The Pulse | Security | South Asia

A Year After Operation Sindoor: Rising Risks and Deepening Instability

The next India-Pakistan crisis will be shaped by compressed timelines, more domestic pressure, weaker external constraints, and the perception that escalation can be controlled.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi waves to his supporters at a post-Operation Sindoor road show in Vadodara, India, May 26, 2025.

On the night of May 6-7 last year, India launched Operation Sindoor, targeting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The operation was in response to a gruesome terrorist attack at Pahalgam in the Kashmir Valley on April 22, 2025, which left 26 people, all male civilians and mostly Hindu, dead. The Indian government pointed to the “cross-border linkages of the terrorist attack” and blamed Pakistan.

Operation Sindoor began with India carrying out air and missile strikes on terrorist camps, including the headquarters of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed. Pakistan retaliated the following day, and the exchanges quickly escalated into a four-day military conflict between India and Pakistan. A ceasefire came into effect on May 10.

In the months following the military exchanges, Indian leaders and officials said that New Delhi’s approach to terrorist attacks henceforth would be “firm, decisive and unwavering.” Another terror attack would trigger a strong response from India, they warned. An assessment of recent trends indicates that the space for restraint is narrowing and escalation dynamics are changing.

Domestically, there are political incentives for the Indian and Pakistani governments to posture aggressively and project military strength against each other. In recent years, each crisis has only upped the ante and lowered the escalatory threshold.

Public expectations for a robust retaliation to what is seen to be a Pakistan-backed terrorist attack have risen significantly, narrowing the space for restraint. The role of real-time media coverage and social media amplification further intensifies public pressure, limiting maneuvering space for governments. The limited scope for backchannel diplomacy compounds this, as years of bilateral animosity have severed most official channels of communication.

The public’s view of the crisis’ outcome and the ability to control domestic narratives will guide the future actions of both governments. Perception has become increasingly important in modern warfare, shaping international opinion and often determining claims of victory and the status of a conflict. Both sides genuinely believe, or have at least successfully convinced their domestic audience, that they emerged victorious in face-offs.

Following any terrorist attack, the Indian state has set expectations for itself, increasing pressure on itself to not only act decisively but swiftly. After the Pahalgam attack, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated clearly that any terrorist attack would be met with a “befitting response on our terms… at every place from where the roots of terrorism emerge.” It clarified that India will not be constrained by any diplomatic pressure or by norms set in the past, but will go ahead to target not just attackers, but also the roots of these terror groups – their planners, sponsors, and protectors. Defense Minister Rajnath Singh further added that any attack on Indian soil will be considered an act of war.

Additionally, New Delhi no longer faces the same concerns of attribution. In the past, India would spend much time and energy on convincing the world of Pakistan’s culpability. Space for retaliation was therefore limited.

Many countries condemned the Pahalgam attack, and although they may not have officially named the aggressor, India was not under excessive pressure to showcase proof of Pakistani culpability. India’s blaming of Islamabad was not questioned by any major power, except for some of Pakistan’s very close allies and smaller countries, such as Greece, Switzerland, Spain, Slovenia, and Malaysia. This is a significant break from the past, and one that has grown stronger with each major terror attack on India. India has thus reduced Pakistan’s ability to delay, deny, or internationalize such attacks.

This now sets a precedent wherein any major pressure from international actors on India for external investigation of terror attacks or calls for restraint and a response short of kinetic action will not enjoy popular domestic support.

India’s stance suggests a change in the distinction it draws between terrorist groups based out of Pakistan and those with direct links to the Pakistani state apparatus.

India has long maintained that Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism. However, in 2008, after the terror attacks in Mumbai, since it did not want an escalating India-Pakistan conflict to divert attention from the global fight against terrorism, the Indian government chose not to retaliate militarily. Another reason was........

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