Flashpoints | Diplomacy | East Asia

Fear and Loathing in Pyongyang: What the Iran Strikes Imply for North Korea

Alarmed by the example of Iran, Pyongyang will learn its lessons – and learn them fast.

In the first 48 hours of the joint Israeli-U.S. strikes, Iran has been left without a navy, air defenses, and most of its military commanders, including the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Meanwhile, in North Korea, Kim Jong Un has remained suspiciously quiet. Despite quickly condemning U.S. military action, the regime maintained silence on Khamenei’s death, mostly observing the events from the sidelines.

For Pyongyang, which has long flexed its military muscle through test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), braggadocious military parades, and by sending troops to Russia, events in Iran have undoubtedly caused a moment of uncomfortable realization.

Following the U.S. raid on Caracas, which captured President Nicolas Maduro, and now the strikes on Tehran, a hypothetical scenario of rapid leadership and military-industrial complex elimination on the Korean Peninsula instills fear in the regime.

The mechanics and the aftermath of the Iran strikes have brought to the forefront North Korea’s own gaps in strategy of contingency and response. The regime fears targeted elimination and consequent power vacuum more than direct military engagement.

However, in a similar hypothetical scenario, North Korea appears to be a harder nut to crack. Shielded by its nuclear forces, mountainous terrain, proximity to its allies – China and Russia – and alarmed by the example of Iran, Pyongyang will learn its lessons – and learn them fast.

First, Pyongyang is a fully fledged nuclear power. It currently fields an arsenal of land-based ballistic missiles, from short-range options to ICBMs, and is preparing to deploy the second leg of the nuclear triad – its first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) – giving the regime diversified strike options.

Such deterrence architecture, combined with updated nuclear weapons use law, which since 2022 incorporates the “dead hand” and excludes “no first use” clauses, highlights Pyongyang’s bet on mutual vulnerability as a form of deterrence.

Following the strikes on Iran and its nuclear facilities, the regime in Pyongyang may double down on its nuclear component as the deterrence mechanism that prevents any possibility of operations targeted at regime change. 

With continuing decentralization of command and control, Pyongyang’s strategy of becoming a nuclear porcupine, built upon “deterrence by denial” (first strike option to impede any threats) and “deterrence by punishment” (non-military targets that the regime deems necessary), would persist, chiefly emerging as the core mechanism that restrains any action against the regime.

Second, the elimination of Khamenei in Iran has shown how prone North Korea is to a power vacuum. Tehran has claimed that it developed a doctrine for such events, putting emphasis on “decentralized mosaic defense” and a clear path to succession for key military and political figures. North Korea, on the other hand, despite being a dynasty, appears to lack a structured succession framework.

In a similar scenario, the succession of the supreme leader in Pyongyang would hinge on the availability of a clear path to reduce power vacuum, rapidly replace key figures, and maintain an acceptable level of autonomy in strategic decision-making.

While it has been rumored that Kim Jong Un appointed his 13-year-old daughter, Kim Ju Ae, as his heir, another prominent candidate – Kim Yo Jong – remains in the picture. 

Elimination of the supreme leader and other key military and political figures could increase the chances of infighting among different factions within the Workers’ Party of Korea, the Korean People’s Army, and the Security Services. To preserve the regime, there are grounds to expect that Pyongyang and Kim himself would put more emphasis on succession contingency and retaliation plans identical to those in Iran.

A final implication is the asymmetric nature of Iranian retaliatory strikes, which are targeting oil refineries, data centers, civilian infrastructure, and maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. While causing limited damage, such strikes are rather a form of political and economic warfare, aimed at causing market volatility, political turbulence, and depleting costly air defenses with cheap drones.

Pyongyang would undoubtedly learn and apply this lesson, tailoring it to the regional specifics. In addition to identical targets in South Korea and Japan, Pyongyang has the option to target chip and microelectronics manufacturers in the region. Any maritime traffic to and from South Korea and Japan could also become targets. Furthermore, the possibility of destabilization of the region via cutting chip and microelectronics supply lines gives the North Korean regime a much stronger footing in its negotiations with Washington, as well as certain leverage over trade-dependent China.

North Korea increasingly has all the means to conduct such asymmetric warfare. Moscow has supplied Pyongyang with both assembled kamikaze drones and Shahed/Geran drone technology, as well as trained North Korean workers in its drone manufacturing plants. Domestic drone developments are also being highlighted by the regime. KPA troops have received substantial anti-drone and first-person-view drone training in Russia’s Kursk, effectively adapting Russia’s drone tactics and doctrine.

North Korea has been actively learning lessons from around the world and reforming its military. With an emphasis on porcupine nuclear deterrence, establishment of succession plans, and development of its asymmetric capabilities, Pyongyang would emerge more prepared for any conflict in the region. It is, therefore, only a matter of time before the lessons learned from Iran begin to show up in its behavior.

