Shall Israel resort to using nuclear weapons over Iran, as US forces find themselves unable to open the Strait of Hormuz? That is the paramount question – one that now overshadows all others as the war on Iran enters day 19.

The closure of the Strait has jeopardised the world economy, particularly that of Europe, along with the aura of US hegemony and the dream of Greater Israel, simultaneously. There appears to be a consensus among American defence analysts that the US does not have the power to make this happen. Its military is not as strong as it was during the Gulf War of 1991. Its NATO allies have plainly refused to be part of a war they are not responsible for starting and barely support.

But here’s the catch.

The rising cost of fuel hurts Europeans more than anyone else. They stopped buying Russian oil after the Ukraine war began – a self-inflicted injury under the pretext of saving US-installed Zelenskyy in Kyiv, who was hell-bent on bringing his country into NATO. Ironically, the alliance’s own future is shrouded in uncertainty. The US, on the other hand, benefits from higher oil prices, as these invest in hard-to-drill Venezuelan oil, viable at about $80–90 a barrel, with prices having jumped from a pre-war $57 per barrel to over $100.

As energy costs rise while the Strait remains closed, countries like India and others turn to Russia for their oil needs, which now sells at a premium price, hurting the Ukrainian cause. Higher oil prices might also push domestic users to purchase more solar electricity systems and EVs, which China is ready to provide quickly and cost-effectively.

So, apparently, all major powers are benefiting from this crisis. But oil prices are not the only reason to prolong it, or to end it quickly. There are geopolitical reasons too.

For the US, allowing Iran to hold the Strait for a longer period would mean diminishing influence in the Gulf, as the Arab monarchies suffer on both economic and security fronts, with the US having very little to offer them in return for their lifelong investments. They might begin to look elsewhere for their security and future investments. That is not a very good prospect for the US. A prolonged engagement with Iran would allow Russia to finish the job in Ukraine – perhaps in the next few weeks – while China might simultaneously mount pressure on Taiwan, with North Korea following suit against its southern neighbour.

The assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and others has not delivered the desired results – it has, in fact, backfired, in the sense that even opposing political sides within Iran now stand united

The assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and others has not delivered the desired results – it has, in fact, backfired, in the sense that even opposing political sides within Iran now stand united

With these theatres heating, the US would have too much on its plate, while its resources – ammunition, air defence systems and others – remain primarily invested in the Middle East, busy defending Israel and its own presence in the Gulf states. These are, however, common observations now. What is being sparingly discussed is the dilemma between the benefits the US draws from high oil prices and its commitment to Israel, which has dragged it into a conflict it certainly did not intend to prolong.

The fundamental question about the temptation to use nuclear weapons to end the war swiftly – as happened in 1945 in Japan – might become increasingly compelling as the situation drags on, with Iranian missiles and drones continuing to strike and hurt Israel, Dubai and other Gulf nations.

Western, mainly US, press is incessantly highlighting that Saudi, Qatari and UAE leaders have been pressuring Trump to strike Iran, along with their arch-rival Israel. Of course, all parties want the same outcome for their own respective reasons. Nevertheless, Arab leaders have been saying they never wanted aggression against Iran, yet, ironically, they could not avoid allowing their airspace, free fuel and air bases to be used for air strikes against Iran, even permitting their rooftops to mount guns targeting Iranian assets. These ambiguities are widening with each passing day.

On the other hand, the US is now demanding that Arab leaders remove their masks and come out openly against Iran with all the weapons they have procured for this purpose over the decades. They are, however, reluctant – not only because they lack the will and ability to fight. There are open debates in Arab media that if they start striking Iran, the Americans will pack up and leave them to continue the fight. They will simply turn into arms dealers, supplying weapons to the warring parties – so long as it lasts.

Israel will nevertheless suffer the pain of Iranian strikes. But that is the cost of getting the job done once and for all, as a report before the war suggested, Netanyahu persuading Trump by saying: " We are ready to bear the cost, but once you start, do not leave it half-finished. However, many things have gone against the plan since the onset of the war.

The assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and others has not delivered the desired results – it has, in fact, backfired, in the sense that even opposing political sides within Iran now stand united. There is no visible dissent. Iran’s ability to bear pain, in the absence of a modern air force and air defence systems, is beyond anybody’s calculations. Its missile technology and stockpile are quite contrary to estimates made by its rivals. Most importantly, its ability to close the Strait of Hormuz and hold it tightly has inflicted more pain than anybody had imagined.

On top of all this, the three massive aircraft carriers – America’s most feared weapons, which it used for decades to subdue nations – have left the battlefield, leaving the US with very narrow military options against the seizure of the Strait. The oil crisis might not hurt the US directly, but the economic and financial cost certainly will – and that might compel a decisive use of nuclear weapons, either by the US or Israel.

In 1945, the US alone possessed nuclear weapons. That is no longer the case. If that threshold is crossed, restraint may not be a choice for others. That is the most dangerous uncertainty of all – for those contemplating it, and for those holding their breath.

© The Friday Times