Features | Security | East Asia

US Counterterrorism Aircraft Could Be Surprisingly Useful in a Taiwan War

Some equipment central for the Global War on Terror could play important roles in a potential conflict against China.

A fully armed MQ-9 Reaper taxis down a runway in Afghanistan, Nov. 4, 2007.

After decades of fighting rogue states and non-state actors, the U.S. military is preparing for conflict with a much more powerful adversary: the People’s Republic of China. This would differ from any of the United States’ recent wars, both in scale and in kind. The U.S. military’s current capabilities would be inadequate. However, some equipment central for the Global War on Terror (GWOT) could remain surprisingly relevant in the Pacific.

Three types of aircraft would struggle to serve their traditional roles in contested airspace, but can be adapted for new ones: medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drones, subsonic ground-attack planes, and attack helicopters. These are known for striking targets from relatively short distances, and for lacking both speed and stealth. Accordingly, using them against a modern adversary would pose severe risks.

This is why they might seem useless outside of asymmetrical warfare. Despite these drawbacks, they’re fully capable of four important tasks: shooting down Shahed-style drones, sinking speedboat-style sea-drones, launching certain long-range missiles, and finding targets.

Affordable Air Defense

Aircraft often associated with the GWOT can bolster U.S. air defense, which is likely insufficient for countering China.

In an attempted invasion of Taiwan, Beijing would be strongly incentivized to use Shahed-style drones. Many U.S.-aligned military bases and warships in the region would be within range of these weapons from mainland China. While outperformed by decades-old strike missiles, they’re dramatically cheaper and easier to produce, allowing massive salvos to overwhelm air defense.

These drones have proven their merit in combat. Moscow launched over 112,000 of them at Ukraine, surpassing any bombardment that Russian cruise missile production could sustain. Fifteen months of Houthi attacks with Iranian-made Shaheds consumed more of the U.S. Navy’s interceptors than the previous 30 years. The same drones were used for Iran’s two fatal strikes on U.S. soldiers in 2026, which cost seven American lives.

Given that China already helps Russia and Iran build Shahed-style drones for their war efforts, Beijing is highly likely to replicate this if it starts a war in the Pacific. In response, the United States has already prepared a combat-tested countermeasure: a munition known as the AGR-20 FALCO (Fixed wing, Air Launched, Counter-unmanned aircraft systems Ordnance).

The FALCO converts unguided air-to-ground rockets into low-cost substitutes for air-to-air missiles. At roughly one-19th the price of a Sidewinder missile, this rocket is cheaper than the drones it intercepts. Beyond solving the economic issue of traditional missiles, the FALCO allows aircraft to carry several times more munitions. Instead of mounting directly to under-wing pylons, these rockets are stored in multi-shot pods. In turn, any aircraft carrying rocket pods can cheaply destroy dozens of Shahed-style drones without landing to reload.

Maximizing the FALCO’s effectiveness requires well-suited aircraft. Counterintuitively, relying on the United States’ most advanced fighter jets might not be ideal. These need either well-maintained runways or aircraft carriers, which will both be high priority targets for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force. Further, stealth fighters typically cannot carry the FALCO, as rocket pods don’t fit in their internal weapons bays. Lastly, even non-stealth fighters need relatively frequent maintenance and refueling, which affect readiness and operational costs.

Aircraft that played key counterterrorism roles can fill this gap. The FALCO can be mounted on MALE drones, including the MQ-9 Reaper and its potential successor, the Mojave. The same applies to planes like the OA-1K Skyraider II and A-10 Thunderbolt II, also known as the Sky Warden and Warthog, respectively. FALCO rockets are also compatible with attack helicopters, namely the AH-1Z Viper and AH-64 Apache, whose larger 19-shot rocket pods can carry a staggering 76 interceptors.

These depend less on runways or carriers, require less maintenance, and offer greater loiter time than supersonic jets, making them valuable platforms to consider for patrolling Taiwanese airspace. They fall short in survivability, but hunting Shaheds doesn’t necessarily involve flying near the frontline. Ukraine’s use of cropdusters in this role suggests that the tradeoffs can be worthwhile.

Along with the FALCO, these aircraft offer other cost-effective ways to take out Chinese drones. The United States, Israel, and the UAE have all showcased this with the Apache’s 30mm chaingun, which will become even more capable with a new dedicated anti-drone shell now entering mass production. 

Theoretically, the A-10’s 30mm cannon could be adapted for similar proximity fuzed munitions, such as the identically-sized shells fired from the SkyRanger 30 air defense system. Guns are also included on Vipers, and can be installed on the Mojave and Sky Warden. Despite their smaller caliber and standard ammunition, guns like these are another counter-drone weapon proven useful by Ukraine, where they’re used on Soviet-era helicopters.

Answering the Rise of Sea Drones

As with Shaheds, China recognizes another weapon’s influence on the Ukraine war: remotely operated kamikaze speedboats, or Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs). These have proven deadly against Russia’s Navy. Their low profile keeps them close to the waves, allowing them to catch warships off guard. They’re also cheap, so munitions shot at them must be as well. 

The most proven defense is patrolling from the air. Russian helicopters successfully eliminated many USVs, at least until Ukraine started putting missiles on its sea drones. These missions call for slow speed, sustained flight, and hitting small moving targets. Once again, the United States can leverage aircraft known for the GWOT.

The same rocket modified for the FALCO can also be configured to hit targets on the ground or at sea, instead of air-to-air strikes. Rockets in this configuration have already been tested in combat against a threat comparable to USVs; the U.S. fired them at Iranian speedboats, which are similar in size to sea drones, and sometimes even carry the same types of anti-aircraft missiles that Russia has encountered.

This munition enables all aircraft referenced earlier to destroy USVs from a distance, without compromising precision or cost efficiency. Greater range will keep American pilots safe and prevent the losses faced in Russia’s counter-USV efforts, where helicopters primarily rely on guns.

These aircraft will be even more effective if China refrains from arming its sea drones with missiles, which is entirely plausible, as USVs are meant to be simple and rapidly mass produced. In this scenario, pilots........

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