Flashpoints | Security | East Asia

Forging China-US ‘Constructive Strategic Stability’ Starts in the Nuclear Realm

Real strategic stability starts with recognizing mutual vulnerability.

U.S. President Donald Trump participates in a welcome ceremony with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, May 14, 2026.

The summit meeting between the leaders of the United States and China in May 2026 introduced a “new positioning” of bilateral ties. Described as “very successful” by U.S. President Donald Trump and equally praised by his counterpart President Xi Jinping of China as a “historic and landmark,” the summit appeared to have stabilized a bilateral relationship that has grown increasingly competitive. The summit saw Trump and Xi agreeing to manage economic tensions through measures to “enhance stability and build confidence.” 

Xi announced the year 2026 might “open up a new chapter in China-U.S. relations.” Sure enough, the summit concluded by introducing a new framework to govern relations between the two superpowers: Constructive Strategic Stability. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, this concept entails pursuing stability and peace “with cooperation as the mainstay,” where differences are managed effectively and competition kept “within proper limits.”

During the Shangri-la Dialogue, when asked about how the U.S. views this framing, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth elaborated that the framework rests upon “mutual respect,” “a recognition of capabilities and power,” and communication.

Yet, despite the diplomatic significance of this framework, the concept of “constructive strategic stability” remains – perhaps intentionally – vague. While analysts have broadly interpreted it as a managed strategic competition within limits, it’s unclear how both sides can operationalize and advance such a relationship in practice. Given that the term coincides with the traditional concept of “strategic stability” in nuclear studies – commonly understood as stability in both a nuclear crisis and an arms race – the question remains as to how both Washington and Beijing can advance a strategic relationship that is stable and constructive.

One possible starting point that might initialize “constructive strategic stability” relations in the nuclear domain would be the recognition of mutual vulnerability. Working from the baseline of a mutually vulnerable relationship would establish the strategic foundation necessary to widen the aperture for subsequent dialogues on risk reduction, crisis management, and arms control. Most importantly, such a move would advance Hegseth’s listed factors of respect, recognition, and communication such that it would be politically palatable for the United States to consider. 

First, acknowledging mutual vulnerability fulfills the pillar of recognizing capabilities and power. By professing that neither party can reliably escape catastrophic retaliation in a nuclear exchange, both sides irrevocably recognize the capabilities, survivability, and destructive potential of the other’s nuclear arsenal. 

Chinese quantitative and qualitative modernization of its nuclear arsenal, along with its “shell game” strategy and road-mobile launchers, has vastly increased the survivability of its nuclear forces. As China’s nuclear arsenal becomes more sophisticated and survivable, its second strike capability has become increasingly credible; there are serious doubts surrounding U.S. capability to fully neutralize China’s nuclear threat with a first strike. 

As a result, a growing number of experts have thus argued for the United States to forgo its damage limitation strategy. Instead, Washington should recognize the strategic reality that improvements in China’s second strike capability has engendered a relationship of mutual vulnerability.

Second, the recognition of vulnerability can also serve the purpose of respect. Given that Washington has long denied recognizing a mutually vulnerable relationship, such a shift would signal to Beijing that the U.S. is now viewing China’s nuclear arsenal and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a serious and credible strategic competitor. Such a recognition is imperative, particularly given that China has long called for negotiations and dialogues........

© The Diplomat