A ceasefire can silence guns, but it cannot silence fear. In the present crisis surrounding Iran, the world may mistake a pause in hostilities for the arrival of stability. Yet beneath the surface lies a strategic reality far more troubling: for Iran, mere cessation of fighting is insufficient unless accompanied by credible guarantees against future attacks. And for its adversaries particularly in the Gulf, allowing Iran to emerge with dignity and residual strength appears equally unacceptable. This contradiction is what makes the current situation dangerously fragile.

Iran’s leadership understands a hard truth. The resilience it demonstrated in this round of confrontation may not be repeatable six months or a year from now. Sanctions, attrition, internal pressures, and the depletion of resources all erode its ability to sustain prolonged resistance. Therefore, from Tehran’s perspective, agreeing to a ceasefire without structural assurances is tantamount to postponing defeat. It would mean waiting for the next blow while growing weaker by the day.

On the other side, the Arab Gulf states calculate the situation differently. For them, an Iran allowed to exit the crisis with face-saving space remains a long-term threat. Even if Iran cannot strike Israel directly, it retains the capacity to pressure Gulf economies in asymmetric ways. The single most powerful lever at its disposal is geography: control over the Strait of Hormuz.

Roughly a fifth of the world’s oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s demonstrated ability to threaten this chokepoint has reminded the world that energy security can be weaponized. Gulf capitals now fear that Tehran, emboldened by survival, could repeatedly invoke this leverage in future disputes, large or small. Even sporadic disruptions would inflict severe, perhaps irreparable, damage on their economies and investor confidence.

This is why many in the Gulf quietly expect the United States not merely to de-escalate the conflict but to degrade Iran’s strategic capacity to such an extent that it can no longer hold Hormuzor the region hostage. The objective, from this perspective, is not deterrence but disablement. Iran must be forced into a regional arrangement where control of Hormuz is effectively shared or internationally supervised, removing Tehran’s unilateral leverage.

The United States views Iran through two additional lenses: its long-range missile capability that threatens Israel, and the potential coupling of that capability with nuclear advancement. Limiting Iran’s missile range and permanently constraining its nuclear pathway are long-standing American objectives. A crisis provides an opportunity to impose conditions that negotiations alone could not achieve. From Iran’s vantage point, however, accepting such an arrangement would be existential humiliation. A state that sees itself as the guardian of revolutionary sovereignty cannot willingly accept a future in which it lives under perpetual strategic vulnerability like a frightened mouse surviving at the mercy of others. Such a posture is incompatible with the ideological identity of its leadership and the narrative that sustains domestic legitimacy.

This is the heart of the dilemma: the outcome acceptable to Iran is unacceptable to its adversaries, and the outcome desired by its adversaries is unacceptable to Iran.That is why any ceasefire in the present environment feels temporary. The structural drivers of conflict remain unresolved. History shows that wars resume not because leaders desire destruction, but because they see no safe alternative. The current course suggests that a broader conflict is not only possible but increasingly probable.

Should this war expand, Arab states may not remain bystanders.

Their economic survival, regime stability, and strategic alignment with Washington make neutrality difficult. If the conflict widens, the involvement of Gulf states, directly or indirectly becomes likely. And once multiple state actors are engaged, escalation dynamics become unpredictable. Weapons of far greater destructive capacity, once considered unthinkable, move closer to the realm of possibility. For Pakistan, this scenario carries uncomfortable implications. With deep economic ties to Gulf countries and a fragile domestic economy, Pakistan may find itself under pressure to politically, diplomatically, or even logistically support its Arab partners. Refusal may not be a realistic option if economic lifelines are at stake. Pakistan’s leadership would face a painful balancing act between regional neutrality, ideological considerations, and economic survival.

A prolonged war in the Gulf would also trigger global economic shockwaves, energy price spikes, supply chain disruptions, and financial volatility. For an already struggling economy like Pakistan’s, such shocks could be devastating. In such a context, foreign policy choices may be driven less by principle and more by necessity. If the conflict continues until Iran is strategically broken, as some Gulf strategists hope, the aftermath would not simply be a regional reset. It could mark the beginning of a new phase in the international order. The balance of power in the Middle East would be redrawn. External powers would consolidate new security arrangements. Maritime chokepoints, energy routes, and regional alliances would be restructured under a new logic of control and deterrence.

In the reordering ahead, countries like Pakistan may find strategic openings but only after severe turbulence. What looks like a ceasefire is merely an intermission.

The real contest is over who shapes the Gulf’s security order and controls global energy routes. Until that is settled, peace will remain out of reach. A ceasefire pauses war; it does not end it.

—The writer is PhD in Political Science, and visiting faculty at QAU Islamabad.

© Pakistan Observer