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Air Force Ascendant: Senior PLA Leadership Changes and Their Implications

15 0
11.08.2026

China Power | Security | East Asia

Air Force Ascendant: Senior PLA Leadership Changes and Their Implications 

If current trends continue, the PLAAF is likely going to have a greater-than-usual presence on the next Central Military Commission.

Chinese airmen parade during a full honors arrival ceremony at the Ministry of National Defense headquarters in Beijing, China, July 12, 2000.

Amid leadership disruption caused by the purges, the reconstruction of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) high command is underway. Recent reports by the South China Morning Post and Channel News Asia indicate that officers from the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) have recently risen to senior leadership positions, prompting renewed discussions on the significance of this development. 

At present, PLAAF officers are in charge of five Central Military Commission (CMC) departments, compared with seven headed by Army officers, making the PLAAF the second-best-represented service at the CMC level. Moreover, of the PLA’s five theater commands, PLAAF officers lead two: the Eastern and Central Theater Commands. Meanwhile, an Army lieutenant general heads the Northern Theater Command, while a Navy vice admiral leads the Southern Theater Command. The situation within the Western Theater Command is murkier. Its commander, an Army general, has been missing for many months and his PLAAF deputy appears to have taken up some of his responsibilities. 

Overall, the expanding PLAAF presence at the top of the PLA hierarchy is obvious. If current trends continue, the PLAAF is likely going to have a greater-than-usual presence on the next CMC, whose composition is expected to be confirmed at the 21st  Party Congress in 2027. This development has the potential to reshape the PLA in multiple ways, rendering an analysis of the PLAAF’s rise and its wider implications worthy. 

The PLAAF’s representation on the CMC has historically been limited. In the Xi Jinping era, only two PLAAF officers served as CMC members: PLAAF Commander Ma Xiaotian from 2012 to 2017, and Air Force General Xu Qiliang as the CMC vice chairman from 2012 to 2022. Only one PLAAF officer served as the director of a CMC department: Air Force General Xu Xueqiang, who led the Equipment Development Department from 2022 until 2026. 

However, the limited representation may have been a blessing in disguise. As officers from other services rose to prominence, many quickly became targets of the expanding purges. With few senior leaders at high posts, the PLAAF was less exposed to the turbulence. From 2013 to 2026, there were only ten documented cases of senior PLAAF officers falling victim to the purges, with the most recent cases being the aforementioned Xu Xueqiang and the PLAAF’s 14th Political Commissar Guo Puxiao. 

The survival of PLAAF officers provided Xi with a larger pool of candidates to draw upon as he seeks to rebuild the PLA’s senior leadership. Also, PLAAF officers’ ability to survive constant Discipline Inspection Commission surveillance may have strengthened Xi’s confidence in their reliability. The rise of PLAAF officers is therefore natural in a time of leadership reconstruction amid elevating global tensions, creating a situation where military talents are desperately needed.  

The rise of PLAAF officers to senior leadership posts could influence........

© The Diplomat