China Power | Society | Central Asia

The Murder of a Uyghur in America Spotlights the Dangers for the Diaspora

China’s transnational repression is real, and host governments themselves are now playing a role in pressuring Uyghur communities.

A women holding the flag of East Turkestan in Ankara, Turkiye, Oct. 1, 2023.

At 10:15 p.m. on July 29, Shukur Aikebaer was abducted and murdered outside his residence in Chino County, California, by two individuals, reportedly named Zhengfeng Bo and Jianquan Bo. Aikebaer’s death sent shock waves through Uyghur communities worldwide. 

Investigators have not established a motive or released details about the suspects; Zhengfeng Bo was killed by police during the kidnapping. However, the incident mirrors a similar case from Uzbekistan. In July 2024, Ablehet Qahar, an Uyghur historian, was murdered in his Tashkent apartment. The crime was quietly swept under the rug, and shortly after, Qahar’s residence was barricaded and the entirety of his Uyghur historical collections disappeared. 

Together, the two deaths underscore a reality many Uyghurs know well: that physical distance from Xinjiang – called East Turkestan by many of the region’s native Uyghur people – no longer guarantees their safety.

Over the past decade, the People’s Republic of China has dramatically expanded its efforts to stifle the voices of Uyghurs outside its borders. Reports of surveillance, harassment, threats to family, and attempted deportations have become familiar features of diaspora life. Collectively, such practices are understood as transnational repression – the effort by governments to monitor and coerce individuals living outside their territorial jurisdiction.

But focusing only on Beijing’s direct actions misses a larger shift that is unfolding globally, notably in Central Asia.

Most discussions of transnational repression emphasize the sending state’s own actions, whether these be intelligence services, diplomatic pressure, cyber surveillance, or direct intimidation. However, China’s growing political and economic influence appears to be producing a different dynamic, one in which repression is carried out also through the institutions of partner governments. It is, in effect, a form of transnational repression by proxy.

Home to one of the world’s largest Uyghur diasporas, Central Asia has long been central to preserving Uyghur language and culture. However, in recent years the atmosphere has changed. The last few decades in foreign policy have repositioned Central Asia’s importance on the international stage, with the region now reemerging as a key bridge between East Asia and the West. China’s rising economic footprint has sculpted Beijing into an increasingly influential actor in shaping both the foreign policy and the domestic priorities of Central Asian states.

Today, half of the economic corridors within China’s Belt and Road Initiative rely on Central Asian soil and support, making the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan vital arteries in China’s push for worldwide connectivity. The tight-knit relationship has brought significant economic benefits but has also created incentives for governments to accommodate Beijing’s concerns – including those involving Uyghur communities.

In Tashkent, my field interviews in 2024 revealed a sharp decline in Uyghur cultural identity over the past five years. Across all interviews conducted in Uzbekistan, community members noted a drastic decline in Uyghur language use and preservation in the past year, particularly among Uyghur youth. Many described a shift away from using Uyghur in public and semi-public environments, especially in contexts where visibility to authorities was a concern. 

Several interviewees reported perceived changes in important cultural hubs. The Tashkent Uyghur National Cultural Center, for example, has now begun sharing its space with representatives of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a Chinese state-backed organization that has been utilized to “project power and influence beyond China’s borders.” After the introduction of an SCO presence, Uyghur language classes ceased, and youth groups were no longer able to use the space as they once had. Visitors also described increased monitoring inside the building. 

The same sentiment emerged when discussing political symbolism. One community member explained: “We don’t have our motherland’s flag up. We cannot. If we hang it from the window or outside, we........

© The Diplomat