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China’s Economic Bullying of Japan Will Backfire

24 0
25.03.2026

Tokyo Report | Diplomacy | Politics | East Asia

China’s Economic Bullying of Japan Will Backfire

Both public sentiment and political trends in Japan mean that a firm approach toward China is likely to endure.

Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae (left) shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during a meeting on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Gyeongju, South Korea, Oct. 31, 2025.

In response to hypothetical remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae about possibly recognizing a Taiwan contingency as a “survival-threatening situation” – a circumstance that would allow the Japanese government to dispatch troops into harm’s way – China has embarked on a wholesale diplomatic and economic campaign to admonish the prime minister. In doing so, China wants to make abundantly clear the consequences that Japan would face for meddling in what Beijing regards as its internal affairs, namely Taiwan.

The first salvo of the campaign was a provocative online post by the Chinese consul general in Osaka, which implied that Takaichi’s head should be “cut off” because of what he perceived to be her insensitive remarks. Then came restrictions on seafood imports from Japan. Even more concerning was the reported strengthening of export controls on rare earth materials, which Takaichi described as “economic coercion aimed at forcing other countries to submit to its claims.”

However, China’s strong-arm tactics against Japan have not borne fruit; in fact, they may have backfired. They strengthened Takaichi’s resolve to consolidate power by calling a snap election, which her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won in a landslide. The public – including many who did not vote for her, according to polling – has approved of her government’s approach toward China. Moreover, structural changes that have taken place in Japanese politics this year make it even more likely that a firm approach toward China will endure.

First, the ruling party’s coalition reshuffle has set in motion a far-reaching transformation in Japanese security policy. While the LDP’s former coalition partner, Komeito, prided itself on acting as a brake on its partner’s more activist foreign policy instincts, Nippon Ishin no Kai, which has replaced it, seeks to unleash such inclinations. The new coalition has already embarked on policy reforms agreed upon in its coalition agreement. It has submitted a joint proposal to the government to loosen restrictions on arms exports, and the government has recently established an “International Peace Mediation Unit” focused on engaging in conflict resolution efforts – both policy initiatives outlined in the agreement.

Nippon Ishin no Kai goes beyond the LDP’s consensus position on security matters in other areas as well. Regarding self-defense, the party argues that Japan should lift geographical limitations and enable the Self-Defense Forces to assist its allies when they are in dire need. It also advocates making the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty a truly equal alliance and expanding the existing framework to include Australia and the Philippines. To this end, Nippon Ishin proposes the establishment of a “Four Seas Alliance” aimed at deterring China. 

With regard to China, some of the more vocal figures calling for the expulsion of the Chinese consul general in Osaka were members of Nippon Ishin, suggesting that the party seeks to adopt a tougher China policy rather than a more conciliatory one.

While Nippon Ishin currently has no Cabinet members in the Takaichi government, it is likely to gain representation in the next Cabinet reshuffle, which would signal further integration between the two parties. This, in turn, would likely generate greater momentum within the executive branch to pursue a more robust security architecture – one that could continue for at least the next few years, if not until the next general election – providing a significant window for advancing its policy agenda.

Second, the composition of the Diet is likely to further accelerate the security reforms that the executive branch is eager to pursue. The so-called “realist” faction – parties that are open to increasing........

© The Diplomat