As U.S. and Iranian delegations begin the first round of direct talks mediated by Pakistan in Islamabad, the process opens under visible strain. The two-week ceasefire is holding, but Israeli strikes in Lebanon have already tested it, tanker movement through the Strait of Hormuz remains limited, and both sides remain far apart on core demands. The fighting has paused, but the drivers of the conflict remain intact.

Pakistan did not bring both sides to the table through routine diplomacy. In the final hours before the ceasefire, it combined pressure and reassurance with precision. After Iranian-linked strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure, Islamabad conveyed that further escalation—especially against Saudi targets would narrow Pakistan’s neutrality and risk drawing it into a wider conflict.

At the same time, it avoided joining coercive diplomatic moves against Tehran and kept political space open by framing Israel as a parallel escalatory factor. That balance helped shape Iran’s decision to accept a pause without appearing to concede.

Pakistan then had to prevent the ceasefire from collapsing almost immediately. Israel’s large-scale strikes in Lebanon—over 100 targets hit within minutes and more than 300 killed reopened the dispute over whether Lebanon was covered by the ceasefire framework. Tehran treated it as part of the understanding; Washington and Israel did not. Islamabad engaged Washington directly to contain the fallout while maintaining contact with Tehran to prevent a response that could have unravelled the process.

The result was limited Israeli restraint and the opening of a parallel Lebanon track. The issue, however, remains unresolved. Israel has since resumed strikes in southern Lebanon at a lower intensity than in the immediate aftermath of the ceasefire, but sufficient to keep the risk of escalation alive.

This underlines why the ceasefire was not a low-cost outcome for Pakistan. Islamabad effectively staked its position on both sides. It warned Tehran that escalation beyond a certain point, particularly through attacks on Saudi infrastructure, would trigger consequences Pakistan could not ignore. At the same time, it pressed Washington to restrain Israel at a critical moment.

Had the ceasefire collapsed, Pakistan would have faced a widening regional conflict, pressure on its Saudi commitments, and immediate economic fallout through energy disruption. That is why Islamabad is now invested not just in hosting the talks, but in ensuring they hold.

The structure of the talks reflects the stakes. As reported, the U.S. side is led by Vice President JD Vance, supported by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, while Iran is represented by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and his deputy. Pakistan’s civil-military leadership will be in the room.

Their role is layered—Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif provides political authority, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar manages the diplomatic process, and Field Marshal Asim Munir, alongside National Security Advisor Asim Malik, remains engaged at the strategic level. This alignment enables Islamabad to engage both sides across political and security channels with consistency and without mixed signalling.

Iran’s position is built around security and survival—guarantees against future attacks, early economic relief, and preservation of deterrence, including controlled enrichment and regional influence

Iran’s position is built around security and survival—guarantees against future attacks, early economic relief, and preservation of deterrence, including controlled enrichment and regional influence

The format is cautious. Initial exchanges are expected to be indirect, with Pakistan moving between the two sides. That reflects the level of mistrust. Earlier contacts collapsed into open conflict, and neither side is prepared to move too quickly without control over sequencing. Pakistan’s first task is therefore straightforward but critical: keep both sides engaged long enough for the process to stabilise.

The immediate pressure points are already visible. Lebanon remains the most volatile. Israel’s strikes have made it a test case for whether the ceasefire can hold beyond paper commitments. Iran has signalled that continued escalation there would undermine the talks. For Tehran, Lebanon is part of the negotiating balance; for Washington, it is something to be managed separately. That gap has not been resolved.

Hormuz is the second and more urgent issue. The ceasefire was expected to restore tanker movement, yet flows remain limited and uncertainty persists. Washington has already raised concerns over restrictions, while Tehran continues to treat access as leverage. Both President Trump and Vice President Vance have warned Tehran against violating the ceasefire terms, making clear that the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz for international shipping is a central condition of the arrangement. This is the one area where movement is both urgent and measurable. If Hormuz does not stabilise, pressure will build quickly and reduce room for negotiation.

Both sides face internal and external spoilers that could still derail the process. In Iran, hardline elements—particularly within the IRGC—remain sceptical of negotiations shaped under pressure, viewing any pause as a tactical setback after decades of confrontation with the United States and Israel. The prospect of Hezbollah being drawn into a disarmament framework through parallel Israel–Lebanon talks only sharpens this resistance.

