ASEAN Beat | Politics | Southeast Asia

The Bangsamoro’s New Government Faces a Test of Public Trust

The main challenge of the incoming administration will be to sustain the peace process with Manila while representing the interests of local residents.

The parliament of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in Cotabato City, Philippines.

Last month’s parliamentary election in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in the southern Philippines, the first ever, has settled one question but opened another.

The election results are now clear. The Bangsamoro Federalist Party (BFP) secured 31 seats across the party and district races, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) 30, and the BARMM Grand Coalition (BGC) 15, with the remaining seats going to other parties and sectoral representatives. No party has the 41 votes needed to elect the chief minister. The 80 elected members of the first regular Parliament are set to assume office on October 30, marking the formal transition from the interim government to the first elected Bangsamoro government.

Most attention has understandably been directed at the question of which parties might come together to form the “Government of the Day”. But whatever its composition, the coalition that eventually emerges will offer an early indication of what kind of political order is taking shape in the Bangsamoro.

The September 14 election marked a transitional milestone from a negotiated peace settlement to elected government. The election results bring together political forces with different origins. BFP is composed of former combatants of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), including local political figures. The UBJP is associated with the MILF, while BGC brings together established political parties and clan-based political networks.

The poll also reflects the changing place of the Moro National Liberation Front,  a Moro armed movement that signed a separate peace agreement with the Philippine government in 1996, in this political order. Its two political parties from its two major factions – the Mahardika and the Bangsamoro Party – did not secure seats as Sulu, where the MNLF has historically had a strong political presence, is no longer part of the BARMM electorate. But MNLF-linked voices have entered the new political order through other parties and individual representatives.

For the BFP, its coalition choice means defining what its break from the UBJP political camp means for the next phase of Bangsamoro politics. A BFP-UBJP alliance would bring together the two largest parties, potentially forming the “super majority”. The two share roots in the broader MILF political tradition but have since taken different political paths, particularly after President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. appointed Abdulraof Macacua,  then chief of staff of the MILF’s armed wing,  the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, as BARMM’s interim chief minister in 2025.   Macacua later joined BFP and became its chair and president.

Such a coalition would test whether political differences within the former movement can be managed within the institutions created by the peace process.  It could also allow BFP to broaden its political base through UBJP’s strong showing in the sectoral races, while bringing BFP’s relationship with Manila into a broader governing coalition.

For UBJP, a BFP coalition would likewise have significant implications. The party remains closely associated with the MILF and the peace agreement that produced the BARMM. An UBJP-BFP coalition could provide continuity with this political project within the new parliamentary system. BFP’s perceived close relationship with Malacañang could help move some of the remaining normalization commitments. At the same time, such a coalition would require UBJP to navigate the question of national government influence, which has contributed to political divisions within the MILF.

For a Bangsamoro public that has long been sensitive to Manila’s role in BARMM governance, the stakes would extend beyond securing a parliamentary majority.  The two political strands that emerged from the MILF would have to work together without blurring the distinction between cooperation with the national government in implementing the peace process and preserving political autonomy for the Bangsamoro.

The BGC faces a different choice. With 15 seats, it has the numbers needed by either BFP or UBJP to form a majority.........

© The Diplomat