IN recent days, Pakistan’s provinces of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan have witnessed a fresh wave of terrorist attacks.

The attacks, attributed to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), commonly known as Fitna al-Khawarij and Fitna al-Hindustan. These terrorist attacks have once again underscored the fragile security environment along Pakistan’s western frontier. Among many casualties, Lieutenant Colonel Shahzada, embraced martyrdom in the line of duty. In response, Pakistan conducted retaliatory air strikes against seven terrorist hideouts in Afghanistan, reportedly killing a significant number of terrorists. The Afghan Taliban regime responded with heightened tensions along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border, while militant activity inside Pakistan also intensified, all sponsored from across the border. In fact, terrorists always react whenever Pakistan “go after their hideouts in Afghanistan.”

On February 25, 2026, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), announced that 34 terrorists had been killed in a series of “high-tempo, intelligence-driven operations” across KP and Balochistan. According to the ISPR statement, the operations targeted Indian-sponsored proxies. It further claimed that militants attempting to infiltrate Pakistan from Afghanistan were identified as Afghan nationals. The TTP’s recent threats appear aimed at generating widespread fear, expanding the theatre of militancy beyond border regions and military targets to population centers. These warnings followed Pakistani strikes on TTP hideouts across the border, strikes that reportedly inflicted significant losses of the terrorist outfits.

Three possible motivations can be discerned; first, Pakistani operations may have disrupted militant infrastructure, creating frustration within Regime and TTP ranks. Second, by issuing high-profile threats, the group and its alleged backers may seek to sow panic and destabilize public confidence. Third, as Pakistan’s counterterrorism campaign intensifies, such threats could be intended to create leverage for indirect engagement or negotiations under pressure. Simultaneously, an uptick in BLA activity in Balochistan suggests a coordinated strategy. Security analysts in Pakistan argue that the planners and sponsors behind these groups share common objectives: to stretch Pakistan’s security apparatus and undermine economic and strategic stability. Indeed, Pakistan always welcome Taliban Regime to give-up its support to terrorists and negotiate with Islamabad. Political and diplomatic collaborations between India and Afghan Taliban Regime are already underway since January, 2025, once India’s Foreign Secretary met the Afghan Taliban’s Acting Foreign Minister in Duba and later Afghan FM visited New Delhi. Pakistani observers view the timing of this engagement amid rising cross-border militancy as noteworthy. They argue that militant violence on the ground is accompanied by diplomatic and political signaling, suggesting alignment between Kabul and New Delhi that carries implications for Islamabad. This alignment is often interpreted through the classical maxim associated with Kautilya: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” For decades, Pakistan has expressed concern over Afghan governments cultivating close ties with India. The current perception of an Indo–Taliban nexus is seen in Islamabad as a continuation of that historical pattern.

The ideological contrast between India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), often associated with Hindu nationalist politics and the Taliban’s rigid Islamist framework makes their engagement geopolitically striking. Despite sharp ideological differences, strategic interests appear to be driving pragmatic cooperation. It is worth recalling that during negotiations between the United States and the Afghan Taliban in 2020, Pakistan played a facilitative role at the request of US President Donald Trump. However, after the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in 2021, relations between Islamabad and the Afghan Regime cooled. Since 2022, there have been multiple high-level contacts between Indian officials and Taliban representatives, reflecting a gradual normalization of ties. A December 12, 2023 reports by the Wilson Centre, authored by Mirwais Balkhi and titled “BJP–Taliban Ties and Their Implications,” highlighted frequent exchanges between New Delhi and Kabul. According to the report, senior Taliban figures including Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani’s brother Anas Haqqani and Defence Minister Mullah Yaqub publicly invited India to resume full diplomatic operations in Kabul. Subsequently, India reactivated its diplomatic presence and expanded economic engagement. In October 2022, agreements were signed to enhance trade via air corridors and through Iran’s Chabahar Port, a facility developed with Indian assistance. The January 8, 2025 meeting in Dubai further emphasized strengthening trade, people-to-people contacts and developmental cooperation. Taliban officials reportedly sought expanded Indian involvement in infrastructure and security-sector training.

From Pakistan’s perspective, these developments carry serious security implications. Islamabad alleges that Indian spying network the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), has historically supported anti-Pakistan militant networks. Pakistani officials argue that the Taliban’s control of Afghan territory provides space that could be exploited by such actors. The crux of Pakistan’s concern is that militant groups such as the TTP and BLA operate with Indian and Israeli financing, training and sanctuary, thereby sustaining a persistent insurgent threat. Whether these allegations can be substantiated at international forums remains a diplomatic challenge for Islamabad.

What is clear is that the convergence of militant violence and shifting regional alignments has heightened tensions along both Pakistan’s eastern and western borders. For Pakistan, the policy response may require a dual approach: sustained counterterrorism operations at home and proactive diplomatic engagement abroad to present evidence and build international consensus. Regional stability in South and Central Asia hinges on preventing proxy conflicts from deepening fault lines. As geopolitical rivalries evolve, the test for all regional actors will be whether strategic competition can be managed without fueling militancy that imperils the broader quest for peace and development.

— The writer is Professor of Politics and IR at International Islamic University, Islamabad.

© Pakistan Observer