From motivational speakers to workplace seminars, we're often told that our beliefs shape our reality. But not all beliefs are created equal. Some of them—like believing that your car is parked outside or that water boils at 100 degrees Celsius—are straightforward and can easily be proven right or wrong. Others—like "There's a deeper meaning to life" or "Everyone deserves a second chance"—aren't so simple. These kinds of beliefs don’t work the same way because they aren’t falsifiable. We can't gather evidence to definitively prove or disprove them. And this distinction raises an interesting question: Are these unfalsifiable beliefs inherently bullsh*t?

Pinsof (2024)1 recently argued that there are two types of beliefs: regular beliefs, which are involuntary and easily tested against reality, and credences, which are voluntary and more abstract. According to Pinsof, credences are what tend to fill our heads with bullsh*t. To clarify, Frankfurt (2024) defines bullsh*t as statements made without regard for their truth value. Unlike lying, where the speaker knows the truth and intentionally misrepresents it, bullsh*tting involves a disregard for whether something is true or false—the focus is on the effect of the statement rather than its accuracy. But before we dismiss credences entirely, it’s worth considering whether they are really bullsh*t by definition, or if there’s something else going on here.

In this post, I want to explore the difference between the falsifiability of beliefs and whether credences inherently qualify as bullsh*t. We'll look at how credences function, why they can still be useful, and why the distinction matters for understanding our biases, decisions, and the way we navigate the world.

In a previous blog post, I discussed how fundamental beliefs act as lenses through which we view the world, ultimately influencing how we process information and interact with the world around us. And many of these fundamental beliefs would be defined as credences. For example, if someone holds a fundamental belief that “people are inherently good,” this belief serves as a default lens through which others are viewed. The default assumption might be that people are good unless proven otherwise. If this belief is strongly held, the person is likely to be biased toward inferences and behavior that are consistent with it, even when it is inconvenient or comes at a personal cost. In such cases, this would be considered a true belief—even though it is not falsifiable—and would not be considered bullsh*t.

If, on the other hand, the person claims to espouse said belief but only acts on it when convenient or fails to uphold it when it requires sacrifice, then the belief itself is likely bullshit. Acting inconsistently with one's stated beliefs is not uncommon, especially when different contexts activate competing values or present new challenges. When such inconsistencies become a pattern—when the belief is only upheld when convenient—it reveals a lack of genuine commitment, which moves the belief into the territory of bullsh*t.

The key here is that for a credence to qualify as a true belief, it must be sincerely held and consistently shape one's actions and interactions with the world. A credence that influences behavior and decision-making in meaningful ways, even when inconvenient, is fundamentally different from a statement made without concern for its truth. If a credence is merely asserted without a genuine commitment to its implications or without consistently guiding behavior, then it lacks the authenticity required to be considered a true belief.

This distinction suggests that some credences might not be bullsh*t, while others are. The sincerity and strength with which a belief is held determine whether it is a guiding principle or simply an empty statement. For instance, believing that "everyone deserves a second chance" might shape how someone treats others, influence their willingness to forgive, and guide their decisions in social contexts. If the belief genuinely drives these actions, then it is more than just a convenient claim—it is a meaningful credence that reflects a person's values and worldview.

However, if the belief is not consistently reflected in one's actions—if, for example, someone claims to believe in second chances but refuses to give others the benefit of the doubt when it matters—then the belief is likely bullsh*t. In this case, the belief is used instrumentally, perhaps to present oneself in a certain way, rather than as a genuine guiding principle. This lack of consistency between belief and action is what differentiates a true belief from bullsh*t.

Whether credences qualify as bullsh*t depends on the sincerity and consistency with which they are held. Credences that genuinely influence our actions and interactions with the world are true beliefs, even if they are not falsifiable. However, credences that are adopted without a genuine commitment to their truth—those that are not consistently reflected in behavior—fit Frankfurt's definition of bullsh*t. The challenge, then, is to discern whether our beliefs are sincerely held and guide our actions or whether they are merely convenient statements without true substance.

Reflecting on Pinsof's argument, the challenge with credences lies in determining whether they genuinely guide our behavior or whether they merely fill our heads with convenient, unfalsifiable ideas. We should be reflective about the credences we claim to possess—how strongly do we hold them, and are they truly consistent drivers of our behavior? If not, maybe we need to rethink them.

Moreover, even if we genuinely believe in a credence, we should be cautious about treating it as if it has the same empirical validity as a regular, falsifiable belief. Doing so can lead us to act on assumptions that lack grounding in evidence, which can ultimately result in misguided actions and unrealistic expectations. In practical terms, this means recognizing when our credences are simply guiding principles rather than empirically supported truths. By acknowledging this distinction, we can avoid overcommitting to beliefs that are not based on evidence, allowing us to make decisions that are more grounded and realistic.

References

1. David Pinsof. Bullsh*t is a choice. Everything Is Bullsh*t blog. October 15, 2024. Much of the grounds for his piece was the work of philosopher Neil Van Leeuwen, who was the one who differentiated between regular beliefs and credences.

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