Flashpoints | Diplomacy | South Asia

China’s Emergence as a Backroom Mediator 

Reading the tea leaves in South Asia and the Middle East, Beijing is positioning itself as a peacemaker and a stabilizing force in the present geopolitical flux. 

On April 3, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared to be self-certifying her country’s role in the active conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan,  which has resulted in 800-1000 deaths, depending on the partisan sources one relies on. Mao Ning said that both “Pakistan and Afghanistan value and welcome China’s mediation efforts and are willing to sit down again for negotiations, which is a positive development.”  

Using the often characteristically ambiguous language of Chinese diplomatic communications,  she referred to China’s mediation and facilitation of talks through “close communication,” “multiple channels,”  and “various levels,” which have led to a “consensus” and “specific arrangements regarding operational modalities.” 

On April 5, Pakistan’s Information Minister Attaullah Tarar provided an update on Operation Ghazab Lil Haq, his country’s war on Afghanistan. He said, since its launch in early March, 796 Afghan Taliban operatives have been killed and more than 1043 injured. Pakistan has destroyed 249 tanks, in addition to armored vehicles and artillery guns. While the details of Tarar’s claims remain unverified, it certainly points to the intensity of the “open war” Pakistan launched in Afghanistan. 

The Afghan Taliban, militarily far weaker than Islamabad, has likewise claimed to have inflicted losses on the Pakistan military by engaging in asymmetric warfare. In addition, they have repeatedly highlighted the loss of civilian lives in Pakistani attacks, including 400 deaths in an attack on an addiction treatment hospital in Kabul on March 16.  While Pakistan denies that it attacked the hospital,  independent estimates cite more than 100 deaths in the nighttime strike on the facility, which before 2016 used to be Camp Phoenix, an American military base.

While it appears to be a herculean task to decipher the true meaning behind Beijing’s characteristically vague language of achievement, the on-the-ground situation is simpler to interpret.  Senior officials from the three countries met in Urumqi on April 2, following which cross-border firings and drone attacks by both Afghanistan and Pakistan,  and aerial assaults by Islamabad, have halted, albeit temporarily. 

Beijing claims to have delivered peace when the conflict seemed intractable, although given the prevailing animosity and the deaths involved, there is no guarantee of recurrence, given the conflict’s fragility. Many Middle Eastern countries, like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkiye, have mediated in such conflicts in the past; their preoccupation with the ongoing war in Iran may have provided the space for Beijing to play the role of the most responsible, if not sole, interventionist.

While Beijing has showcased its success in halting the conflict, a few pertinent questions do remain unanswered. Why did it, despite its enormous clout in both Islamabad and Kabul, allow the conflict to reach such proportions in the first place? Why didn’t it intervene earlier, especially when its economic projects like CPEC are at stake? Is its influence, conventionally understood in terms of the deep economic and defense linkages with Pakistan, and with Kabul, especially in the post-US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan period, not so enduring after all?

A pattern and trend analysis of Chinese mediation in other conflicts provides an answer. In Myanmar, where China does business with both the military junta and some of the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), it waited for months before applying pressure on the latter to cease armed operations against the military junta. At one point, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA)’s territorial gains in its Operation 1027 had heralded hopes of the collapse of the junta. Beijing waited long enough to make Naypyidaw come to its knees before intervening. The outcome saved the day for the junta, but made it extremely vulnerable vis-à-vis Chinese demands on economic investments. 

A similar situation has emerged in the ongoing conflict in Iran. Beijing, as a strategic partner of Tehran and a facilitator of the Iran-Saudi Arabia diplomatic breakthrough in 2023, has done little to provide direct assistance, concentrating mainly on issuing statements and condemnations of U.S. and Israeli moves. Recently, however, China has begun to present itself as a peacemaker, trying to establish a role in the mediation efforts involving Pakistan, Turkiye,  and Egypt. Pakistan has kept Beijing closely informed and may even have taken directions from Beijing as it aims to take the lead in mediating the conflict and act as a bridge between the U.S. and China. If a ceasefire is established, it will not be without Beijing’s behind-the-scenes involvement in the process.

One could argue that the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict is unique in many ways. Pakistan demands that the Afghan Taliban rein in the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), but this expectation is unlikely to be accepted by the Taliban leadership in Kandahar. By breaking a symbiotic nexus and losing the TTP as a leverage tool, the Afghan Taliban risks becoming entirely subservient to Islamabad, a scenario they wish to avoid. Therefore, Chinese mediation may not be effective in resolving the conflict in the long-term; it might only lead to a temporary ceasefire. Long-term success is contingent on Islamabad agreeing to reopen talks with the TTP, as has been suggested by the Afghan Taliban.

The outcome of these processes notwithstanding, the emergence of Beijing as a mediator with Chinese characteristics in a host of conflicts is an important development. Known for its territorial ambitions in the South China Sea, also vis-à-vis a host of countries like Taiwan, India, Bhutan, the Philippines, among others, the ongoing conflicts in South Asia and the Middle East have allowed China an opportunity for an image makeover. Beijing is also leveraging its role as a major security and trading partner through its Global Security Initiative (GSI). While China’s foreign policy regarding its historical claims over various territories may remain largely unchanged, its self-portrayal as a peacemaker and a more stabilizing force in the present geopolitical flux could gain some credence, especially when compared to the tendency of Trump’s United States to ignite conflicts in many parts of the world and with no clear strategy to resolve them.

