Interviews | Politics | Central Asia

Aijan Sharshenova on the Japarov-Tashiev Political Divorce in Kyrgyzstan

Put one way, the Japarov-Tashiev split is a “political divorce…  involving high stakes, such as significant assets, complex business structures, or intense custody battles.”

For five years, Kyrgyzstan’s government has been led by the “two friends,” with President Sadyr Japarov and head of the State Committee for National Security Kamchybek Tashiev viewed as a tandem, a “package deal.” But in February the tandem split, with Japarov dismissing his long-tine ally Tashiev while the latter was out of the country.

In the two months since, while Tashiev has returned to Kyrgyzstan and as of publishing remains a free man, the Kyrgyz government has cracked down on Tashiev’s network of friends, family and allies on the back of corruption allegations ironically aired four years ago by the very same media that Tashiev has spent years degrading. 

To help grasp this fast-moving political drama, The Diplomat’s Catherine Putz spoke with Aijan Sharshenova, an independent political analyst, on the current state of Kyrgyz politics.

After five years, the ruling tandem of Sadyr Japarov and Kamchybek Tashiev ended abruptly when Japarov dismissed Tashiev from his post as head of the State Committee for National Security. What do you think triggered this split?

Just as many observers in Kyrgyzstan, I cannot state anything with complete certainty, but I believe this split was inevitable. Kyrgyz political life is highly volatile, complex, multidimensional, and dynamic. It has been quieter in the last four years or so, but the underneath currents have never stopped shifting. Running a country and negotiating sensitive issues between not just two people, but two rapidly growing retinues is almost an impossible task. 

I am genuinely amazed Japarov and Tashiev managed to keep their arrangement for over five years. The split was inevitable. What triggered it was probably the short window of opportunity when Tashiev left the country for a few days.

Both Japarov and Tashiev have enjoyed what appeared, from the outside, to be significant popularity since coming to office. Where do you think their popularity stands now, individually?

Unfortunately, Kyrgyzstan does not have a reliable and longitudinal polling as it would be fascinating to see what people think right now. From the outset, Japarov and Tashiev have presented themselves as a “package deal,” two-for-one kind of arrangement. 

This arrangement has had clearly allocated assigned roles; Tashiev acted as the strongman, a punisher, while Japarov acted as a fatherly, kinder figure. Political myth-making has a lot to say about it, but we probably won’t have sufficient space to dive into this here.

With the tandem split, their popularity has certainly changed in one way or another. My feeling is that public popularity follows those in power, so I guess Japarov is more popular as a winner now. 

Prior to his dismissal, Tashiev insulated himself from criticism and specifically allegations of corruption with the might of the security services. Now that he’s out, those discussions are happening once again in public – driven by state agencies. What does this say about accountability and the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan?

The rule of law has been fragile for a while. Against the background of the recent event, I would characterize the rule of law and accountability as feeble. I am afraid at this point, public expectations of political elites upholding the rule of law are rather low. 

What is curious is that those discussions are launched by the state, certainly with Japarov’s approval or endorsement. Both Japarov and Tashiev must have accumulated a significant amount of compromising information about each other. However, I did not expect Japarov would start using it so soon. I guess the split is final, and, in a way, one of them is already burning bridges. 

Although Tashiev’s allies and family have been targeted in the unfolding Kyrgyzneftgas case, Tashiev himself (and his son) have so far only been questioned as witnesses. What do you make of that?

Again, it is rather difficult to state anything with certainty, but my feeling is that Japarov and Tashiev (and their retinues) are negotiating the future. In a way, this is a high-asset political divorce – a complicated divorce involving high stakes, such as significant assets, complex business structures, or intense custody battles. 

Japarov went in hard, decapitating his former friend’s empire and eliminating his people from their positions of any significance across the country. Bringing Tashiev and his family in as witnesses is only one step away from bringing them in as suspects. Being a witness is a major red flag for a politician, if you recall what happened after former President Almazbek Atambaev was called in as a witness in 2019. 

Looking ahead: Kyrgyzstan is scheduled to hold presidential elections in January 2027. Japarov will be eligible to run for a second term. Do you think Tashiev will try to contest the election?

To be honest, I doubt it. Japarov and his team cleared the political field completely. In the past five years, Japarov has de facto neutralized all actual and potential political opponents, significantly suppressed civil society and silenced independent media with Tashiev’s hands. 

I am cautious of forecasting anything as Kyrgyz politics are notoriously unpredictable (and I personally love it exactly for this reason), but I doubt Tashiev is willing or able to confront his former friend and ally. 

Finally, in November 2025 you wrote for The Diplomat about Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary elections, which lacked energy and in which people seemed to have little interest. With that frame of reference, how has the tumult between Japarov and Tashiev been perceived by Kyrgyz exhausted by repeated political upheavals?

The Parliament has stopped playing any significant role whatsoever with the adoption of Japarov’s constitution in 2021, and this has affected the interest in the elections last year. 

Generally, the public in Kyrgyzstan is beyond fatigued – it is exhausted. While economic indicators might look good, the inflation rates and increasing fuel prices have put a certain strain on the people. If you add this to the autocratization processes of the last five years, there is low likelihood of political upheavals any time soon. In a way, Japarov has managed to build a fairly successful authoritarian political system. 

