Despite several rounds of direct talks, Russia and Ukraine remain far apart when it comes to agreeing the terms of a ceasefire. The prospects of a permanent peace settlement are dimmer still. One of the biggest stumbling blocks is the question of land – namely, how much of Ukraine’s prewar territory should Russia be allowed to occupy?

In the past, Kyiv and its strongest Western backers held that Russian forces must be expelled from every inch of Ukraine before peace could be contemplated. Even those who privately judged a military victory over Russia to be highly unlikely were forced to maintain in public that Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity were inviolable. This view was rooted in a deep respect for international law but was also rhetorically popular in Ukraine and among most Western publics.

The Inevitability of Territorial Losses

Today, though, the conversation about territory has shifted in line with some unforgiving battlefield realities. Ukraine has had four years to eject Russia from its eastern oblasts but has failed to do so. As a result, there is now a realization that peace will have to precede a restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity rather than the other way around. Even worse, it is increasingly accepted that Ukraine might never regain its lost territories – that Russia’s occupation of Crimea, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk might become permanent.

Such pessimism is entirely justified. There is precious little chance that Ukraine will overturn Russia’s conquests through fighting. Nor is there any indication that Moscow will give up via negotiation what Kyiv cannot wrestle away through force of arms. The only question is whether Ukraine can be bullied into ceding even more territory to Russia – especially, those parts of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk that Moscow claims to have annexed but has not managed to conquer militarily.

There is no way to know exactly how the forthcoming negotiations over territory will shake out. But there is an obvious need for Kyiv and its friends abroad to develop a common approach to the inevitable loss of territory to Russia. If they act with foresight, it might even be possible to lay down markers for the eventual reunification of Ukraine at some point in the future.

A Plan for the Future

First – and most obviously – Kyiv should withhold legal (de jure) recognition of Russia’s conquests even if its negotiating team is forced to accept the effective (de facto) loss of territory. To be sure, this position might be impossible to hold onto – that is, Moscow might insist that any treaty to end the war includes a clause giving legal effect to territorial changes. In this case, it will fall to Kyiv’s friends and backers to refuse recognition and to be custodians of the legal opinion that Ukraine remains intact albeit under unlawful Russian occupation.

For the avoidance of doubt, preserving the legal view that Russia’s occupation of Ukraine is illegitimate will be of more than just symbolic importance. It will be central to any long-term project for reunifying the country. If there is ever to be a reunification between the remainder of Ukraine and its lost territories, it is simply essential that there remains a legal basis for the union. The legal theory that Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders are the country’s de jure borders must never be extinguished.

Even as it strives to withhold legal recognition of Russia’s landgrabs, however, Ukraine must renounce the use of force as a means of undoing those conquests. On the contrary, Kyiv must profess a commitment to resolving its territorial grievances with Russia via peaceful means only. This will be hard for many Ukrainians to swallow given the gross injustice of the Russian occupation. But renouncing the use of force will be essential if Russia is to be denied a pretext to restart the war after a peace treaty has been concluded.

To this end, Ukraine should consider submitting itself to an international monitoring regime designed to guarantee peaceable behavior. Russia, of course, will not reciprocate by subjecting itself to international monitoring. Nor will Moscow agree to peacekeepers along the new border between Russia and Ukraine. But even so, Kyiv can take unilateral steps to reassure the international community that it has no intention of forcibly reclaiming its lost territories – that Ukraine is a wronged but peaceful nation, committed to the rule of international law and the nonviolent resolution of disputes.

Instead, the campaign to overturn the Russian occupation must rely upon non-military tools. Allied capitals and friendly non-governmental organizations can and should take the lead in this fight. They can use legal processes (“lawfare”) to shine a spotlight on Russia’s unlawful actions inside the eastern oblasts, sanction individuals and organizations that participate in the occupation, and bear witness to the human rights abuses meted out by occupying forces.

There is an obvious limit to what human rights campaigns can achieve against a state such as Russia. But there are also grounds for studied optimism. The Helsinki Accords, for example, are widely credited with helping to discredit the Soviet Union and encouraging dissidents to challenge the communist system. Absent a vigorous transnational movement in favor of democracy and human rights, it is doubtful that the Soviet collapse would have happened as it did.

Finally, Ukraine should establish a permanent bureaucracy – even if it must be a small and discreet one – charged with planning for the eventual reabsorption of the lost territories. The point of this office would be to remind Ukrainian citizens that their government has not abandoned all hope of national unity, and that ideas exist for the peaceful reintegration of the country when conditions are favorable.

In the end, none of this may be enough. Over time, Russia might succeed in emptying the occupied territories of ethnic Ukrainians and anyone else suspected of sympathizing with Kyiv. It is even possible that Ukrainians in the western part of the country will one day lose enthusiasm for national reunification if the eastern oblasts are “Russified” to an extreme extent. Sadly, monstrous outcomes are quite common in international relations – and there is not much evidence that bad deeds tend to get undone.

But even so, there is probably no alternative to what has been outlined here. Ukraine cannot reclaim its lost territories via military reconquest. Nor can it reclaim them through negotiations. The coming peace with Russia will be agonizing, whatever precise form it takes. When it comes to the occupation, all Ukraine can do is accept territorial losses for the time being while developing an adroit plan – in concert with friends and allies in other countries – for the long-term reunification of Ukraine if circumstances ever allow.

Peter Harris’ recent article, “The agony of peace: Russia’s Occupation of Eastern Ukraine,” is published in International Journal, and available in full here.

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