Could Vietnam Help Repair U.S.-Cuba Relations?
ASEAN Beat | Economy | Southeast Asia
Could Vietnam Help Repair U.S.-Cuba Relations?
As a communist nation and a responsible member of the international community, Vietnam is a natural bridge between Washington and Havana.
In late 2025 and early this year, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio held meetings with a number of senior Vietnamese leaders. It is plausible that their discussions included whether Vietnam could help broker a new phase of engagement between the U.S. and Cuba.
Nearly a decade ago, in 2017, I wrote about the possibility of Vietnam serving as a mediator between the U.S. and North Korea. As it turned out, over the following two years, I found myself reporting for Tuổi Trẻ from both Singapore and Hanoi on the historic, albeit inconclusive, summits between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump.
Vietnam, a country that has reconciled with the U.S. after decades of hostility, has consistently found ways to constructively contribute to international relations, particularly those involving Washington. And now, Cuba may be next.
On March 13, Cuban President Miguel Díaz Canel confirmed that his government was holding talks with the Trump administration. The statement signals that the two sides may be exploring a path toward renewed relations, or even a historic economic arrangement of some kind.
In this context, Vietnam could become a credible intermediary. As a longstanding and trusted partner of Cuba, which simultaneously maintains deep and expanding ties with the U.S., Vietnam represents a potential diplomatic bridge between the two adversaries.
From Washington’s perspective, several factors help explain why Hanoi may be seen as a credible interlocutor in sensitive diplomatic contexts.
First, Vietnam offers a practical precedent of post-conflict reconciliation. The path that led to the normalization of U.S.-Vietnam relations demonstrated how two former adversaries could gradually rebuild trust through humanitarian cooperation, diplomatic engagement, and a rapidly expanding economic relationship. For American policymakers, that experience provides a tangible example that engagement with a socialist state can evolve into a stable and mutually beneficial relationship.
Second, as noted, Vietnam maintains political credibility with both sides. Hanoi has preserved close historical ties with Havana, while simultaneously expanding its strategic and economic relationship with Washington. This dual familiarity allows Vietnam to understand the political sensitivities of both governments, something few countries can credibly claim.
Third, Vietnam has demonstrated its ability to host and support delicate diplomatic encounters. The country’s role in organizing the 2019 Hanoi Summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un reinforced its reputation as a politically neutral and reliable venue for high-stakes dialogue.
Finally, Vietnam represents a model of engagement that has not required fundamental changes to its political system. Three decades after normalizing relations with Washington, Vietnam remains politically stable while pursuing economic openness and deep integration into global markets. For the U.S., this experience offers a useful reference point in discussions about how relations with countries such as Cuba might gradually evolve.
For Cuba, Vietnam’s trajectory may be equally instructive.
The fact that the U.S. has maintained and deepened its relationship with Vietnam while respecting its political system could help reassure Havana about Washington’s intentions. Economic cooperation and political differences, after all, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. At the very least, they can coexist within a pragmatic framework of engagement.
In other words, Vietnam can serve both as a source of practical experience in managing relations with the U.S. and as a real-world example of how such a relationship can function over time.
Cuba, however, would still need to navigate several structural challenges of its own. These include the political influence of the Cuban diaspora in the U.S., the natural differences between Cuba’s current state-dominated economic structure and Vietnam’s reform trajectory since the late 1980s, and the geopolitical reality of Cuba’s geographic proximity to the U.S. Against this backdrop, Vietnam could potentially provide useful support and perspective as Havana considers its options. Its experience in balancing political continuity with economic engagement may offer insights relevant to some of these challenges.
Diplomatically, Vietnam could also play a more visible role. Much as it did during the dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea, Hanoi could serve as a neutral venue for talks or even a future summit. In the past, Pyongyang had limited options for meeting with Washington outside its own territory. Today, amid heightened geopolitical tensions and conflicts in several parts of the world, Vietnam could once again emerge as a stable and credible location for high-level dialogue between the Cuban leadership and the Trump administration.
Economically, Vietnam could also help open practical pathways forward. Beyond sharing its experience of economic reform, Hanoi could explore initiatives that encourage early cooperation, such as a trilateral framework for economic engagement among Vietnam, Cuba, and the U.S.
Beyond the immediate diplomatic context, there are also broader reasons why Vietnam may see value in playing such a role. As its economic and political profile grows, Hanoi has increasingly sought to present itself as a constructive middle power, one that can contribute to global stability and dialogue.
Such an approach also aligns with Vietnam’s long-standing foreign policy principles: promoting dialogue, supporting peaceful resolution of disputes, and encouraging international cooperation.
