A Dilemma For Japan At The US Summit

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Alliance or Constitution?

Ahead of Japan-U.S. summit scheduled for March 19, the Japanese government faced a difficult decision whether to dispatch the Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to the Strait of Hormuz. The government was caught between legal constraints and alliance considerations.

Trump’s pressure on allied countries included Japan before he publicly shifted strategy and argued outside help was unnecessary on March 17. He wanted allies to send warships to the Gulf, and the extent to which Tokyo will help has emerged as likely focus of the summit. (RELATED: Japan, America And Strait Of Hormuz Cooperation)

The summit was originally expected to discuss mainly strategic coordination regarding China, the situation in the Taiwan Strait and strengthening supply chains. But the rapidly escalating tensions over Iran have shifted the focus of the agenda significantly to the Middle East.

International Support Idea

Following Iran ‘s attempted closure of the Strait of Hormuz, President Trump has expressed his hope that countries like Japan, South Korea, France, China and the UK would send naval vessels. Trump has since raised doubts about needing help, but perhaps the suggestion is still on the table.

Washington’s main concern is the extent to which Japan can cooperate militarily and politically. Japan is highly dependent on crude oil imports from the Middle East, the majority of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Instability in the Strait is not merely a remote security issue. It is a problem that could directly impact Japan ‘s economy and energy security, and Tokyo cannot remain indifferent.

Possible Japanese Involvement?

However, from the outset the Japanese government has been extremely cautious. The main reason is that the current situation differs from anti-piracy operations or general maritime security. It is an international fight involving the United States and Israel in conflict with Iran.

What would the nature of the mission be? If Japan’s Self-Defense Forces were actually dispatched, then the line between this and the use of force prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution would be questioned.

The government has so far maintained that the current situation in Iran does not fall under the category of a “survival-threatening situation.”

This category allows for the exercise of collective self-defense, but it does not apply in this case. Nor is it an “importance influence situation,” which would allow for Japan to provide logistical support to the U.S. military. (RELATED: Risks To Japan Following Attacks On Iran)

For these reasons, the prevailing view is that there are extremely high legal hurdles to overcome to permit the dispatch of forces to an area, namely the Strait of Hormuz, where fighting is continuing.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi explained at the Upper House Budget Committee on March 16 that the government is seeing “what can be done within the legal framework.” However, maritime security operations in the Strait of Hormuz would be difficult if the other party is a state or a similar entity. All of this means that the Japanese government is not showing any intention of taking a direct military stance, at least not at this point.

Acting within Limitations

Given these constraints, the options the Japanese government is considering are limited. One is to expand “research and study” and information gathering missions in the waters surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. This would be similar to the Middle East deployment carried out during the first Trump administration in 2019. In this case, the stated purpose would be Japanese-led information gathering, which distinguishes it from U.S.-led military operations.

Another potential option is to limit involvement to tasks such as mine sweeping coupled with ensuring the safety of Japanese-related vessels after the end of combat. Furthermore, while refraining from deploying warships, Japan could possibly provide information and evacuation support from the Japan Coast Guard.

Proposals have also emerged to strengthen cooperation in non-military areas, such as security measures and alternative energy procurement.

Questioning the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The difficulty for Tokyo lies in the fact that this is not merely a matter of legal interpretation. If they decide not to send troops or equipment, Washington may perceive it as Japan receiving significant energy benefits while being cautious about sharing the security burden, especially since the Trump administration tends to demand tangible contributions from its allies in terms of defense spending and role-sharing. If Japan responds to this request in a very limited way, it could be seen as a passive stance toward the alliance.

On the other hand, deploying the Self-Defense Forces would inevitably face domestic political backlash. If the Self-Defense Forces were to operate in an area that is effectively close to a combat zone, members of the Diet (Japan’s National Legislature) would undoubtedly be rigorously questioning its consistency with Article 9 of the Constitution.

During 2015 deliberations on the security-related laws, the Japanese government argued that laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz would be an example of a situation that could constitute a survival-threatening situation. However, the then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed caution regarding the exercise of collective self-defense in that way. The current case is in the same vein, and the government would have no choice but to carefully determine how far is permissible and where is the line that must not be crossed.

Within the current Japanese government, there is a strong sentiment to seek a compromise in response to President Trump ‘s demands —neither outright rejection nor outright acceptance. The idea is likely to show a certain level of cooperation with the United States while limiting the Self-Defense Forces’ mission as much as possible, say by avoiding direct contact with combat. This would balance the alliance with domestic legislation. (RELATED: China Tries Both Ways: A Diplomatic Balancing Act)

A Litmus Test for Japan

What Prime Minister Takaichi says at the summit meeting on March 19 will be a litmus test not only in terms of Middle East response but also in demonstrating what kind of ally Japan will be in the future under the Trump administration.

What Washington is trying to work out at this summit is not just whether or not the Self-Defense Forces could actually be dispatched. More importantly, what is Tokyo ‘s strategic judgment as an ally? How far is Japan willing to take risks, and where will it draw the line due to constitutional constraints? The issue of whether to dispatch the Self-Defense Forces to the Strait of Hormuz has been closely watched in Washington. It reflects the reality of burden-sharing of the Japan-U.S. alliance and the limits of Japan’s post-war security.

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