Tokyo Report | Security | East Asia

Japan’s Forgotten Deployment to the Middle East

Tokyo should take two-step approach to support safe passage in the Strait of Hormuz, starting by leveraging its existing force in the region.

Japan’s JS Samidare conducted a PASSEX with FS Surcouf of the French navy during counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden as part of CTF 151, May 1, 2022.

On April 24, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presented a set of policy proposals to Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae outlining measures the Japanese government should consider to address challenges posed by the disruption of energy supplies in the Middle East. In addition to looking for alternative fuel sources, the proposal also urged the government to seriously examine the feasibility of deploying Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) minesweepers to the Strait of Hormuz once a cease-fire is agreed upon.  

As the United States continues to press its allies to “do more” for the safety of the Strait of Hormuz, speculation has already begun to swirl on whether Japan should deploy MSDF vessels in the waters near the Strait of Hormuz for “intelligence-gathering” purpose.

To those who remember Japan’s response to the 1991 Gulf War, this is almost a “deja vu” moment. 

The Gulf War: Same Pressure, Different Context

In 1991, the disruption of oil supply out of the Middle East was a major concern, especially after Iraq, then under the rule of Saddam Hussein, systematically destroyed Kuwaiti oil wells by setting them on fire as its military began a retreat after the Operation Dessert Storm commenced. Japan also faced pressure – directly from then-U.S. President George H. W. Bush, according to declassified diplomatic documents – to send “forces” to participate in the multinational force’s operations to repel Iraq’s invasion attempt of Kuwait.  

At that time, Japan did send MSDF minesweepers to clear mines positioned by Iraq, but only in April 1991 – after the fighting had stopped.  

It is important to note the difference in context between 1991 and now, however. Most importantly, In the case of 1991 Gulf War, Japan was requested to send the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to support a multinational force whose operations were authorized by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 678. Operation Dessert Storm was truly a multinational force – a total of 28 countries sent combat troops and an additional 11 countries sent their military assets and/or non-combat personnel.  

This presents a stark contrast between 1991 and today’s conflict with Iran. From the international authorization (or lack therefore) to the number of countries that are participating in the military operations, the 1991 Gulf War and the situation in the Strait of Hormuz today cannot be more different.   

Still for Japan, one important factor remains constant – pressure from the U.S. administration. To be clear, Japan is not alone in facing U.S. pressure this time. In fact, most U.S. allies – in Europe as well as Indo-Pacific – have been facing mounting pressure from the Trump administration since the United States and Israel began joint military operations against Iran on February 28. 

More importantly, Japan, unlike the 1991 Gulf War, is not alone at balking at U.S. demands. In fact, there is a widespread hesitation that has been shared by U.S. allies worldwide in supporting U.S. and Israeli military operation while the combat operation is ongoing. That much is clear from a March 19 joint statement signed by 20 countries – including Japan – that expressed their collective commitment to support the safe passage in the Strait of Hormuz after the cessation of hostilities.  

Japan Already Has Forces in the Area

Still, given the importance of the Strait of Hormuz being “free and open” for global energy security, it would be wise for Japan to “show the flag” to signal that it has a concrete plan to that end. And this mark another difference from the 1991 Gulf War: today, Japan is in much better position to articulate its plan of contribution to the international effort.  

Specifically, Japan can shape a two-step approach. As the first step, it can utilize the contingent it has already deployed in the Gulf of Aden to participate in the ongoing Combined Task Force (CTF 151) counterpiracy operations. The CTF 151 is one of the five task forces established under the Combined Maritime Force, a 47-nation naval partnership established in 2001 following the 9/11 terrorist attacks to “promote security, stability and prosperity across approximately 3.2 million square miles of........

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