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In late 2025 and early this year, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio held meetings with a number of senior Vietnamese leaders. It is plausible that their discussions included whether Vietnam could help broker a new phase of engagement between the U.S. and Cuba.
Nearly a decade ago, in 2017, I wrote about the possibility of Vietnam serving as a mediator between the U.S. and North Korea. As it turned out, over the following two years, I found myself reporting for Tuổi Trẻ from both Singapore and Hanoi on the historic, albeit inconclusive, summits between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump.
Vietnam, a country that has reconciled with the U.S. after decades of hostility, has consistently found ways to constructively contribute to international relations, particularly those involving Washington. And now, Cuba may be next.
On March 13, Cuban President Miguel Díaz Canel confirmed that his government was holding talks with the Trump administration. The statement signals that the two sides may be exploring a path toward renewed relations, or even a historic economic arrangement of some kind.
In this context, Vietnam could become a credible intermediary. As a longstanding and trusted partner of Cuba, which simultaneously maintains deep and expanding ties with the U.S., Vietnam represents a potential diplomatic bridge between the two adversaries.
From Washington’s perspective, several factors help explain why Hanoi may be seen as a credible interlocutor in sensitive diplomatic contexts.
First, Vietnam offers a practical precedent of post-conflict reconciliation. The path that led to the normalization of U.S.-Vietnam relations demonstrated how two former adversaries could gradually rebuild trust through humanitarian cooperation, diplomatic engagement, and a rapidly expanding economic relationship. For American policymakers, that experience provides a tangible example that engagement with a socialist state can evolve into a stable and mutually beneficial relationship.
Second, as noted, Vietnam maintains political credibility with both sides. Hanoi has preserved close historical ties with Havana, while simultaneously expanding its strategic and economic relationship with Washington. This dual familiarity allows Vietnam to understand the political sensitivities of both governments, something few countries can credibly claim.
Third, Vietnam has demonstrated its ability to host and support delicate diplomatic encounters. The country’s role in organizing the 2019 Hanoi Summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un reinforced its reputation as a politically neutral and reliable venue for high-stakes dialogue.
Finally, Vietnam represents a model of engagement that has not required fundamental changes to its political system. Three decades after normalizing relations with Washington, Vietnam remains politically stable while pursuing economic openness and deep integration into global markets. For the U.S., this experience offers a useful reference point in discussions about how relations with countries such as Cuba might gradually evolve.
For Cuba, Vietnam’s trajectory may be equally instructive.
The fact that the U.S. has maintained and deepened its relationship with Vietnam while respecting its political system could help reassure Havana about Washington’s intentions. Economic cooperation and political differences, after all, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. At the very least, they can coexist within a pragmatic framework of engagement.
In other words, Vietnam can serve both as a source of practical experience in managing relations with the U.S. and as a real-world example of how such a relationship can function over time.
Cuba, however, would still need to navigate several structural challenges of its own. These include the political influence of the Cuban diaspora in the U.S., the natural differences between Cuba’s current state-dominated economic structure and Vietnam’s reform trajectory since the late 1980s, and the geopolitical reality of Cuba’s geographic proximity to the U.S. Against this backdrop, Vietnam could potentially provide useful support and perspective as Havana considers its options. Its experience in balancing political continuity with economic engagement may offer insights relevant to some of these challenges.
Diplomatically, Vietnam could also play a more visible role. Much as it did during the dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea, Hanoi could serve as a neutral venue for talks or even a future summit. In the past, Pyongyang had limited options for meeting with Washington outside its own territory. Today, amid heightened geopolitical tensions and conflicts in several parts of the world, Vietnam could once again emerge as a stable and credible location for high-level dialogue between the Cuban leadership and the Trump administration.
Economically, Vietnam could also help open practical pathways forward. Beyond sharing its experience of economic reform, Hanoi could explore initiatives that encourage early cooperation, such as a trilateral framework for economic engagement among Vietnam, Cuba, and the U.S.
Beyond the immediate diplomatic context, there are also broader reasons why Vietnam may see value in playing such a role. As its economic and political profile grows, Hanoi has increasingly sought to present itself as a constructive middle power, one that can contribute to global stability and dialogue.
Such an approach also aligns with Vietnam’s long-standing foreign policy principles: promoting dialogue, supporting peaceful resolution of disputes, and encouraging international cooperation.
Du Nhat Dang is a communications professional and former international affairs correspondent at Tuổi Trẻ newspaper (Vietnam), where he covered global politics and Vietnam’s foreign relations. He holds a Master’s degree in Political Science from the University of Essex as a Chevening Scholars.
U.S.-Vietnam relations
Vietnam Cuba relations
Vietnam foreign policy