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On April 3, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared to be self-certifying her country’s role in the active conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan,  which has resulted in 800-1000 deaths, depending on the partisan sources one relies on. Mao Ning said that both “Pakistan and Afghanistan value and welcome China’s mediation efforts and are willing to sit down again for negotiations, which is a positive development.”  

Using the often characteristically ambiguous language of Chinese diplomatic communications,  she referred to China’s mediation and facilitation of talks through “close communication,” “multiple channels,”  and “various levels,” which have led to a “consensus” and “specific arrangements regarding operational modalities.” 

On April 5, Pakistan’s Information Minister Attaullah Tarar provided an update on Operation Ghazab Lil Haq, his country’s war on Afghanistan. He said, since its launch in early March, 796 Afghan Taliban operatives have been killed and more than 1043 injured. Pakistan has destroyed 249 tanks, in addition to armored vehicles and artillery guns. While the details of Tarar’s claims remain unverified, it certainly points to the intensity of the “open war” Pakistan launched in Afghanistan. 

The Afghan Taliban, militarily far weaker than Islamabad, has likewise claimed to have inflicted losses on the Pakistan military by engaging in asymmetric warfare. In addition, they have repeatedly highlighted the loss of civilian lives in Pakistani attacks, including 400 deaths in an attack on an addiction treatment hospital in Kabul on March 16.  While Pakistan denies that it attacked the hospital,  independent estimates cite more than 100 deaths in the nighttime strike on the facility, which before 2016 used to be Camp Phoenix, an American military base.

While it appears to be a herculean task to decipher the true meaning behind Beijing’s characteristically vague language of achievement, the on-the-ground situation is simpler to interpret.  Senior officials from the three countries met in Urumqi on April 2, following which cross-border firings and drone attacks by both Afghanistan and Pakistan,  and aerial assaults by Islamabad, have halted, albeit temporarily. 

Beijing claims to have delivered peace when the conflict seemed intractable, although given the prevailing animosity and the deaths involved, there is no guarantee of recurrence, given the conflict’s fragility. Many Middle Eastern countries, like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkiye, have mediated in such conflicts in the past; their preoccupation with the ongoing war in Iran may have provided the space for Beijing to play the role of the most responsible, if not sole, interventionist.

While Beijing has showcased its success in halting the conflict, a few pertinent questions do remain unanswered. Why did it, despite its enormous clout in both Islamabad and Kabul, allow the conflict to reach such proportions in the first place? Why didn’t it intervene earlier, especially when its economic projects like CPEC are at stake? Is its influence, conventionally understood in terms of the deep economic and defense linkages with Pakistan, and with Kabul, especially in the post-US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan period, not so enduring after all?

A pattern and trend analysis of Chinese mediation in other conflicts provides an answer. In Myanmar, where China does business with both the military junta and some of the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), it waited for months before applying pressure on the latter to cease armed operations against the military junta. At one point, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA)’s territorial gains in its Operation 1027 had heralded hopes of the collapse of the junta. Beijing waited long enough to make Naypyidaw come to its knees before intervening. The outcome saved the day for the junta, but made it extremely vulnerable vis-à-vis Chinese demands on economic investments. 

A similar situation has emerged in the ongoing conflict in Iran. Beijing, as a strategic partner of Tehran and a facilitator of the Iran-Saudi Arabia diplomatic breakthrough in 2023, has done little to provide direct assistance, concentrating mainly on issuing statements and condemnations of U.S. and Israeli moves. Recently, however, China has begun to present itself as a peacemaker, trying to establish a role in the mediation efforts involving Pakistan, Turkiye,  and Egypt. Pakistan has kept Beijing closely informed and may even have taken directions from Beijing as it aims to take the lead in mediating the conflict and act as a bridge between the U.S. and China. If a ceasefire is established, it will not be without Beijing’s behind-the-scenes involvement in the process.

One could argue that the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict is unique in many ways. Pakistan demands that the Afghan Taliban rein in the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), but this expectation is unlikely to be accepted by the Taliban leadership in Kandahar. By breaking a symbiotic nexus and losing the TTP as a leverage tool, the Afghan Taliban risks becoming entirely subservient to Islamabad, a scenario they wish to avoid. Therefore, Chinese mediation may not be effective in resolving the conflict in the long-term; it might only lead to a temporary ceasefire. Long-term success is contingent on Islamabad agreeing to reopen talks with the TTP, as has been suggested by the Afghan Taliban.

The outcome of these processes notwithstanding, the emergence of Beijing as a mediator with Chinese characteristics in a host of conflicts is an important development. Known for its territorial ambitions in the South China Sea, also vis-à-vis a host of countries like Taiwan, India, Bhutan, the Philippines, among others, the ongoing conflicts in South Asia and the Middle East have allowed China an opportunity for an image makeover. Beijing is also leveraging its role as a major security and trading partner through its Global Security Initiative (GSI). While China’s foreign policy regarding its historical claims over various territories may remain largely unchanged, its self-portrayal as a peacemaker and a more stabilizing force in the present geopolitical flux could gain some credence, especially when compared to the tendency of Trump’s United States to ignite conflicts in many parts of the world and with no clear strategy to resolve them.

Shanthie Mariet D’Souza

Dr. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza is the founder & president, Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS), a senior research fellow, University of Massachusetts Amherst and visiting faculty at the Naval War College, Goa, India.

Afghanistan-Pakistan clashes

China-Pakistan relations

Pakistan mediatory role

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