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For five years, Kyrgyzstan’s government has been led by the “two friends,” with President Sadyr Japarov and head of the State Committee for National Security Kamchybek Tashiev viewed as a tandem, a “package deal.” But in February the tandem split, with Japarov dismissing his long-tine ally Tashiev while the latter was out of the country.

In the two months since, while Tashiev has returned to Kyrgyzstan and as of publishing remains a free man, the Kyrgyz government has cracked down on Tashiev’s network of friends, family and allies on the back of corruption allegations ironically aired four years ago by the very same media that Tashiev has spent years degrading. 

To help grasp this fast-moving political drama, The Diplomat’s Catherine Putz spoke with Aijan Sharshenova, an independent political analyst, on the current state of Kyrgyz politics.

After five years, the ruling tandem of Sadyr Japarov and Kamchybek Tashiev ended abruptly when Japarov dismissed Tashiev from his post as head of the State Committee for National Security. What do you think triggered this split?

Just as many observers in Kyrgyzstan, I cannot state anything with complete certainty, but I believe this split was inevitable. Kyrgyz political life is highly volatile, complex, multidimensional, and dynamic. It has been quieter in the last four years or so, but the underneath currents have never stopped shifting. Running a country and negotiating sensitive issues between not just two people, but two rapidly growing retinues is almost an impossible task. 

I am genuinely amazed Japarov and Tashiev managed to keep their arrangement for over five years. The split was inevitable. What triggered it was probably the short window of opportunity when Tashiev left the country for a few days.

Both Japarov and Tashiev have enjoyed what appeared, from the outside, to be significant popularity since coming to office. Where do you think their popularity stands now, individually?

Unfortunately, Kyrgyzstan does not have a reliable and longitudinal polling as it would be fascinating to see what people think right now. From the outset, Japarov and Tashiev have presented themselves as a “package deal,” two-for-one kind of arrangement. 

This arrangement has had clearly allocated assigned roles; Tashiev acted as the strongman, a punisher, while Japarov acted as a fatherly, kinder figure. Political myth-making has a lot to say about it, but we probably won’t have sufficient space to dive into this here.

With the tandem split, their popularity has certainly changed in one way or another. My feeling is that public popularity follows those in power, so I guess Japarov is more popular as a winner now. 

Prior to his dismissal, Tashiev insulated himself from criticism and specifically allegations of corruption with the might of the security services. Now that he’s out, those discussions are happening once again in public – driven by state agencies. What does this say about accountability and the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan?

The rule of law has been fragile for a while. Against the background of the recent event, I would characterize the rule of law and accountability as feeble. I am afraid at this point, public expectations of political elites upholding the rule of law are rather low. 

What is curious is that those discussions are launched by the state, certainly with Japarov’s approval or endorsement. Both Japarov and Tashiev must have accumulated a significant amount of compromising information about each other. However, I did not expect Japarov would start using it so soon. I guess the split is final, and, in a way, one of them is already burning bridges. 

Although Tashiev’s allies and family have been targeted in the unfolding Kyrgyzneftgas case, Tashiev himself (and his son) have so far only been questioned as witnesses. What do you make of that?

Again, it is rather difficult to state anything with certainty, but my feeling is that Japarov and Tashiev (and their retinues) are negotiating the future. In a way, this is a high-asset political divorce – a complicated divorce involving high stakes, such as significant assets, complex business structures, or intense custody battles. 

Japarov went in hard, decapitating his former friend’s empire and eliminating his people from their positions of any significance across the country. Bringing Tashiev and his family in as witnesses is only one step away from bringing them in as suspects. Being a witness is a major red flag for a politician, if you recall what happened after former President Almazbek Atambaev was called in as a witness in 2019. 

Looking ahead: Kyrgyzstan is scheduled to hold presidential elections in January 2027. Japarov will be eligible to run for a second term. Do you think Tashiev will try to contest the election?

To be honest, I doubt it. Japarov and his team cleared the political field completely. In the past five years, Japarov has de facto neutralized all actual and potential political opponents, significantly suppressed civil society and silenced independent media with Tashiev’s hands. 

I am cautious of forecasting anything as Kyrgyz politics are notoriously unpredictable (and I personally love it exactly for this reason), but I doubt Tashiev is willing or able to confront his former friend and ally. 

Finally, in November 2025 you wrote for The Diplomat about Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary elections, which lacked energy and in which people seemed to have little interest. With that frame of reference, how has the tumult between Japarov and Tashiev been perceived by Kyrgyz exhausted by repeated political upheavals?

The Parliament has stopped playing any significant role whatsoever with the adoption of Japarov’s constitution in 2021, and this has affected the interest in the elections last year. 

Generally, the public in Kyrgyzstan is beyond fatigued – it is exhausted. While economic indicators might look good, the inflation rates and increasing fuel prices have put a certain strain on the people. If you add this to the autocratization processes of the last five years, there is low likelihood of political upheavals any time soon. In a way, Japarov has managed to build a fairly successful authoritarian political system. 

Catherine Putz is managing editor of The Diplomat.

Kyrgyzneftegaz corruption case

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