an actor attempting to shape outcomes before they reach its own borders.

From a more austere perspective on power politics, effective mediation often depends less on visibility than on positional advantage—specifically, the ability to become difficult to bypass.

Pakistan’s vantage point, rooted in necessity and executed without extensive public display, is presented as having enabled it to function as a broker in a crisis that neither the region nor the wider economy can easily absorb.

The first round in Islamabad is framed as evidence of what sustained, largely uncelebrated diplomacy can deliver. The second round will test whether the same pragmatic approach can carry the process forward.

If it does, the benefits may be measured not primarily in prestige but in a more durable currency: incremental stability across South and West Asia, with spillover relevance for a global economy that remains sensitive to disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz.

On the account presented here, the opportunity remains available, contingent on Islamabad’s continued careful navigation.

© The Friday Times