Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been working on a simple strategic bargain, where the United States provides the military backbone, and Europe gives the political strength and supplementary capabilities. Today, that bargain is being rewritten. Though the alliance’s reorientation is logical and necessary, the unofficial banner of NATO 3.0 isn’t merely another phase of NATO’s evolution; it represents the most consequential shift in transatlantic security. 

The debate is no longer whether Europe should spend more on defence or not; that argument has already been settled. The real question is whether Europe is in a position to assume a greater responsibility for its own defence, without losing its deterrence against Russia. 

European Defence Capabilities And Division:

One of the biggest circumstantial achievements is that NATO members are spending more on defence. On 25th June, when Mark Rutte met Trump, he showed him charts showing over one trillion USD in cumulative extra core defence expenditure by European Allies and Canada since 2016. Rutte suggested that this increase was largely driven by Trump’s repeated pressure on the European allies. However, we see that several countries had already begun spending much more on defence before NATO adopted the new 5% GDP budget. For instance, Poland and the Baltic states were already spending 4% of their GDP, not under Trump’s pressure, but due to the Russian threat. 

One of the important divisions among European states concerns perceptions of the Russian threat, which hinders equal defence contributions. Northern Europe – due to its closeness to Russian territory – perceives Russia as a major security threat, whereas southern European countries see it as a less direct threat. Historically, Southern European nations have viewed Russia as a reliable trade partner and supplier of........

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