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In the first 48 hours of the joint Israeli-U.S. strikes, Iran has been left without a navy, air defenses, and most of its military commanders, including the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Meanwhile, in North Korea, Kim Jong Un has remained suspiciously quiet. Despite quickly condemning U.S. military action, the regime maintained silence on Khamenei’s death, mostly observing the events from the sidelines.

For Pyongyang, which has long flexed its military muscle through test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), braggadocious military parades, and by sending troops to Russia, events in Iran have undoubtedly caused a moment of uncomfortable realization.

Following the U.S. raid on Caracas, which captured President Nicolas Maduro, and now the strikes on Tehran, a hypothetical scenario of rapid leadership and military-industrial complex elimination on the Korean Peninsula instills fear in the regime.

The mechanics and the aftermath of the Iran strikes have brought to the forefront North Korea’s own gaps in strategy of contingency and response. The regime fears targeted elimination and consequent power vacuum more than direct military engagement.

However, in a similar hypothetical scenario, North Korea appears to be a harder nut to crack. Shielded by its nuclear forces, mountainous terrain, proximity to its allies – China and Russia – and alarmed by the example of Iran, Pyongyang will learn its lessons – and learn them fast.

First, Pyongyang is a fully fledged nuclear power. It currently fields an arsenal of land-based ballistic missiles, from short-range options to ICBMs, and is preparing to deploy the second leg of the nuclear triad – its first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) – giving the regime diversified strike options.

Such deterrence architecture, combined with updated nuclear weapons use law, which since 2022 incorporates the “dead hand” and excludes “no first use” clauses, highlights Pyongyang’s bet on mutual vulnerability as a form of deterrence.

Following the strikes on Iran and its nuclear facilities, the regime in Pyongyang may double down on its nuclear component as the deterrence mechanism that prevents any possibility of operations targeted at regime change. 

With continuing decentralization of command and control, Pyongyang’s strategy of becoming a nuclear porcupine, built upon “deterrence by denial” (first strike option to impede any threats) and “deterrence by punishment” (non-military targets that the regime deems necessary), would persist, chiefly emerging as the core mechanism that restrains any action against the regime.

Second, the elimination of Khamenei in Iran has shown how prone North Korea is to a power vacuum. Tehran has claimed that it developed a doctrine for such events, putting emphasis on “decentralized mosaic defense” and a clear path to succession for key military and political figures. North Korea, on the other hand, despite being a dynasty, appears to lack a structured succession framework.

In a similar scenario, the succession of the supreme leader in Pyongyang would hinge on the availability of a clear path to reduce power vacuum, rapidly replace key figures, and maintain an acceptable level of autonomy in strategic decision-making.

While it has been rumored that Kim Jong Un appointed his 13-year-old daughter, Kim Ju Ae, as his heir, another prominent candidate – Kim Yo Jong – remains in the picture. 

Elimination of the supreme leader and other key military and political figures could increase the chances of infighting among different factions within the Workers’ Party of Korea, the Korean People’s Army, and the Security Services. To preserve the regime, there are grounds to expect that Pyongyang and Kim himself would put more emphasis on succession contingency and retaliation plans identical to those in Iran.

A final implication is the asymmetric nature of Iranian retaliatory strikes, which are targeting oil refineries, data centers, civilian infrastructure, and maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. While causing limited damage, such strikes are rather a form of political and economic warfare, aimed at causing market volatility, political turbulence, and depleting costly air defenses with cheap drones.

Pyongyang would undoubtedly learn and apply this lesson, tailoring it to the regional specifics. In addition to identical targets in South Korea and Japan, Pyongyang has the option to target chip and microelectronics manufacturers in the region. Any maritime traffic to and from South Korea and Japan could also become targets. Furthermore, the possibility of destabilization of the region via cutting chip and microelectronics supply lines gives the North Korean regime a much stronger footing in its negotiations with Washington, as well as certain leverage over trade-dependent China.

North Korea increasingly has all the means to conduct such asymmetric warfare. Moscow has supplied Pyongyang with both assembled kamikaze drones and Shahed/Geran drone technology, as well as trained North Korean workers in its drone manufacturing plants. Domestic drone developments are also being highlighted by the regime. KPA troops have received substantial anti-drone and first-person-view drone training in Russia’s Kursk, effectively adapting Russia’s drone tactics and doctrine.

North Korea has been actively learning lessons from around the world and reforming its military. With an emphasis on porcupine nuclear deterrence, establishment of succession plans, and development of its asymmetric capabilities, Pyongyang would emerge more prepared for any conflict in the region. It is, therefore, only a matter of time before the lessons learned from Iran begin to show up in its behavior.

Anton Ponomarenko is an international security researcher and Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research 2024 Sylff Fellow. His work focuses on China-Russia-North Korea relations and asymmetric warfare and has appeared in War on the Rocks, 38 North, The Diplomat, and Foreign Analysis Magazine. 

Israel-U.S. strikes on Iran

North Korea security strategy

U.S.-North Korea diplomacy

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