On the U.S. side, Israel’s leadership has consistently favoured sustained pressure on Iran and remains wary of any arrangement that leaves Tehran with residual capabilities. This position is reinforced by a strong pro-Israel lobby in Washington and by domestic political pressures on Trump ahead of the mid-term cycle. These factors limit flexibility on both sides and make the early phases of the talks particularly vulnerable to disruption.

Beyond these immediate issues lies the central divide. Washington is working from a 15-point framework; Tehran from a 10-point proposal. The difference reflects two opposing negotiating logics. The U.S. position is built around rollback—constraints on nuclear activity, limits on missile capabilities, and changes in regional posture —with sanctions relief tied to compliance. Iran’s position is built around security and survival—guarantees against future attacks, early economic relief, and preservation of deterrence, including controlled enrichment and regional influence.

A final agreement will not measure success in the first round. It will be measured by continuity

A final agreement will not measure success in the first round. It will be measured by continuity

The problem is sequencing. The United States wants concessions first, under pressure. Iran wants relief and security first, before concessions. Neither side can shift its position without political cost. Washington cannot appear to reward Iran after a war. Tehran cannot appear to concede after absorbing one. That is why a comprehensive agreement in the first round is not realistic.

Pakistan’s backchannel diplomacy suggests the gap may not be as wide as public positions indicate. In the run-up to the ceasefire and in coordination with key stakeholders including China, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Egypt, Islamabad has been carrying proposals and counter-proposals between the two sides.

This has not produced agreement, but it has narrowed the space of disagreement on some core issues, particularly around sequencing and interim arrangements. Both Washington and Tehran will need face-saving formulations, but the pressure is not symmetrical. Iran enters the talks under active threat of escalation, and the cost of renewed confrontation, especially if it extends to Gulf targets, is significantly higher for Tehran. That reality creates an incentive for flexibility, even if it is not visible in public positions.

The talks will therefore hinge on whether sequencing can be imposed. Stabilisation must come first—holding the ceasefire, preventing escalation in Lebanon, and ensuring that Hormuz begins to function. Only then can the harder issues—nuclear limits, sanctions relief, missiles, and regional alignments—be addressed in stages. Pakistan’s role is to keep the process anchored to that order.

Pakistan’s signalling was not directed at Iran’s political leadership alone. It was calibrated to reach security actors, driving escalation. That distinction mattered. It allowed Tehran’s political leadership to engage diplomatically while constraining the space for actions that could have collapsed the ceasefire from within. At the same time, external alignment—particularly quiet support from China for de-escalation—reinforced the pressure on Tehran to remain within the process.

Iran enters these talks under pressure but not in retreat. It has taken military and economic damage, but it is framing survival as success. That limits how far it can move publicly. At the same time, Tehran knows that if talks collapse and conflict resumes, the next phase—especially if it expands to Gulf targets—would be far more damaging.

Washington also faces constraints. Trump wants a deal, and quickly, but not one that appears weaker than past arrangements. A return to conflict would raise costs—military, economic, and political, particularly if Hormuz remains unstable. That creates an incentive to keep the process alive, even while maintaining a hard public position.

This is where Pakistan’s role becomes decisive. It is the only actor with active channels to Washington, Tehran, and key regional stakeholders, and the ability to coordinate across political and military levels. That position allowed it to help secure the ceasefire. It now has to sustain the process under pressure from all sides.

A final agreement will not measure success in the first round. It will be measured by continuity. If both sides reaffirm the ceasefire, avoid escalation in Lebanon, agree to continue negotiations under Pakistani mediation, and move even modestly on Hormuz, the talks will have achieved their purpose.

Failure will be immediate. If Lebanon escalates again, if Hormuz remains contested, or if either side pushes maximal demands too early, the talks could collapse quickly. In that scenario, the ceasefire would unravel, and the next phase of the conflict would be more intense and less contained.

Pakistan has already stopped the war at a critical moment. The task now is to ensure that the pause holds long enough for negotiation to take root. If Islamabad succeeds, it will not just have mediated a ceasefire; it will have shaped the only viable path away from a wider regional conflict.

If it fails, the consequences will be immediate. The conflict will return under worse conditions—more intense U.S. strikes, a higher probability of Iranian retaliation against Gulf targets, and a real risk of regional expansion. In that scenario, Pakistan’s room for neutrality would shrink sharply, and the costs—for the region and beyond—would be far greater than those already absorbed. For now, the war has paused in Islamabad. Whether it ends there or returns with greater force will be decided in the same rooms Pakistan brought both sides into.

© The Friday Times